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My chief purpose In this dissertation is to explain Fransclsco 
Romero's theory of man. In doing so I shall raise some c r it ic a l 
questions concerning a number of problems in his theory. I shall also 
show the points at which I  disagree with others who have written on 
Romero's philosophy of man.
In fu l f i l l in g  my purpose three ancillary matters must be 
treated to make the work come a live . These are: (a) the philosophical
ambience of Argentina immediately prior to and during the l i f e  of 
Romero, (b) the philosophical influences assimilated by Romero, and 
(c) consideration of the man himself—biographical material. All these, 
however, are merely supportive of the task, which is to present Romero's 
philosophy of man.
In this b rie f Preface I wish to give my reasons for selecting 
Francisco Romero's doctrine of man as a topic. In addition, I must 
ju s tify  the inclusion of the partia l history of Argentine philosophy 
and the biographical material on Romero himself. Furthermore, I shall 
outline here the chapters ahead. F ina lly , for purely personal reasons,
I wish to acknowledge the part others have had in the completion of 
this work.
During my research and writing on Romero, I have been asked 
repeatedly, "Why does one select a Latin American fo r a dissertation  
topic in philosophy?" The reason is clear: there are many fine
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philosophers in both Spanish and Portuguese America. Besides Romero, 
the following are representative: Raimundo de Farias Brito and Tobfas
Barreto of B razil; Antonio Caso and Jose Vasconcelos of Mexico;
Alejandro Deustua of Peru; Carlos Vaz Ferreira and José Enrique Rodo of 
Uruguay; José Ingenieros and Alejandro Korn of Argentina; Enrique 
Molina of Chile; and Enrique José Varona of Cuba. One could ju s tify  a 
doctoral dissertation on any of these.
As for my reasons for selecting Romero and his philosophy of 
man, le t  me point out that at the time of his death in 1962 Francisco 
Romero was probably the leading philosopher of South America. Through 
his writings and lectures he had earned the t i t l e  of dean of Latin 
American Philosophers. Because of his in te llectual stature I hope that 
my work w ill result in his being better known to the English-speaking 
world. This is , however, quite incidental to my basic intention.
Man's unique place in the universe excited Romero's persistent 
curiosity. What are we to make of man, who is not merely in the world 
but who has the world? Man is the being who gives the world objective 
id e n tity , meaning, and value. He inhabits the world that actually is , 
but also possesses great in terest in the world that should be but is not.
I have concentrated on man and his culture. Romero's 
philosophy of man is a cultural philosophical anthropology and, as such, 
concerns i ts e lf  with the production and meaning of culture as well as 
the reciprocal influence between man and culture.
I have incorporated into this study an account of Romero's 
work in comparative culture and his analysis of the c ris is  of the West.
As that portion unfolds, i t  w ill be evident to the reader that Romero's
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treatment of these topics is strongly influenced by and connected with 
his philosophy of man.
The material on positivism in Argentina and Romero's 
biography support my purpose of delineating, interpreting and analyzing 
Romero's theory of man. His work is better understood in the context 
of the philosophical background out of which i t  develops. Romero's 
philosophy is a contrast to positivism. He was opposed to the positiv- 
is t ic  scientism, determinism and mechanism. He found metaphysics 
meaningful. The reaction against positivism in Argentina in itia te d  
passionate conflic t between the older generation committed to a deter­
m inistic view and a younger one committed to the survival of freedom 
in both philosophy and p o litic a l l i f e .  Romero took an anti-positivism  
position, but acknowledged positivism as the schoolmaster that taught 
the Argentine in te llectuals  to do philosophy.
The information on Romero's l i f e  and work is intended to 
enhance and enliven the study. In that portion of the material I have 
attempted to establish the identity  and stature of this man as w rite r , 
educator, and philosopher. Romero was not merely the leading philosopher 
of Argentina in his own life tim e  but a scholar of enormous international 
reputation as w ell.
The work I o ffe r here on Romero's philosophical anthropology 
is ,  to a great extent, expository. I have endeavored to show that his 
doctrine of man is within the framework of a descriptive phenomenology, 
influenced chiefly by German philosophers. I have attempted to specify 
the precise points at which his philosophy is indebted to Wilhelm 
Dilthey, Max Scheler, Edmund Husserl, and Nicolai Hartmann.
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In interpreting Romero I have taken issue with some esteemed 
scholars whenever I believed th e ir  treatment of Romero's ideas to be in 
error. Some of these issues focus on items of translation while others 
are concerned with interpretations of Romero's philosophy.
The criticisms I o ffe r of Romero's theory of man are sometimes 
my own. However, previous studies on his philosophy have yielded some 
fru it fu l insights and I have made use of these. As with any philosophy, 
Romero's has weak points, and I have attempted to trea t them candidly 
and ju s tly .
The organization of this work w ill be made clear by the 
following preliminary statements.
Chapter One has fiv e  basic tasks: (1) to review the s ig n if i­
cant developments in Argentine philosophy during a fif ty -y e a r  period 
crucial to an adequate understanding of Romero's philosophy, (2) to 
provide biographical material on the man Romero, which w ill make the 
study of his theory of man "come a liv e ,"  (3) to establish that the 
influences on Romero's philosophy were from four German philosophers— 
Wilhelm D ilthey, Max Scheler, Edmund Husserl, and Nicolai Hartmann,
(4) to show that Romero's method of doing philosophy is a "problems 
approach" as d ifferen tiated  from a system-building approach and that 
realizing this is an aid to understanding Romero's theory of man and 
its  place in his philosophy as a whole, and f in a lly , (5) to o ffer an 
introductory statement of Romero's theory of man.
Chapter Two is intended to: (1) develop the points at which
Romero regarded several other theories of man as e ither inadequate or 
erroneous, (2) show that Romero held to the doctrine that "mere
i.x
in tentionality" is the essence of natural (minimal) man. In connection 
with this second intention Romero's analysis of the intentional 
consciousness is treated, along with his position on the objects of 
in ten tio n a lity , and his ontology of the s e lf. This chapter also 
(3) presents Romero's theory of individuals and shows its  relation to 
his theory of the identity  of human individuals and the intentional 
community, (4) deals with Romero's theory of culture on the natural 
level with special attention to objective culture, the creative process, 
and cultural l i f e ,  and f in a lly , (5) offers criticisms of Romero's 
philosophy of the natural man.
Chapter Three, "Man as S p ir it ,"  undertakes: (1) to show
that "sp irit"  in Romero's work is a nonsubstantialist concept, despite 
some apparent disagreement on the subject among writers on Romero's 
philosophy, (2) a b rie f presentation of Romero's theory c f re a lity  with 
particu lar attention to man's place in the scheme, (3) an explication 
of the essential characteristics of s p ir i t ,  (4) an exposition of 
Romero's theory of the necessary duality of man, (5) a partia l treatment 
of Romero's theory of value and ethical theory as they relate to the 
dualism of man, (6) a statement on the ontology of the sp iritua l s e lf ,  
(7) a c la rific a tio n  of the distinction made by Romero between the 
individual and the person, (8) an assessment of the sp iritua l dimension 
in culture, and (9) some criticisms of Romero's theory.
Chapter Four is largely an exposition of the use Romero makes 
of some of the positions he took in his philosophy of man in his studies 
in comparative cultures and in his analysis of the "cris is of the West." 
The following divisions are made in this b rie f chapter: (1) Romero's
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analysis of three great and enduring world cultures which culminated 
in his persuasion of the superiority of the Western culture based on 
its  more suitable view of the individual man, its  concept of the 
transcendence of the individual, and its  concept of time, and (2) Romero's 
analysis of what he took to be a major turning point in Western culture 
expressed in the three-fold cris is  involving in tellectualism , activism, 
and individualism.
Chapter Five is the conclusion and as such w ill bring 
together in the form of a summary the contents of the study as a whole.
In addition, this fin a l chapter undertakes to (1) assess the place and 
significance of Romero's theory of man in contemporary Latin American 
philosophy, and (2) re fle c t on the value of my own work on Romero's 
theory of man.
My appreciation goes to three groups of people whoso kindness 
and patience have made possible the completion of this work. These 
include my dissertation committee, manuscript typ ists , and family.
Some of Plato's remarks in "Epistle Seven," 340b-341a, are an 
appropriate preface to acknowledging the members of my committee.
Plato's insight into what constitutes a "genuine convert" to philosophy 
is particu larly  worth recalling here. One who would take up philosophy, 
he says, should see the course ahead as "a path of enchantment, which 
he must at once strain every nerve to follow, or die in the attempt. 
Thereupon, he braces himself and his guide to the task and does not 
relax his efforts until he either crowns them with fin a l accomplishments 
or acquires the faculty of tracing his own way no longer accompanied by 
the pathfinder."
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I am about to "trace my own way." I assume that the members
of my committee believe that I have, as Plato put i t ,  "a natural
a f f in ity  and fitness for the work," and I think none have ever questioned 
my devotion to philosophy.
I am acutely aware of the inadequacies of this study. However, 
none of the weaknesses that remains e ither in this work i ts e l f  or in n\y 
development in philosophy should be attributed to this committee of 
"guides." They have endeavored to show me as Plato said, "how many 
subjects there are to study, how much hard work they involve, and how 
indispensable i t  is . . .  to adopt a well-ordered scheme of liv in g ."
They have done what they could. The deficiencies remain in spite of 
their efforts and I must myself bear that responsibility.
The chairman of my committee. Dr. J. Clayton Feaver, who is 
David Ross Boyd Professor of Philosophy and Kingfisher College 
Professor of Philosophy of Religion and Ethics, made possible my com­
mencement in graduate work by permitting me the privilege of working 
as a Kingfisher fellow in Philosophy from 1966-1968. Furthermore, I 
am grateful for the many hours he has spent on my study of Romero 
during the months this manuscript was in preparation.
My sincere appreciation is extended to the other members of 
the committee: Dr. Carlton W. Berenda, Dr. William Horosz, Dr. Kenneth 
R. M e rr ill,  and Dr. J itendra N. Mohanty. All have been a great 
encouragement and th e ir  professional judgments have been invaluable.
Typing of the reading copy was shared by Miss Donna Erickson
and Mrs. Treva Whinery. They have shown themselves unbelievably adept
in following my notations and repeated changes which, without a doubt,
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was often lik e  trying to find a single correct route through a maze. I 
owe a hearty thanks to them for th e ir  indomitable s p ir it .  Mrs. Marilyn 
Buchanan typed the final d raft of the manuscript and her professional 
expertise is evident, indeed.
Words cannot convey the sentiment I have for my wife and 
children. During the months consumed by my work on Romero, as well as 
the years in graduate study, they have accepted my near abandonment of 
them with rare understanding. My w ife , Peggy, has remained patiently  
near in quiet hope that some day the years of e ffo rt would come to 
fru it io n . Our children, Oudi and Mark, have grown up during the years 
of my graduate work and have never shown any s p ir it  but that of 
acceptance of the sometimes severely lim ited time I have spent with 
them.
I must include my father and mother, Monroe and Edna Parker 
of Ada, Oklahoma, in my acknowledgment of family help. Their eagerness 
to contribute to the completion of this degree has known no bounds, 
and I am g rate fu l.
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CHAPTER I
THE GROWTH OF PHILOSOPHY IN ARGENTINA AND 
FRANCISCO ROMERO'S DEVELOPMENT
In this chapter I shall show that French thought, particu larly  
Comtian positivism, was of s ignificant influence in the development of 
philosophy in Argentina during the nineteenth century and especially in 
its  las t twenty-five years. Furthermore, I shall establish that the 
p o s itiv is tic  philosophy was discarded by the leading thinkers of the 
Argentine and that Romero, while aware of the u t i l i t y  of positivism  
in his country, developed a philosophy that is in disagreement with i t .
In order to add v ita l i ty  to my work on Romero's philosophical 
anthropology, the material on Argentine philosophy w ill be followed by 
biographical information designed to establish the identity  and stature  
of Romero the man and philosopher. These inclusions, I believe, give 
a personal dimension to the work which i t  would not otherwise possess.
Following the biographical account, my concern w ill be to 
show what were the most d irect and forceful philosophical influences on 
Romero's philosophy of man. I shall be specific as to the precise 
points at which he is influenced by Wilhelm D ilthey, Max Scheler,
Edmund Husserl, and Nicolai Hartmann. Many writers allude to those 
influences but few specify clearly the positions and views taken by 
Romero that are traceable to these men. My suggestion in these
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matters, while not extensive, are su ffic ien t, I believe, to serve as 
a foundation fo r future work in this area.
The account o f the philosophic influences on Romero w ill be 
followed, in turn, by an account of his manner of doing philosophy— 
a method I re fe r to as the "problems approach" and which I contrast 
with the system approach. An accurate and careful presentation of the 
philosophic method used by Romero w ill aid our understanding of his 
philosophy as a whole and help the reader to see that among the many 
problems of philosophy Romero saw the problem of man as the most 
important enigma to be solved.
As is expected, the final concern of this introductory 
chapter w ill be to present to the reader an opening statement on 
Romero's theory of man. In so doing, I o ffer what I believe to be an 
accurate and concise account of his philosophical anthropology. Under­
standably, the greater portion of my dissertation w ill be concerned 
with expanding and c larify ing  this in it ia l  statement.
An adequate introduction to Romero's philosophy of man 
requires the context of the philosophic history within which i t  was 
generated. Prior to developing his own philosophy Romero distinguished 
himself as a student of the history of philosophy, and i t  is quite 
clear that he was very well acquainted with the development of philosophy 
in his own country. The portion of Argentine philosophic history which 
requires our attention spans the las t quarter of the nineteenth and the 
f i r s t  quarter of the twentieth centuries. By the end of that time 
Romero was publishing his early essays and becoming known for his work 
in philosophy.
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The f i f t y  years from approximately 1875 to 1925 comprise the 
inception, expansion, and decline of positivism in Romero's country.
I shall take notice of the inception of French philosophy in Argentina 
and of the national significance of positivism in that country.
Romero's predecessors had waged the successful an tip o s itiv is t attack. 
Although he was not involved in the polemic, his philosophy clearly  
espouses positions in d irect opposition to p o s itiv is tic  tenets.!
Before treating the role of positivism in Argentina I wish 
to suggest the beginnings of the French philosophic influence in that 
country. French philosophy had been in Argentina since at least the 
second decade of the nineteenth century. In 1819 Father Juan Crisostomo 
Lafinur taught philosophy in Buenos Aires at the Colegio de la Unidn 
del Sud. He was committed to the views of Condillac and French Ideology, 
which was a plan of reductive semantic analysis sometimes called a 
"science of ideas." The commitments enthusiastically expressed by 
Lafinur constituted a philosophy of sensationalism. He regarded the 
senses as the origin of a ll the ideas of the mind and "as the origin of 
a ll the affections of the soul."^ All ideas were to be analyzed 
according to the sensory elements to which they were traceable, and in 
the event an idea would not y ie ld  i ts e lf  to such an explanation i t  was 
regarded as groundless. Since numerous religious ideas cannot be so 
analyzed i t  seemed to follow that they should be discarded.
Even though Lafinur had made provision in his teaching for the 
existence of God and the immortality of the soul, he found himself 
having to defend his sensationalistic views, especially against charges 
from the church of naturalism and materialism. A fter being tried  he was
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ex iled , but the French influence had begun and with i t  the scholastic 
order had been called into question by the introduction of a "modern" 
philosophy into the schools of Argentina.
In addition to Lafinur's teaching there were other early 
traces of French influence in the in te llec tu a l development of Argentina 
during the early years of its  independence. Father Juan Manuel 
Fernandez de Agüero, the f i r s t  professor of philosophy at the University 
of Buenos Aires (1822), was strongly influenced by the French Ideology 
of Destutt de Tracy and others. Through Agliero's and Lafinur's acceptance 
of French Ideology and its  sensationalistic epistemology, a departure 
from the church's theology was in itia te d . Additional French philoso­
phers who found a ready Argentine audience are Saint Simon and his 
followers, including Pierre Leroux. Their views found expression in 
the work of Alberdi and Sarmiento.
Between the earlies t French influence and the arriva l of 
positivism in Argentina there was an interim during which French and 
German romanticism inspired the growing patriotism and sense of destiny 
in the republic. By the th ird  quarter of the nineteenth century, how­
ever, positivism had won out against a ll contenders fo r the support of 
Argentine thinkers and educators.
Positivism was appropriated in Argentina in part fo r a 
negative task—to supplant scholasticism in the republic's struggle 
toward a secure independence from Spain. But this was not merely a 
desire to be free from colonialism; i t  was a struggle for philosophical 
and in te llectual id en tity . During the fin a l twenty-five years of the 
nineteenth and the f i r s t  decade or so of the twentieth century the 
philosophies of Comte and Spencer served to break with the prevailing  
theology and metaphysics.3
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Leopoldo Zea, in his excellent history of positivism in Latin
America,* provides a simple division of the groups responsible for the
rise and spread of positivism in Argentina.
One comprised the so-called positivists sui generis, or 
pre-pos itiv is ts , the most prominent of whom were Sarmiento, 
Alberdi, and Echeverrfa. The second was the Comtian Parana 
school [the Normal School at Parana] . . . .  Another 
powerful group was formed at the University of Buenos Aires,
which combined Comtian positivism with English positivism,
especially that of Spencer.5
One person often associated with Argentine positivism is José 
Ingenieros, a member of the Argentine Socialis t party. Although he 
held "that science can give us both truth and ideals"® and also sub­
scribed to the three stages of history made famous by Comte, Ingenieros 
probably was not, s t r ic t ly  speaking, a p o s itiv is t.^  One assumes that 
no p o s itiv is t views metaphysics as necessary, yet Ingenieros held such 
a view. In the following statement Anfbal Sanchez Reulet confirms 
that this position was taken by Ingenieros. "Although Ingenieros 
always denied the existence of a transcendent re a lity , he believed in 
the necessity of a metaphysics."® According to Romero, Ingenieros 
"belonged to the general trend of positivism, but with a sc ie n tific
emphasis and a rejection of the rigorously p o s itiv is t postulates that
fin a lly  converted him into an enemy of doctrinaire positivism."^ 
Regardless of what label may be correct fo r Ingenieros, his philosophy 
was "n atu ra lis tic , deterministic and evolutionary."^®
Without doubt the leading figure a llie d  with positivism at 
Parana was J. Alfredo Ferreira under whose hand much of Argentina's 
philosophy of education received a p o s itiv is tic  impress. According to 
Ferreira, Comte was to be interpreted to aid the democratic cause of 
Argentina. His reforming fervor in education aimed at the destruction
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of what he regarded as the despotism of Spanish trad itio n . In opposing 
uniformity and absolutism in education, he strongly favored personal 
freedom and individual expression and saw democracy as coincident with 
"the c iv iliz in g  march of humanity."
In keeping with Comtian positivism, Ferreira contends for 
the primary value of observation and experimentation. In the same 
tra d itio n , he held that whatever lay outside one's f ie ld  of experience 
was meaningless and, thus, he turned away from any inquiry other than 
that concerned with the Argentine and his experienced world.
The spread of positivism in Argentina succeeded in establishing  
in te llec tu a l independence from Spain but i t  did not succeed in furnishing 
a foundation for a new age. The scholastic philosophy was thrown o ff  
as an outgrown garment but there was no new philosophic a tt ire  ready 
fo r wear. To the present day, Argentina remains uncertain of its  
philosophical iden tity . Although our interest here is with philosophy, 
i t  should be said that Argentina accomplished its  p o litic a l and 
re lig ious, as well as philosophical, liberation from Spain without 
being prepared to take on its  own national identity  in these areas.
There was, indeed, an eagerness for freedom but su ffic ien t preparations 
were not made for the transition to independence. Positivism was not 
retained by the Argentine thinkers. The revolt against the past was, 
perhaps, untimely. I t  was as i f  a new national mind was born without 
thoughts of its  own. A freedom had been gained but the new direction  
to be taken was unclear.
Positivism's role in Argentina is unique. Those in Argentina 
who turned to i t  were convinced that i t  was the philosophy for a new 
order in an era of independence. Other European currents of thought
7
such as sensationalism, Cartesianism, Ideology, eclecticism, and
u tilita rian ism  had also helped undermine Scholasticism; but, unlike
the rest, positivism
tried  to be in . . . independent America what scholasticism 
had been in the colony--an instrument of in te llectual 
order. Those who advocated i t  attempted to carry out 
something which had not been possible up to that time in 
spite of p o litic a l emancipation: in te llectual emancipation.*'
The p o s itiv is tic  philosophy, hov/ever, fa iled  to meet these expectations.
The fa ilu re  to make education available to a ll the people, a growing
materialism that created an economically e li te  bourgeois class, and
the resurgence of tyranny in new forms were sources of dissatisfaction.
Less Comtian than Spencerian, the positivists who were
entrenched in the University of Buenos Aires during the opening decades
of the twentieth century had "conceived of c iv iliza tio n  as the triumph
of personal e ffo rt as expressed in wealth obtained by means of industrial
exp lo ita tion ."12 Theirs was the generation of 1880, as i t  was called,
and Korn viewed i t  as an Argentine bourgeoisie. Zea recalls Alejandro
Korn's assessment of these men.
The men of 1880 warmly embraced Spencer's agnostic 
and evolutionary doctrine while at the same time 
keeping abreast of the related currents of the 
universal movement. . . . They professed the individ­
u a lis tic  tendencies of English liberalism , they 
proclaimed the excellence of the experimental method; 
sometimes they used i t ,  and they distinguished them­
selves by adhering to a just and honest crite rio n .
[B ut,] absorbed by European culture, they placed no 
value on the innate strength of the Argentine soul, 
and fo r the solution of our troubles, they sought 
exotic remedies. They had the mentality of o ffice ­
holders and never identified  themselves with the 
masses; men of thought, they lacked a m ilitan t push.,g 
Others fought with the ideas that they disseminated.
These fa ilures of positivism to provide for democracy and individual
freedom in Argentina were the source of general disappointment among the
people.
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Korn's attack against positivism and naturalism had as its  
main intention the discrediting and rejection o f the doctrines of 
mechanism and the deterministic view of man. One account of Argentine 
in te llectual history offers the following explanation of Korn's a n ti­
positivism:
With [p o s itiv is tic  philosophy] Korn had scant sympathy.
I t  seemed to give man only a subordinate place in a 
world of blind and mechanical force; in opposition to 
its  naturalism and determinism, he offers us a philo­
sophy of personality, of freedom, of values. Science 
can give us only a mathematical interpretation of 
spatio-temporal re a lity . But man, although he lives  
in a world of space and time, is not defined by i t ;
His personality is defined by the values that he 
freely  chooses. . . Korn's philosophy goes straight 
to the subjective. The heart of the subjective is 
the reaction of the person before a fa c t, the value 
that he attaches to the fa c t .14
Torchfa Estrada expresses a sim ilar view.
According to Korn, positivism ought to be overcome in 
order to reclaim man's free personality, to restore 
responsibility of human conduct and with i t  to 
establish ethics. For that reason, essentia lly , Korn 
is an an tip os itiv is t and for that reason also his great 
theme is that of lib e r ty .'^
Korn's Creative Liberty clearly suggests by its  t i t l e  that lib e rty  is
his "great theme."
Although the defeat of positivism in Argentina is attributable
to the efforts of Alejandro Korn more than to those of any other man̂ ^
there is an anachronism in Korn's attitude toward metaphysics.
P o s itiv is tic  philosophies are generally regarded as inclined toward
the rejection of metaphysics and i t  would be expected that a polemicist
against positivism might wage his attack in defense of metaphysics.
However, Korn maintained that metaphysics is not a legitim ate part of
philosophy.17 In contrast, Ingenieros, the reputed p o s itiv is t, held
to the possibility--even the necessity--of metaphysics.
Curiously--and surprisingly to some—the supposed 
p o s itiv is t Ingenieros advocated lim iting  philosophy 
to metaphysics and supported the legitimacy of 
metaphysics as a group of credible hypotheses, 
while the an tip os itiv is t Korn attacked him and 
denied the possib ility  of a doctrinary metaphysics, 
excluding i t  from the preserve of legitimate  
philosophy and attributing  to any metaphysical 
position merely the scope of a conviction for  
private individual use.18
Korn was aware that the Argentine positiv ists had applied the 
views of Comte and Spencer according to the specific Argentine needs.
What they had no use for in positivism they rejected. Leopoldo Zea 
recalls Korn's judgment concerning what in positivism was most funda­
mentally unacceptable to the thinkers of Argentine:
In short, Comte upheld the realm of authority and was 
in disagreement with a ll democratic tendencies; he 
had also committed the error of rejecting the concept 
of evolution. These ideas were irreconcilable with 
our m ilieu; i t  was necessary for us to affirm  
evolution and democracy. The Normal School group [a t  
Paranâ] took from Comte only his theory on the three 
stages of knowledge and a certain anti c le rica l ism 
which fundamentally was lib e ra l, not Comtian.19
In addition to Alejandro Korn—whose success in opposing
positivism is probably as much to be attributed to the captivating,
compelling strength of his personality as to his arguments--the
successful struggle against the ideas of positivism was carried on
principally  by Coriolano A lberin i, Alberto Rouges, and Juan Agustfn
Garcfa. According to the las t of these three a ll the i l l s  of the country
were attributable to the influence of Spencerian ideas. Argentine
society as seen by Garcfa had become a super-organism which he likened
to
a colossal ranch bustling with railroads and canals, 
fu ll of factories, with populous c ities  abounding in 
wealth of a ll kinds, but without a single learned man.
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a r t is t  or philosopher. . . .  I should prefer to be­
long to the most wretched corner of the earth where 
there s t i l l  lives a feeling for beauty, tru th , and 
goodness.20
Indeed, Garcia's attack on positivism is most vehement and emotional, 
but at times not as carefully planned as the polemics of the others.
By means of public speeches, essays, and books Korn, A lberin i, 
Rouges, Garcia, and others lik e  them were able in a generation to change 
the philosophical climate of th e ir  country. With the discrediting of 
positivism a genuine transition appeared on the in te llectual horizon 
of Argentina. There were new and varied trends in philosophy. Neo- 
Thomism found a place in the panorama. Although the post-positiv ist 
era exhibited various French influences (notably that of Bergson in 
the works of Korn and others), the strongest and most abiding appeal 
to the awakening Argentine philosophical consciousness came from 
Germany.
Any review of positivism in Argentina would be misleading,
indeed, i f  i t  le f t  the impression that in the fin a l analysis that
philosophy yielded no benefits. Positivism did contribute to the
progress of Argentine philosophy. Some of the most generous eulogies
in its  behalf were expressed by Romero himself.
Positivism was a breeze of realism and renovation 
that swept away many remnants of the colonial past 
and helped to raise Ibero-America to modernity.
From the p o litic a l and social point of view, the 
benefits i t  brought are undeniable.21
Writing in 1951 Romero acknowledged that since "positivism in philosophy
has been discredited . . . and the echoes of the frequently b itte r
debate that accompanied its  downfall have died out"22it is appropriate
to give cred it to the "c iv iliz in g  influence" positivism had on the
culture of Argentina. Through its  esteem of science and its  appeal
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to experience the Comtian philosophy, Romero affirm s, was responsible 
fo r whetting the in te llectual appetite of the Argentine th inker, so 
that he was aroused to philosophy. "In short, positivism came to 
be the school where we learned to philosophize, the primer that made i t  
possible to take philosophical studies out o f academic circles and con­
vert them into a habitual concern of the educated man."23 As both 
R isieri Frondizi and Romero point out, positivism, even with its  
lim ita tions, was responsible for furnishing the in te llec tu a l expertise 
for the successful repudiation of positivism's own tenets. The 
p o s itiv is tic  interlude made possible the p ro lif ic  philosophical a c tiv ity  
of the ensuing years.
Our interest has centered thus fa r  on two periods of philo­
sophical history in Argentina--positivism and post-positivism. The 
la t te r  period, as we noted, witnessed the entrance of other European 
philosophies into argentine, particu larly  those from Germany. Romero's 
philosophy gives evidence of some of the most notable German influences 
of the twentieth century, and Argentine philosophy since 1930 has been 
formed in large part by Romero's philosophy. The major European 
influences on Argentine philosophy since the 1920's are from German
phenomenology.24
The v ita l i ty  of German thought in Argentina in the post­
p o s itiv is t period is evidenced in part by its  influence on Romero's 
philosophy. The manner and extent of that influence w ill be dealt 
with below. F irs t, however, the quality of Romero the man w ill be 
brought into focus by means of some pertinent information on both his 
biography and professional accomplishments.
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Spanish by b irth , young Romero came to Argentina as an
immigrant--the eldest of eight children. His fa ther, an in d u s tria lis t,
was an id e a lis tic  but impractical individual. Young Francisco completed
m ilita ry  training in the m ilita ry  College of Argentina at Buenos Aires
and served in the Corps of Engineers with the m ilita ry  service from
1912 to 1931, at which time he began his teaching career in philosophy.
In 1923 Romero and Korn met for the f i r s t  time and i t  was at the
le tte r 's  urging that Romero undertook the new career. He taught until
his retirement in 1960, excepting the years of the Peron government.
Romero was married to Ana Luisa Fuchs in July of 1934 and
between 1936 and 1941 the marriage produced two daughters and a s o n .26
Romero's father-in-law  was a philologist by profession, a fie ld  which
had been an early in terest of Romero's before he turned to philosophy.
Ana Luisa was of German parentage, but born and reared in Argentina.
She had pursued to completion her studies under the Facultad de
Filosoffa y Letras at the University of Buenos Aires and had taken
courses with Professor Romero prior to th e ir  becoming personally
involved with each other.27
Like Alejandro Korn before him, Romero's imposing personality
impressed those who knew him w ell. Friends and students admired his
fervent concern fo r truth and his dedication to great principles.
Salvador CaMas records his impression of Romero.
I s t i l l  feel the radiant mental strength of Francisco
Romero. Facing this simple but great man. . . one 
undeniably realizes that a conflict exists between 
what is mundane and coarse and that which is radiant 
and true. Above a l l ,  in these times of the denial of 
substantive principles, the struggle to recover the 
realms of creative mind ought to be e m p h a s iz e d .28
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Romero lived in Martinez in Buenos Aires province and retired  
from his teaching career in 1960 a fte r an intensive career as a professor 
of philosophy. He had traveled and written extensively, and during 
retirement years intended to publish other works, some of which were 
nearly completed. He died suddenly on October 7, 1962, shortly a fte r  
returning from a tr ip  to Europe.
Romero's career as a w riter started at age seventeen, when he 
began publishing resumes and memoranda on his varied interests in 
philology and philosophy. His f i r s t  published essay was in 1916, with 
his in it ia l  a rtic le  in philosophy appearing probably in 1918. From 
then until his retirement he wrote and published scores of essays and 
several books.
In philosophy he was largely self-taught and, as his own 
writings began to appear, he was instrumental in educating the people of 
Argentina in the philosophies of Europe--particularly those of the German 
thinkers with whom he increasingly found his in tellectual home. Romero 
recalled these contributions of his in a personal le t te r  that has had 
l i t t l e  public ity.
Beginning in 1923 or 1924 I in itia te d  a work of 
philosophic information which nothing has interrupted.
In notes or artic les published in Verdum, . . . Nosotros 
and in other places I reviewed books, ideas and authors, 
preferably the recent German ones who were very much 
unrecognized in Iberoamerica at that time. I believe 
that I f i r s t  published on Dilthey in an a rtic le  that 
appeared in 1928. I also had been the f i r s t  to in tro ­
duce here a ll the recent philosophy of culture, Husserl 
and the lik e . I worked steadily in putting together 
many books on everything in contemporary philosophy.
I thought to possess the best philosophy collection  
in our countries and joined many other philosophers 
in lite ra ry  exchanges.29
When he addressed himself, as he did on occasion, to the 
weaknesses and strengths of positivism in his country, Romero spoke as
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one well informed, for a fter completing his m ilita ry  college training
he had studied under the p o s itiv is t Juan Alfredo Ferreira. Rodrfguez-
Alcala recalls that relationship.
Ferreira was a sincere and fervent Comtian for whom 
positivism constituted "science sp iritua lized , 
naturalized, and generalized." [That is the way 
Romero expressed Ferreira's view.] He became fond 
of the studious and serious young [Romero]. I t  was 
Ferreira who for many years was the leading Comtian 
p o s itiv is t in Argentina--in fact until his death in 
1938.30
Romero spoke warmly of his friendship with Ferreira.
The vast writings of Romero at f i r s t  appear as an unmanageable 
and confused collection. However, he has given them some organization 
by suggesting that they generally f i t  into the following categories 
(1) the interpretation of reality--which Romero said in 1947 "most 
preoccupies and continues to occupy me"32; (2) the history of philosophy, 
especially modern and contemporary; (3) logic; (4) man and culture, 
which he admitted probably should be divided into theory of man, theory 
of culture, and theory of the conceptions of the world ( Weltan- 
schauungslehre) ; and (5) the culture of the West: its  meaning and
c ris is .
In inquiring into any philosophical problem Romero was not 
quick to assert and defend his own position on an issue. He f i r s t  
acquainted himself thoroughly with the history of the problem and only 
then undertook its  solution himself. Most of his books were compilations 
of essays and artic les  published over a period of years, many of which 
were c r it ic a l perusals of the problems of philosophy and th e ir proposed 
solutions throughout the history of philosophy. His own philosophical 
positions are most expressly brought out in four of his works:
Filosoffa de la persona. Ideas y figuras, Papeles para una f ilo s o ffa , 
and--most important—Teorfa del hombre.
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Other books he had intended to produce and on which he had 
long worked included a philosophy of culture, an ethics, and a 
metaphysics.33 In addition to these he had planned to publish a 
volume on comparative culture and the cris is  of the West. At his 
death he was a le rt and active and i t  is lik e ly  that had he lived a 
few more years some of these would have been completed.
In addition to his w ritings, Romero's other professional 
accomplishments are impressive. In 1929 he and Korn founded the 
Kantian Society of Buenos Aires—a highly successful and in flu e n tia l 
organization. He held two chief academic posts simultaneously at the 
Universities of Buenos Aires (1931-1946; 1955-1960) and La Plata 
(1936-1946; 1955-1960). At Buenos Aires he occupied the Chair of 
Epistemology and Metaphysics, while at La Plata he was Professor of 
Contemporary Philosophy and Logic. In addition, he was Professor of 
S cien tific  Knowledge at the National In s titu te  of Teaching, and from 
1940 he occupied the Alejandro Korn Chair of Philosophy in the Free 
College of Higher Studies in Buenos Aires. He also served for a time 
as president of the Argentine Philosophical Society.
Various academic posts and many lecture opportunities were 
extended to Romero. He declined positions in Chile, Cuba, Mexico, and 
the United States. He was invited to lecture in the United States at 
Yale, Columbia, and Chicago U niversities, and at the New School of 
Social Research as well as at the Universities of Chile, Havana, La Paz, 
Lima, Mexico, Puerto Rico, Rio de Janeiro, and Uruguay.34 Upon 
re tir in g  from his university positions in 1960 he was elected to the 
status of Emeritus Professor at fu ll salary with no teaching 
responsib ilities .
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Romero was founder and for years editor of the philosophical 
journal Realidad and in 1938 he became the director of the "Library of 
Philosophy," a special shelf o f philosophical publications at the 
Losada Publishing Company in Buenos Aires. He was a member of the 
ed ito ria l boards of Erasmus, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,
The PersonaliSt, Sur, and Philosophic Abstracts.
The following are academic awards and distinctions he was 
accorded: Vice President of the Academy of Sciences in Buenos Aires,
t i tu la r  member of the Argentine In s titu te  of Juridical and Social 
Philosophy, Vice President of the Argentine Gerontology Society, 
recipient of the Vaccaro p rize , the Grand Award of Honor of the Argentine 
Society of W riters, and a fte r  the collapse of the Peron government, 
f i r s t  lite ra ry  prize for his Teorfa del hombre. 35 Concerning one of 
these awards, Rodrfguez-Alcala offers the following explanation:
"The Vaccaro Prize was conferred upon [Romero on June 7, 1951 in a 
ceremony which, under the Peron dictatorship] constituted. . . the 
highest homage to the merits of a w rite r , an educator, and a c itizen  
representative of the best Argentine liberal tra d it io n .36
F in a lly , he was honorary member of the National Academy of 
Arts and Literature in Cuba, as well as of the American Academy of Arts 
and Sciences in the United States, a member of the Council of Directors 
of both the International Federation of Societies of Philosophy and the 
International Phenomenological Society, and a Fellow of Honor in each of 
the following: Bolivian Society of Philosophy, Chilean Society of
Philosophy, Cuban Society of Philosophy, Peruvian Society of Philosophy, 
and the University of C h ile .37
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During Romero's long and productive career he was influenced 
in the formation of his philosophical views by some of the new currents 
pervading the in te llectual atmosphere of Argentina in the post­
p o s itiv is t era. The German philosophers Wilhelm D ilthey, Max Scheler, 
Edmund Husserl and Nicolai Hartmann were the most in fluen tia l in Romero's 
theory of man. I shall consider these influences in d iv idua lly , expanding 
the treatment of them beyond the topic of the philosophy of man in order 
to provide a more nearly complete view of the German influences on 
Romero. My remarks concerning the German sources should not be regarded 
as exhaustive. I have encountered references to these influences in 
several works on Romero, but I have attempted in the following material 
to o ffe r substantial information on the specific views found in Romero's 
thought which are attributable to the influence from Germany. These 
influences, however, are worthy of further investigation.
D ilthey's analysis of a lived experience ( Erlebnis), as in 
the following exerpt, expresses a structuralism with which Romero is 
id en tified . A l i f e  is not merely composed of its  individual parts or 
events, Dilthey held, but
there exist experienceable connections which link the 
parts of the course of a l i f e  from birth to death . .
. . In b rie f, there are connections quite independent 
of the temporal sequence and the d irect causal re­
lations in i t ,  which jo in the parts of a l i f e  into a 
whole. Thus the unity of l i f e  is actually experienced 
and is securely based on such experience.38
In point o f fa c t, "The only complete, self-contained and clearly defined
happening encountered everywhere in history and in every concept that
occurs in the human studies, is the course of a l i f e . "39
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The structuralism of Romero is expressed at a ll levels of 
re a lity  in his insistence that the whole exceeds the sum of its  parts.
On this ground he opposed reductionism on every fro n t, particu larly  
in his ontology.
Dilthey held that just as there are categories according to  
which we interpret or understand external re a lity  (as Kant had shown), 
so there are categories by which we interpret out lives . The distinction  
between "occurrences within us and objects outside us" is such a 
category and that distinction is basic to symbolizing. The attention  
Romero gives to symbol and to cultural ob jectification  brings out his 
acceptance and use of Dilthey's views.
The significance of history is shared by the two philosophers. 
Dilthey provided an important place for history or temporality in his 
analysis of a ll levels of re a lity , and Romero follows his example.
Both agree that human studies, Geisteswissenschaften, and the method of 
approach to them require emphasis on the historical perspective, on 
duration.
Dilthey's analysis of the structure of a world-view presents 
some of the framework fo r Romero's philosophy of man. In that analysis 
Dilthey distinguishes three stages through which the development of a 
Weltanschaunng proceeds. The f i r s t  is the psychological l i f e ,  in which 
we are aware of the difference between our experiences with inner 
occurrences and with objects outside us. Through judgment and the use 
of concepts the s p ir it  achieves a comprehension of re a lity . Here, also, 
self-consciousness occurs. The value attached to other persons and 
objects is in terms of the a b ility  they are believed to have for
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enhancing and broadening our own existence. I .e .  th e ir  "prospective 
Influence." All the while "we are seeking an absolute standard of 
measurement."40
In the second phase, by means of the construction of a 
Weltanschauung "the cosmic picture becomes the foundation for a fu ll 
evaluation of l i f e  and for a comprehension of the w o r l d . " 4 1
The th ird  stage achieves "an upper level of our consciousness," 
which develops comprehension of "Ideals, the highest good, and the 
supreme principles" and which In turn penetrate the Individual l i f e .
At this level the world-view Is creative and reforming. In tent, s triv in g , 
and tendency take on permanence with directedness. Differences are 
made between means and ends, selections are arrived at among particular 
alternatives, and comprehensive l i f e  plans, as well as Ideal societies, 
are conceptually formed.
Romero presents his Ideas on the development and significance 
of world-views In Theory of Man under the heading "The Self and the 
World: The Natural M a n . "42 Here he expresses his chief difference
with Dilthey In the matter. "The world view does not necessarily In ­
clude the sp iritua l element, although, to the actual man. I t  may 
normally presuppose I t .  Mere In ten tlon a llty  Is su ffic ien t to give an 
account of I t . "43
In turning to Scheler's Influence I discern, f i r s t ,  a number 
of views which both men re jec t. They both reject the Idea of Cartesian 
substances, as well as mechanism, naturalism, and reductionism In the 
explanation of re a lity . Furthermore, they are In agreement that any 
telos external to the world-process must be rejected as an explanation 
for that process.
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Scheler's influence in Romero's philosophy is evidenced by 
the importance given to s p ir i t .  I wish to emphasize, however, that 
although Scheler regarded s p ir it  as the identifying essence of humanity, 
Romero held that mere in ten tion a lity  is adequate to distinguish man 
as a unique form of l i f e  and that s p ir it  is the higher development in 
humanity—"in ten tionality  made s p ir itu a l,"  as he called i t .
Scheler, as well as D ilthey, expounded a s tru c tu ra lis tic  
philosophy which influenced Romero. Perhaps i t  was Scheler, more than 
Dilthey, who was in fluen tia l in this regard. This is a d i f f ic u lt  
matter to judge.
There are four important points in Romero's indebtedness to 
Nicolai Hartmann. The f i r s t  is that Romero follows Hartmann in a 
"problems approach" to philosophy.*4
Second, in accord with Hartmann, Romero adopts a four-level 
ontology. In Romero's philosophy these are often id en tified  as the 
physical, the liv in g , the intentional psychical, and the s p ir itu a l.
In the th ird  place, Romero agrees with Hartmann that i t  is  
necessary to reject the ra tio n a lis tic  assumption of complete agreement 
between the categories of reason and those of being.
F in a lly , Romero identifies  himself with Hartmann's views 
concerning the two primary realms of being--the real and the i d e a l . 45 
Neither Hartmann nor Romero s tra tif ie s  id e a lity .
The las t German influence on Romero to be accounted for is 
that of Edmund Husserl. Romero regards the intentional consciousness 
as the d e fin itive  identity  of "minimal" man.46 in Theory of Man, the 
f i r s t  section is en titled  "Intentional Consciousness" and extensive 
traces of Husserl's thought are discernible there.47 However, Romero
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is not the rigorous analyst of the intentional act that Husserl is .
He shows l i t t l e  or no inclination to trace the steps meticulously 
la id  out by Husserl in the e idetic  and phenomenological reductions.
The foundation work Husserl found necessary but painful and which kept 
him from work on the philosophical "superstructure," is generally 
simply accepted by Romero. He uses the idea of intentional 
consciousness as the essential characteristic of natural man.48
In addition to the ve rifiab le  German influences, questions 
regarding the influence of Ortega and Korn on Romero's philosophy of 
man often arise in works on Romero. The apparent Ortegan influence 
is concerned with the view both men take of the "programmatic" nature 
of the l i f e  of the human individual, whereas the supposed influence 
from Korn is in reference to the importance given to lib e rty  in human 
existence.
Although Romero regarded Ortega as a genuine "sp iritual leader" 
in the cultural l i f e  of Spain and held his friend Korn in high personal 
esteem, his philosophical views developed quite independently of both 
these men.
In an essay written in the mid-1950's Romero expressed his 
b e lie f that for the las t one hundred years in Spain's in te llectual 
history only Ortega and his students have been of primary importance.49 
Our concern here, however, is whether Ortega's philosophical views 
direc tly  influenced Romero's formations. The period of Romero's 
philosophical maturity—a period beginning with the appearance of 
Papeles para una filo s o ffa  in 1945--does not reveal an Ortegan 
influence.50
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The positive influence of Ortega on Romero, which has been 
assumed because of the terminological s im ila rity  in th e ir views of 
individual human l i f e  as "program," is dispelled by careful attention  
to what each of them means by "programmatic." The manner in which each 
develops the theme over a period of years reveals the differences.
For Ortega the individual man's "program" is to develop an existentia l 
authenticity or responsibility. For Romero i t  is the obligation to 
conduct oneself "in keeping with the sp iritual dimension of one's 
character. To act in th is way means to focus on what an object is in 
its  essence, regardless of what that object may be so that the object 
is never merely used."51
Alejandro Korn exerted a profound and unique personal in ­
fluence on Romero; for example, in his persuading Romero to seek Korn's 
former academic posts upon his (Romero's) m ilita ry  retirement. Neither 
man held that Romero's philosophy was influenced by Korn's ideas.
Romero was well known for his writings by the time he met Korn and, 
although he was la te  developing his own theories, his philosophy is not 
an extension of Korn's. The informed opinion on this point is expressed 
by one w rite r as follows:
In 1927, Korn stated in a le t te r  to Alberto Rougés 
that Romero's philosophical position differed from 
his own in that Romero reflected much more of the 
recent German philosophy. . . . Some years la te r ,
Romero confirmed this view, stating that he was 
not influenced in his own in te llectual development 
by Korn's works.52
Romero reveals his personal esteem for Korn in investing a 
great deal of time and energy in his memory. In an interview published 
after his own death Romero refers to Korn, as he had often done, as a 
founder (fundador) o f philosophy in Argentina.53
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Romero's writings on Korn, his editing of Korn's works, the 
establishment of the Alejandro Korn Chair of Philosophy in the Colegio 
Libre, a ll a ttest to Romero's personal regard for the man who effected 
a new day in the philosophy of Argentina. In Korn, Romero and the new 
generation of Argentine in tellectuals discovered "the manly exemplar 
[who] reveals the hidden and converts himself into model and guide; 
not as the commanding o fficer who orders but as the lig h t which 
reveals the way in darkness."54 in Korn, the physician turned 
philosopher, Romero and others saw such a lig h t and guide. Because of 
his work and person they could see better the path for bringing the 
people of th e ir Republic into an era which could become more tru ly  
theirs .
In the preceding pages I have endeavored to give some of the 
background information that is necessary for an understanding and 
appraisal of Romero's major philosophical contribution--his theory of 
man. In laying that groundwork I have fe l t  i t  advisable to o ffe r an 
account of the important transitions and trends in the philosophy of 
Argentina, a pertinent statement of Romero's achievements in areas 
that are significant to his in te llectual biography, and, f in a lly , a 
review of the formative influences in his development as a philosopher.
Let us turn now to Romero's philosophic method--a method 
which, as I have said, is close to Hartmann's. My chief concern with 
Romero's method of doing philosophy is that his philosophical anthro­
pology is developed by means of that method. The notions of "structure," 
"emergence," "colonization," and "transcendence"—especially as they 
apply to the theory of man—are introduced and th e ir uses expanded 
through his employment of the "problems approach." This method of
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undertaking one philosophical enigma a fte r  another while bearing in 
mind previous solutions to other problems results in a coalescent and 
coherent whole. This e ffec t is evident in Romero's philosophy of man 
and in the manner in which the theory of man f its  into the larger 
scheme of Romero's metaphysics.
I prefer calling Romero's method a "problems approach" rather 
that a "problematic" one. Speaking of i t  as a "problematic approach," 
as some have, is unacceptable for the obvious reason that such a term 
carries the wrong meaning.^5 Furthermore, using the designation I 
have chosen w ill permit me to employ a similarly-constructed term in 
reference to an opposing philosophic method, i .e .  the "system approach," 
to which Romero quite sternly objected.
I need to explain what I take these two terms to mean. What 
is the "system approach" against which Romero inveighs? I t  has been 
referred to as "speculative philosophy in the grand style" and, 
whether i t  be performed by Paul Heinrich Dietrich d'Holbach with the 
m ateria lis tic  grandiloquence found in his Système de la  nature or by 
G. W. P. Hegel in the commanding style of that comprehensive idealism, 
i t  is regarded by Romero as unpalatable--indeed, dangerous in terms of 
its  fa ilu re  to contribute to increasing our knowledge of ourselves 
and the world.
Hegel is very lik e ly  the best example of a philosopher of 
system. In his philosophy one sees not merely a systematic approach— 
which would be largely an organized, step-by-step procedure—but a 
method, in this case a tr ia d ic  d ia le c tic , that must be employed in 
every area of one's probing into the nature of things. There is a
25
systematization in the organization of Hegel's works themselves. The
Encyclopedia, fo r example, is constructed tr ia d ic a lly  in its  main
divisions with a tr ip lic a te  arrangement provided in many (although by
no means a l l )  of the subdivisions.
I t  is therefore clear that Hegel himself regarded 
his whole work as a d ia lectica l construction, with 
thought and nature as opposites united in mind and 
society, in the a r tis tic  and religious products of 
man, and, u ltim ately, in the a c tiv ity  of philosophical
self-consciousness.5o
All things must conform to the affirm ing, negating, cancelling- 
preserving process--the positing, op-positing, and gathering up 
d ia lec tic . In order to comprehend any part of the world, minute or 
massive, one must see i t  as fa llin g  under the cosmic orthodoxy of 
being "transcended without being wholly discarded [ aufqehoben]."^^
Romero was opposed to such uniformity of philosophical 
method and to the metaphysical assumption that prompts i t —the b e lie f  
that re a lity  is tru ly  developing in precisely this manner. In addition, 
the cosmic essentialism that marks Hegel's philosophy is foreign to 
Romero. Perhaps i t  is Hegel's monism that is most unacceptable to 
Romero, for his own philosophy includes a dualis tic  metaphysics: nature 
and s p ir i t ,  re a lity  and id e a lity , transcendence and immanence. I t  
seemed to Romero that the "system approach" rests on the error of 
developing a commitment antecendent to investigation. To him, such an 
approach devises a ra tionally  coherent theory and imposes i t  on a ll  
re a lity .
Romero was in agreement with Nicolai H a r tm a n n 's^B b e lie f that 
the system-building philosopher has notoriously neglected the 
philosophic problems and the data of experience that do not conform to 
the system he has constructed. In the "system approach" the data are
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made to f i t  the scheme of the system despite the necessity of consider­
able stretching or forcing. Both Romero and Hartmann fe l t  that the 
age of system-building was over.
Romero pursued philosophy one problem at a time, attentive  
to the bearing that the solution of one problem may have on another.
What Romero apparently most admired in Hartmann's approach to philosophy 
was Hartmann's view of philosophy as a series of problems, not a body 
of doctrines.
I t  is important to emphasize that Romero's method is not a
disorganized, d irectionless, unsystematic, piecemeal undertaking. His
method i^  systematic. That is to say he selected the problems on a
basis of human p rio rity  and proceeded in an orderly progression of
inquiry, mindful of results already achieved in the study of problems
other than the one at hand. He was, indeed, aware o f, even dedicated
to , an increasing synthesis among the problems he investigated. In
1947 Romero wrote some of his thoughts concerning the issues with which
we are concerned here.
In philosophy, reference to the whole may never be 
completely le f t  aside. One of the conditions that 
define [s ic ] the philosopher is to think always on 
a duality: on "this" (that which occupies him at
present) and on "the other" (that which does not 
occupy him at the moment, but which is available to
him—and which is a ll the rest) . . . . I t  is as i f
he would continually say to himself: Let us see 
how this is , but le t  us not forget that a ll the 
rest exists: since this is what i t  is because
all' the rest exists and is as i t  is .
I f  there is a fundamental and unquestionable ex­
perience, i t  is th is : that we are in a "cosmos"
of which we are p art, and which surrounds us; an 
ordered re a lity  completely linked by relations and 
crossed by influences and inhabited by consonant 
resonances. I f  re a lity  were only a mere heap of
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things, a disordered dispersion, the investigator 
of philosophy could lim it the object of his study 
or the zone of his occupation, freely within each 
case. As plural and immemorial experience, and 
even the mere consistency and permanence of re a lity  
te s tify  that this re a lity  is a cosmos, a continued 
series and mutual penetration of its  partia l in ­
stances, then the philosophic study is obliged to 
attend to that unitary and solidary quality of 
re a lity . To think in philosophy is , therefore, to 
remember a ll the rest in thinking of any special 
subject.
I think I have been fa ith fu l to this funda­
mental requisite of philosophical work; I do not 
pretend to ju s t i f y ,59 with the above statements, 
the possible reproach of dispersion that might 
be made to what I have written up to now, for i f  
that dispersion ex ists , i t  is due to reasons which 
are, fo r me, su ffic ien t and worthy of respect.60
The conclusions arrived at by the "problems approach" are
always tentative . No position is taken dogmatically. Romero even
suggested the po ss ib ility  that his conclusions were erroneous.
In Contemporary Philosophy ( Filosoffa contemporanea) Romero
expressed the difference between his own method of philosophical
inquiry and that of the system-builder. The quotation that follows,
although exerpted from a study on Romero, incorporates a b rie f quotation
from the work mentioned immediately above.
[Rejection of the "system approach"] does not mean 
that the attempt to arrive at a coherent view of 
re a lity  is abandoned, but the "system" must be an 
a posteriori synthesis, not an a priori scheme, and 
i t  must remain open. " I t  is possible to arrive at 
a systematic and comprehensive conception," states 
Romero, "but not immediately (sin mas ni mas) [ i . e .
"a ll at once"] . . . .  Only a long and troublesome 
e ffo rt of investigation, of d istrustful probing, 
of groping, of re c tif ic a tio n , can approximate us to 
th is end."61
And regardless of the "end" any investigation reaches, a ll conclusions 
achieved by the "problems" approach are tentative. On the contrary.
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every system-builder, according to Romero, "begins with an a priori 
scheme or presupposition and the consequent product of such a 
beginning is inevitably an a r t i f ic ia l  fabrication ."62
Romero identified  three stages in the procedure of philosophi­
cal investigation: 1. The phenomenon is encountered. 2. The data
are perceived as an enigma or problem. 3. F ina lly , an explanation 
or solution is arrived a t. In keeping with Hartmann, these three steps 
are identified  respectively by Romero as the phenomenological, the 
problematical, and the th eoretica l.63
Romero expressed an intention that his "problems approach" 
incorporate an empirical method.
The method w ill be, therefore, em pirical, but 
assuredly [ desde luego] an empiricism d ifferen t 
from that which is the epitome of this caption 
in the history of philosophy. [ I t  must be] an 
empiricism on the style of that proposed by 
Husserl and put to work by phenomenology, which 
expands the notion of experience to provide room 
within i t  fo r essences and values; above a ll an 
empiricism without prejudices or predilections, 
which does not shut i ts e lf  o ff from accepting 
transcendence, as the trad itional did, dazzled 
by the ta n g ib ility  and consistency of "things"—
of immanences.64
He believed that this "expanded empiricism" could investigate the realms 
of re a lity  and id e a lity , trace the path of transcendence, discover 
meaning in a ll of re a lity , and produce a "descriptive and neutral 
ontology."66 i t  was Romero's hope that this "empirical transcendent­
alism" would be increasingly accepted by contemporary philosophy.
Romero kept up "a fru it fu l dialogue with the philosophical 
heritage of mankind." He never abandoned his commitment to the b e lie f  
that the "problems" philosopher must comprehend those enigmas investi­
gated by the philosophers of the past. Furthermore, he regarded 
philosophy's history as a significant problem its e lf .
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Besides the philosophers and th e ir doctrines 
ind iv idua lly , I am interested in the history of 
philosophy i ts e lf  as a special problem, that is , 
in the c r ite r ia  of historical-philosophic in te r­
pretation as they have been successively applied, 
the several theories of philosophic evolution, 
the d ifferen t conceptions of the interconnections 
and inflections in the march of ideas, the e s ti­
mation of the various kinds of influences capable 
of affecting philosophic thought. °
The problems in which Romero took greatest interest were 
concerned with man and culture. All his other studies seem to grow 
out of these. He begins with man as the central philosophical enigma 
and relates a ll other problems to the human situation . He investigates 
problems of value, time, history, logic, epistemology, comparative 
culture, and metaphysics and finds them a ll related to man. That there 
are relations among a ll things, that the temporal and historical pro­
cess is a unity, that being is a structured whole—a ll these are 
continuing beliefs in his approach to the problems of philosophy.
The "problems approach" led Romero into some philosophical 
work that was never published. I mention only those which impinge on 
the content of this present study, i .e .  those concerned with cultural 
philosophical anthropology. In an Americas interview with Rodolfo 
Vinacua during the las t year of his l i f e ,  Romero spoke of working on a 
Theory of Culture (Teorfa de la  cu ltu ra ). In addition, he stated that 
he was preparing
various other books for which I am constantly col­
lecting m aterial. Many of the ideas that I w ill 
develop in them (about culture, values, ethics, 
the theory of knowledge and even metaphysics) are 
found in embryo, or as indications, in my Theory 
of Man, in the central theme of that book or 
interwoven with i t . 67
In 1953, the year following the appearance of Teorfa del hombre, Romero
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had expressed his Intention to publish two important books that would
bring together his views on culture.
I have given considerable attention to the problem 
of culture. I have written several papers about 
i t  and am preparing two books, one on the question
of its  grounds: Theory of Culture and the other
characterizing the great h istorical cultures and 
dealing with the present situation and cris is  of 
Western cu ltu re .68
He had referred to his anticipated work on the cris is  of Western
culture as early as 1947:
Soon I shall be able to publish the work where I
examine a ll these problems [ i .e .  those concerning 
the three principles of in tellectualism , activism, 
and individualism, which to Romero are constitutive  
of Western culture's c r is is ] , and which I have 
tentative ly en titled  El senti do del Occidente [ The 
f4eaning of the West].59
In a le t te r  dated February 25, 1962, scarcely more than seven months
before his death, Romero wrote a friend:
The theme which concerns me most at the present 
moment, and to which I devote hours on end, is 
an Ê tica , an extension and supplement of points
of view advanced in Teorfa del hombre. . . I
don't know when my Etica w ill j e l l ;  I think
about i t ,  and I le t  i t  ripen .70
I t  is unfortunate that the manuscripts on these problems are 
not yet published and thus are unavailable. However, Romero has le f t  
a large corpus of published material on his philosophy of man and culture.
The quantity is ample fo r our work. In addition, we have at hand the
record of interviews and statements Romero offered in the las t few 
years o f his l i f e .  These re fe r to his continued work on man and culture 
and express no changes in his philosophical anthropology.
In the author's prologue to the English edition of the Theory 
of Man, Romero draws a distinction between the problem of man per se
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and that of man in re lation  to the whole of re a lity —a distinction
which we must recognize at the outset of our study. Man is an enigma
which, lik e  a ll other problems for Romero, must be investigated while
one bears in mind the rest of re a lity . Although we can investigate
the nature of man as an isolable problem, we must bear in mind that man
is a part of a ll that is and that no adequate understanding o f man is
possible i f  his relation to the rest of re a lity  is forgotten. This
" to ta lity "  concern is an integral part of Romero's method.
Many studies concerning man—as indicated in th e ir  
t i t le s - -^ !  purport to inquire into his place within  
the whole of re a lity ;  fo r , actually , i t  does not 
seem possible to engage in philosophical discourse 
about man without assigning a place to him or 
searching fo r his meaning in the complex of what 
exists. The author has sought to satisfy the dual 
demand of setting forth a theory of man which rests 
on its  own foundations and is su ffic ien t to i t s e l f ,  
as well as to formulate a hypothesis concerning the 
situation and the significance of man in re a lity  in 
keeping with his theses of an anthropological scope 
[ i . e .  in keeping with what he had asserted the scope 
of any philosophical anthropology should be], which 
completes these theses yet is at the same time 
separable from them. This hypothesis d iffers  from 
the rest of the investigation in its  decidedly 
metaphysical character.'^
Our plan is to trace Romero's doctrine of man as a theory 
"suffic ient to i ts e l f ."  Chapters I I  and I I I  develop Romero's idea of 
man as a duality in terms of nature and s p ir i t .  In doing th is we shall 
need to include some aspects of the more comprehensive issues o f "the 
situation and the significance of man in re a lity ,"  but our primary 
in terest w ill be to analyze his theory of man that rests "on its  own 
foundations and is su ffic ien t to i ts e lf ."  Romero maintained that his 
philosophical anthropology could be defended without the necessity of 
his metaphysics and I wish to take seriously that contention.
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Let me o ffer here an in it ia l  statement of Romero's idea of 
man as a duality of nature and s p ir i t .  The c la rific a tio n  of this  
statement w ill comprise most of our work in the next two chapters.
The concern of Chapter IV w ill be to see Romero's theory of man as i t  
applies to his work on comparative culture and the cris is  of the West.
Man is minimally and essentially constituted by his permanent 
a b ility  to ob jectify his world. This is his class-defining characteris­
t ic . Intelligence requires ob jectification  and, therefore, can belong 
only to man. The cognitive acts of this in it ia l  level of in ten tionality  
( i .e .  "mere in ten tio n a lity ,"  as he calls i t )  regard the object in 
reference to the interests of the subject. Objectifications at this  
level refer the identity  and value of the object back to the subject. 
This is called the "subjective return," and is the fa ilu re  of the 
intentional act to complete its  ob jectification . Such acts of 
consciousness are indigenous to natural man.
There is , however, a higher form of ob jectification  which is 
purged of the subjective return. In this higher objectifying a c tiv ity  
the object is regarded in and for i t s e l f .  This, for Romero, is the 
level of s p ir i t .  I t  is the sp iritua l act.
The individual man exists on both these levels --the natural 
and the s p ir itu a l. Some acts of cognition are natural acts of mere 
in ten tion a lity  marred by subjective return and others are sp iritua l 
acts of purified in ten tion a lity  purged of s e lf reference. The la t te r  
is the highest kind of intentional a c t - - i t  exhibits "absolute tran­
scendence." All th is requires a great deal of c la rify in g  and th a t, 
of course, is the task of the next chapter.
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This introductory chapter has been concerned with matters 
having to do with the philosophical ambience of Argentina prior to and 
during the l i f e  of Romero. I have shown that strong French influences 
were introduced in the early modern period and that both French and 
English positivism became important as the people of Argentina broke 
the national ties  with Spain. There were disappointments, however, in 
positivism's fa ilu re  to accomplish a ll that was dreamed by its  
adherents. I t  had introduced the Argentine in te llectual communities to 
philosophical ideas that brought about liberation from the domination 
by Spain, but i t  had no lasting appeal as a foundation on which to 
build. In lig h t of this a new generation sought and achieved the 
discrediting of the p o s itiv is tic  tenets, largely on the basis that 
positivism declared its  support of naturalism and determinism. Korn 
and others of his generation assailed the p o s itiv is tic  philosophy in 
the name of human freedom and d ignity , for which positivism had not 
provided, according to Korn.
Furthermore, I have presented here the pertinent facts on 
Romero's l i f e ,  including his publications, professional positions, and 
international reputation as a philosopher and educator. I have 
incorporated into that section the treatment of his method of doing 
philosophy and of his opposition to system building.
I have, in addition, shown that the chief influences on the
formation of his thought were neither Argentine nor Spanish, but German.
I have documented the points at which his ideas are structured a fte r
D ilthey, Scheler, Hartmann, and Husserl.
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F in a lly , I have indicated that Romero defines man in terms 
of the intentional consciousness. The occurence of the subject-object 
dichotomy is the basis of humanity and man is ,  fo r Romero, a duality  
of nature and s p ir i t .  I am prepared now to pursue the f i r s t  phase of 
this dualism—the natural man.
Notes
Chapter One
Positiv ism  was adopted in various forms in several Latin 
American republics. In every case i t  served a purpose and then was 
discarded. Whether in B raz il, Mexico, B oliv ia , Cuba, or Argentina, 
positivism served to break the ties  with Spain and Portugal. In the 
burgeoning new republics the doctrines of this philosophy were employed 
to supplant the church's theology and the scholastic metaphysics.
Romero wrote concerning one variation of Comtian thought as 
used by the reformers of Brazil: "The mysticism which pervades Comte's
la te r  doctrine, his attempts to replace trad itional dogma with a 
're lig ion  of humanity,' found no echo [in  Latin America] except in 
B razil. Their influence there was not by chance but in conformity 
with the emotional nature of the Brazilian s p ir i t ,  which distinguishes 
i t  in the Latin American community and gives Brazilian culture some of 
its  most original features." See Romero's a r t ic le , "Latin America's 
Twentieth Century Sages," in Américas, I I I  (February, 1959), 19.
Any reader interested in positivism in Latin America (includ­
ing the influence of Saint Simon, Comte, M il l ,  and Spencer) w ill find  
a great deal o f information on the subject in the following volumes: 
Leopoldo Zea, Dos etapas del pensamiento en Hispanoamerica, Mexico,
El Colegio de Mexico, 1949; Guillermo Francovich, La filo s o ffa  en 
Boliv ia , Buenos Aires, Editorial Losada, S. A ., 1945; Guillermo 
Francovich, Filosofos brasilenos, Buenos Aires, Editorial Losada, S. A ., 
1943; Antonio Gomez Robledo, La filo so ffa  en el B ra s il, Mexico, Imprenta 
Uni versita ri a, 1946; Medardo V it ie r , La filo s o fia  en Cuba, Mexico,
Fondo de Culture Economica, 1948; Leopoldo Zea, Apogeo y decandencia 
del positivisme en Mexico, Mexico, El Colegio de Mexico, 1944; Samuel 
Ramos, Historia de la filo so ffa  en Mexico, Mexico, Imprenta Universi- 
ta r ia , 1943. The best work available on positivism in Argentina is 
found in the writings of Korn and Romero.
Zjuan Carlos Torchfa Estrada, La filo s o ffa  en la Argentina 
(Washington, C .: Union Panamericana, 1961), p. 75, quoting Laflnur 
in Curso filoso fico  dictado en el Colegio de la Union del Sud de 
Buenos Aires en 1819 (Buenos Aires, 1938), pp. 78-79. Note concerning 
translations : All source footnotes which are shown in Spanish w ill
identify  the quotations in the text as my own translations. A ll other 
translators w ill be identified  in the footnotes as necessary.
3See Risieri Frondizi, "Contemporary Argentine Philosophy," 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, IV (December, 1943). I t  
should be noted, however, that the "anti-metaphysical" attitude
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developed by Argentine philosophers in the p o s itiv is tic  stage of th e ir  
history was generally overcome afterward. Frondizi is careful to 
point out this subsequent repudiation.
^Leopoldo Zea, The Latin-American Mind, trans. by James H. 
Abbott and Lowell Dunham (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963). 
This work was originally^published in Spanish as Dos etapas del 
pensamiento en Hispanoamerica (Mexico C ity , 1949).
Zea's work traces the movement of positivism through its  two 
massive stages (dos etapas) - - i t s  inception in Spanish America and its  
development during its  adoption there. Although there are publishing 
reasons fo r the English t i t l e ,  The Latin-American Mind the t i t l e  is  
misleading on two counts: (1) A history of positivism in Central and
South America is by no means descriptive of the philosophic mind of 
these people. In point of fa c t, i t  is a philosophy through which the 
Latin Americans have come and which they have now repudiated. (2) The 
volume, in lig h t of the fact that i t  does not trea t Portuguese America, 
B ra z il, should be more accurately referred to as a book on "Spanish- 
American" rather than "Latin-American" thought.
^Zea, Mind, p. 31. For a clear and extensive treatment of 
positivism in Argentina (in  addition to Zea's work) see Ricaurte Soler, 
El positivismo argentine (Panama: Imprenta Nacional, 1959).
Zea refers to the English philosopher Herbert Spencer as a 
p o s itiv is t. Spencer was quite generally regarded as such by the 
Latin Americans of the period during which positivism was dominant in 
Spanish and Portuguese America.
^William Rex Crawford, A Century of Latin-American Thought 
(rev. ed. ; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 120.
7por an extensive treatment of the work of Jose Ingenieros 
see Crawford's work (previously c ite d ), pages 116-142.
®Anibal Sanchez Reulet, La filo s o ffa  latinoamerica contem- 
poranea (Washington, D. C: Union Panamericana, 1949), p. 196. See 
also Romero, "Sages," p. 19.
^Romero, "Sages," p. 19.
lOArthur Berndtson, "Latin American Philosophy," Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy, IV, p. 398.
TlZea, Mind, p. 27.
IZ lb id ., p. 217. t^ Ib id ., p. 216.
14crawford, Century, p. 143.
T^Torchfa Estrada, La f ilo s o ffa , p. 250.
TGpor an excellent account and appraisal of Korn and his 
philosophy see Francisco Romero's Alejandro Korn, fil6sofo  de la
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libertad (Buenos Aires; Editorial Reconstruir, 1956). A b rie f but 
memorable assessment of Korn is given in Romero's a r t ic le , "Alejandro 
Korn," in Les grandes courants de la pensée mondiale contemporaine,
I I 16 Partie: P o rtra its , Second volume. The work was edited by M. F. 
Sciacca and published in Milan in 1964. See pages 821-830. See also 
Crawford's work cited above, pages 142-148.
T^For a clear statement of Korn's position on metaphysics, 
see Alejandro Korn, La libertad creadora (Buenos Aires: Editorial
Claridad, 1937), especially the chapter en titled  "Esquema gnoseologico," 
which was orig ina lly  written in 1934. See also Alejandro Korn, Obras 
(La Plata, 1938-1940). Korn committed himself to the position that 
philosophy righ tly  understood is  axiology revealed in history. Values 
are divided according to three groups with multiple types discernible 
in each group. They are (1) biological (economic, instin ctive , and 
e ro tic ), (2) social (v ita l or those having to do with power, and socia l, 
which have to do with ju s tic e ), and (3) cultural (re lig iou s , e th ica l, 
logical and aesthetic). For a b r ie f but helpful explanation of this  
scheme see Torchfa Estrada, La f ilo s o ffa , pp. 256-257. M. F. Sciacca 
makes the plausible claim that i t  was Kant who "cured" Korn of meta­
physics. See Sciacca, Philosophical Trends in the Contemporary World, 
trans. by A tt i l io  Salerno (Notre Dame, Indiana: Univers'ity of Notre
Dame, 1964), p. 646.
t^Romero, "Sages," p. 19. See also Torchfa Estrada, La 
f ilo s o fia , p. 259 and Frondizi, "Contemporary Argentine P h iloso]^ ,"  
p." 183.
T^Zea, Mind, p. 207, quoting Alejandro Korn in "Influencias 
filosoficas en la  evolucion nacional," in Obras, I I I ,  no page given.
ZOlb id . , p. 217, quoting Juan Agustfn Garcfa in Sobre nuestra 
cu ltura, no other information given.
Romero, "Sages," p. 18.
2̂ Ibid. 23 Ibid.
24see Berndtson, "Latin," p. 399. The subject of Heidegger's 
influence in Latin America is explored in John Lawrence Grove's dis­
sertation, The Influence of Heidegger in Latin American Philosophy 
(Boston, 1960). Concerning Romero and Heidegger, Groves offers tne 
following summary: "Romero has thought through many of the d e ta ils ,
as well as some central features and problems, of Heidegger's 
philosophy. He has rejected Heidegger, as compared to his own system, 
although he seems to admit the growing importance of Heidegger and 
existentialism  in the future." Groves, p. 360.
2^The information here is gathered from the following sources 
in which further details of Romero's achievements are to be found: 
Marjorie S. Harris, Francisco Romero on Problems of Philosophy (New 
York: Philosophical Library, 1960), pp. I f f .  Humberto Pinera Liera,
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"Vida y obra de Francisco Romero," Revista Cubana de F iloso ffa , I I  
(July - December, 1951), 5-14. Hugo Rodrfquez-Alcalï, Francisco Romero; 
vida y obra; b ib liograK a, antologia (New York: Hispanic In s titu te ,
Columbia University, 1954), pp. 7 -3 l.
2GRomero named the son Francisco Alejandro in honor of his 
friend , Alejandro Korn.
27Rodrfguez-Alcala, Francisco Romero, p. 28.
^^Salvador Canas, "Refugio de paz y trabajo de Francisco 
Romero," Reportorio Americano, XLVI (1950), 280.
Z^Rodriguez-Alcala, Francisco Romero, pp. 23-24 quoting 
Romero's le t te r  of March 14, 1950.
30lb id . , p. 15.̂  For further study on Romero and positivism  
see Hugo Rodrfguez-Alcala, Mi si on y pensamiento de Francisco Romero 
(Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autdnomo de Mexico, 1959), pp. 11-55.
31 Francisco Romero, "Notes on My Work and Writings," Social 
Sciences in Mexico, I (F a ll,  1947), 72-77.
32 Ib id . , p. 74.
33see Romero, "Notice on My Philosophy," The Southern Philos­
opher, I I  (May, 1953), 4.
34pinera L iera , "Vida y obra," p. 14.
S^Harris, On Problems, p. 2.
^®Hugo Rodrfguez-Alcala, "Francisco Romero on Culture East 
and West," Philosophy East and West, I I  (July, 1952), 155.
37pinera Liera, "Vida y obra," p. 14.
^^Wilhelm Oil they. Pattern and Meaning in History (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1961), p. 98.
39 lb id ., p. 97.
40wilhelm Oil they. Dilthey's Philosophy of Existence; 
Introduction to Weltanschauungslehre, trans. by William Kluback and 
Martin Weinbaum (New York: Bookman Associates, 1957), p. 26. Although
I shall trea t the matter in detail in Chapter I I I ,  I wish to note here 
that Romero disagreed with D ilthey's attributing  man's psychological 
l i f e  in its  entirety  to s p ir it .
41 Ib id ., p. 27.
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CHAPTER I I  
MAN AS MERE INTENTIONALITY
In this chapter I wish f i r s t  to establish that Romero rejected 
several current theories of man, and indicated the differences he had 
with each of them.
In the second place I establish that Romero id en tified  man's 
minimal essence as "mere in ten tionality" and indicate what this 
sign ifies . To do this i t  w ill be nececessary to present Romero's idea of 
intentional consciousness and its  objects, and his ontology of the s e lf.
Next I tre a t the theory of individuals because human in d iv i­
duals are included in this theory and the unique human intentional 
community is composed en tire ly  of human individuals.
Human society and the intentional community (which is an 
advancement over mere society) are the necessary conditions for the 
production of culture. In inquiring into Romero's theory of culture 
at the natural level i t  is important to c la r ify  his notions of objective 
culture, the creative process, and cultural l i f e  as they serve to re­
veal the nature of rudimentary in ten tio n a lity . In this portion of the 
chapter I establish Romero's views on the reciprocity between man 
and culture.
The final division of this chapter contains criticisms of 
this portion of Romero's philosophy. There are some d iff ic u lt ie s  in 
i t .  Notable among these are: (1) his inclination to resolve
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terminological problems a rb itra r ily  rather than by means of argumentation 
and reason. (2) Furthermore, he is not consistent in the appeal he 
makes for establishing acceptance of his terms. Sometimes ordinary 
usage is invoked, but when i t  would count against the use of the terms 
he wishes to adopt he neglects that crite rio n . (3) In addition, there 
are some anomalies in Romero's theory of individuals which require 
attention.
Romero was interested in attempting to answer the question 
"What is man?" In reviewing previous works on philosophical anthro­
pology he gave more attention and praise to Max Scheler's Man's Place 
in Nature than to any other work on the subject.^ Although the 
Argentine philosopher was complimentary of Scheler's work, he held 
that there was considerable difference between his and Scheler's views 
regarding what constitutes man as uniquely human. Scheler pointed out 
that some hold that man is essentially distinguished from the animals 
by possessing intelligence and being able to choose.% Others maintain, 
he observed, that there is no difference between higher animals and 
man except in the degree to which man's intelligence has developed— 
the animals themselves also being possessed of in te llig en ce .3 Scheler's 
position was that animals do have intelligence but are d ifferentiated  
from man in that man possesses s p ir i t ,  which is characterized by 
o b jec tiv ity , freedom, and consciousness of s e lf. S p ir it is the class- 
defining essence of man in Scheler's philosophy.
Scheler and Romero seem to be in agreement as to what con­
stitutes man as a unique being but there is a difference in terminology. 
Scheler wrote: "s p ir it  is o b je c tiv ity , or the determination of the
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objective nature of things"^. . . . "To become human is to acquire 
[an] openness to the world by virtue of the s p ir it .  . . .Objective 
being or ob jec tifica tio n , therefore, is the formal category of the 
logical aspect of s p i r i t . A l l  this Romero refers to as "mere 
in ten tio n a lity , not s p ir it ."  He prefers to withhold the term "s p irit"  
for reference to those acts of the intentional consciousness which 
achieve a complete ob jectification  by affirming the identity and value 
of the object in and of i ts e lf  without reference to the se lf-in te res t  
of the subject,
Romero's differences with Scheler regarding "minimal man" 
are best understood in terms of th e ir  differences on "intelligence" 
and "s p ir it ."  In Romero's thought the extension of the term 
"intelligence" does not include animals nor does he consider man an 
animal.
So-called in te llig e n t operations . . . are known to 
ascertain solutions of new problems, to choose means 
in view of ends, to fabricate tools as a normal and 
habitual performance (and not as the result of a 
chance discovery or an accidental achievement both 
of which can be attributed to mere associative 
m e m o ry ) .6 All these ac tiv ities  presuppose an analysis 
or decomposition of re a lity  and conceptual recomposi­
tion of the elements resulting from such analysis.
An in te llig en t being possesses two versions of 
re a lity : a primary one of things as they are per­
ceived, and a conceptual one in which the natural 
en tities  and th e ir  elements appear reduced to classes, 
genera, and concepts according to a certain systematic 
order. '
This, of course, suggests that for there to be intelligence in Romero's 
sense of the term there must be ob jectification— "intelligence relies  
on ob jectification ." This requires "turning sensations into percep­
tions and states into entities."®
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Romero draws a distinction between sensations and perceptions. 
Sensations f i l l  the consciousness and are not ob jectified  as something 
"other." A sensation, as such, constitutes an undifferentiated state . 
Such a situation in human experience may be illu s tra te d , fo r example, 
by an extreme and overwhelming pain. But man can and does ob jectify  
this and other sensory states and identifies the pain as a "that" 
and as "mine." "In passing from sensation to perceptions, the dawning 
consciousness of merely sensorial being is transformed, c la r if ie d , and
9
s p lit  up into the polarity  of subject and object." This level of 
performance where sensations are transcended and perception, in Romero's 
sense, occurs is the achievement of ob jectification .
Unlike Scheler, Romero does not attribute  ob jectification  
merely to s p ir it  but f i r s t  o f a ll to "mere in ten tio n a lity ."  For 
Romero s p ir it  is the culmination and perfection of the ob jectification  
begun in mere in ten tion a lity . I t  is in mere in ten tion a lity  that the 
subject begins to perform an "intentional function"--a term used by 
Romero in accordance with Husserlian phenomenology. But, in addition 
to its  epistemological and psychological uses, Romero regarded the 
intentional consciousness as the de fin itive  essence of man. The 
intentional consciousness as a permanent condition is the sine qua non 
of minimal man. This objectifying ac tiv ity  of man constitutes a 
difference in kind, not merely degree, from other forms of biological 
l i f e .
The position that sees s p ir it  as constituting man's unique­
ness, i .e .  Scheler's position, attributes the entire human psychical 
ac tiv ity  to s p ir it .  Romero sees this view as holding that man is
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"characterized as being what he is ."  Such a view makes no d istinction
between natural man and man as s p ir i t—a difference Romero believes
needs to be made and understood. He appeals to ordinary language to
ju s tify  his rejecting s p ir it  as the essence of man by remarking that
we commonly identify  some human acts as "s p ir itu a l" and others as not.
The religious application of the term "sp iritua l" is not necessary
here. Romero rejects that connotation when he develops the term in
reference to his own theory. "Spiritual" may be understood here as
" a ltru is tic ,"  or "self-transcending." The s ign ifican t point is that
from Romero's perspective Scheler, in a ttributing  a ll the Geisteswis-
senschaften to the work of s p ir i t ,  appears to have no way to make the
distinction which Romero holds must be made between the incomplete
ob jectification  of mere in ten tio n a lity  and the complete ob jectification
of s p ir it--th e  difference between natural and sp iritu a l acts. (The
term "acts" here may be applied both to cognition and behavior.) As
d istinct from the incomplete ob jectifications of the acts of mere
in ten tion a lity  "sp iritual acts are absolutely 'd isinterested ' acts,
of clear objective d irection, in which the subject transcends himself
and severs a ll  connections between his own concrete subjective in terest
and the fu lfillm e n t of the act."^®
In his id en tifica tion  of man as the being who ob jectifies
Romero was aware of the complex role of the affections and the w ill in
the objectifying judgment.
Besides the objectivizing in ten tion a lity  which gives 
us the objects, the world, there is the vo litiv e  
and affective in te n tio n a lity , i . e . ,  the projection 
of the affections and the w ill towards ob jec tiv ities  
as such and relying on what those are in themselves; 
with th is what is proper and exclusive of the feelings
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and vo lition  o f man is configurated. All this  
constitutes the human basis, what we may call 
natural or minimal man, already quite d iffe ren t 
from the animal. ' '
Simple ob jectification  is ,  of course, not the entire function 
of the intentional consciousness. I t  is the in it ia l  stage--that which 
turns states into en tities  and accomplishes the subject-object po larity . 
I t  not only gives man his world and the awareness of himself, but also 
provides the cognitive data fo r the comprehension o f re a lity  through 
concepts. The intentional consciousness further provides fo r the 
development of culture and ethics and is active throughout the 
development of these areas.
Romero took l i t t l e  in terest in attacking the theories of 
man with which he disagreed. He was convinced that the best procedure 
to follow is to give the clearest account of his own theory of man, 
being careful to specify the points of difference between his and 
other theories, and le t  the case speak fo r i ts e lf .  Although he lis ts  
in the Theory of Man no less than five  theories concerning the unique­
ness of man,12 a ll  of which are in contrast to his own, he avoids a 
fu ll-s ca le  polemic against them, confessing that his lack of in terest 
in such stems both from a "distrust of its  efficacy" and from his own 
temperament. He does, however, point out what he regards as the flaw 
in each of the theories he treats .
Besides contrasting his view of man with Scheler's, Romero 
reviews other theories. One of them is "the view that maintains that 
man lacks a fixed nature and that he is to be understood in terms of 
his becoming, in terms of h is to ry ."13 Such is held by existentialism , 
which Romero regarded not as philosophy but anthropology. Ortega was
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committed to this notion of the human individual. Such views, Romero 
contended, must hold either that there are some norms or guidelines 
that order the becoming—in which case these would constitute man's 
essence (a view quite compatible with Romero's)--or that no such 
norms e x is t, which would entail that the becoming is u tte r "confusion 
and arbitrariness."
The b e lie f that man is essentially defined in terms of his 
"practical or manual experience [which makes possible] the appearance 
of the conception of an objective world" is a view that reverses the 
correct order, according to Romero. I t  is intentional consciousness 
which is the necessary condition for purposeful handling of tools and 
not the reverse. "To fabricate tools as a normal and habitual per­
formance (and not as the result of a chance discovery or an accidental 
achievement . . .)"^^ is an act of intelligence requiring o b je c tif i-  
cation rather than producing i t .  As Romero himself put i t ,  "The 
whole zoological spectrum te s tif ie s  that the mere manipulation of things 
does not usher in humanity."^5
The successful handling of things presupposes the 
capacity for ob jec tifica tio n . To manipulate things 
to the degree necessary to derive knowledge from 
th e ir  handling presupposes the possib ility  of dis­
cerning them as things, of being aware of th e ir  
relations, modes, and properties.16
The thesis that opts for the p r io rity  of the emotions and 
w ill over the in te lle c t as d e fin itiv e  of human nature is also rejected 
by Romero. There assuredly are emotive-impulsive elements "in the 
dark procession of pre-intentional psychism," and Romero has no 
intention of denying the "role of the affections and impulses in the 
formation of intentional consciousness."^^ Nevertheless, human
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emotions and the w ill are intentional already, i .e .  they are raised 
above the subhuman or mere psychic states through the objectifying  
judgment.
The nonintentionalized portion of emotive-impulsive 
elements remains outside the boundary of the 
specifica lly  human, as does a ll that is s tr ic t ly  
organic and further removed, y e t, a ll that is 
mere physical condition, such as taking up space, 
lengthening one's existence in a given part of 
general cosmic time, and finding oneself subject
to g rav ity .l8
This is simply to say that there is much about man that is nonintentional — 
the physical and the liv ing  aspects per se--and Romero insists that in 
his philosophy of man there is no "intention to ignore or forget what 
is nonintentional in man."19
F ina lly , Romero contrasts his view with those "that give the 
dominant role to certain organic or impulsive tendencies, such as the 
sex or power in s tin c ts ."20 The forms that such views take are "pan- 
sexual ism" and "w ill to power." In either case i t  is a mistake to 
hold that man's unique characteristic is sexual conduct or his supposed 
necessity to dominate through power. Human sexual conduct and 
particu larly  man's interpretation of i t  surely are unique, but such 
must be accounted for by the prior fact that man objectifies his world 
and reflects on himself and his behavior.
Romero emphasizes that the w ill to power is such a widespread 
natural tendency that i t  certainly cannot be regarded as man's defining 
characteristic. As he points out, even two hens w ill not liv e  
together without determining which is to dominate. On the other hand, 
man struggles against the tendency to dominate. That tendency "is 
gradually replaced by a universal domain where a ll actual domination
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of one's fellow creatures is excluded, placing in its  stead a
domination of re a lity  by the s p ir it  which is quite contrary to that
21prim itive princip le." Human history is not the march of the 
increasing domination of man over man— rather, i t  is the march 
toward lib e rty .
None of the foregoing efforts to define man is successful.
Man, according to Romero, is the unique form of l i f e  that has 
transcended the merely lived states of animal preintentional psychism 
characterized by sensation states lacking perception. He has become 
an intentional consciousness which permanently ob jectifies its  world. 
Romero calls the intentional consciousness at its  lowest level of 
objectification  "mere in ten tion a lity"; its  cognitive acts are 
imperfect ob jectifications, but this is the ac tiv ity  that constitutes 
the natural or minimal man.
Mere in ten tionality  ob jectifies with a subjective return 
( reqreso subjetivo) ,  which is the term Romero uses to speak of the 
manner in which the attention given to the object is in terms of the 
subject's own interests, needs, or desires. The object is not 
affirmed in its  own right. As the term suggests, th is is a regress— 
a fa llin g  back from fu ll or complete ob jec tiv ity . I t  reveals these 
intentional acts as incomplete ob jectifications. Such intentional 
ac tiv ity  alone w ill not account fo r a ll that the human person is ,  but 
i t  is s u ffic ie n t, Romero believed, to clearly distinguish the essential 
difference between animals and humans.
Romero confessed that th is theory of man is in te lle c tu a lis tic ,  
but insisted that in ten tion a lity  is merely the essential id entifica tion
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of man and that a ll else in man should be seen as structured on that.
I wish to emphasize that he did not maintain "that man governs his 
conduct solely and constantly in the lig h t of his objective 
apprehensions or that these apprehensions are never distorted by 
the pressure of the emotions or the w ill."^^
A ll intentional consciousness i£  consciousness o f some 
object. Romero held that there is no consciousness without awareness 
of an object. In th is he agreed with Husserl, who has made the point 
very clear: "In th is manner, without exception, every conscious
process is ,  in i t s e l f ,  consciousness of such-and-such, regardless of
what the righ tfu l actuality-status of th is objective such-and-such
23may be. . . .' Romero expressed the same in his Theory of Man:
"One cannot properly speak of consciousness when there are only lived
24states. Consciousness is inevitably consciousness of something."
To be "conscious of" is to turn a sensorial state into a group of 
perceived e n titie s . "The subject and the object emerge simultaneously, 
and, with th e ir  simultaneous appearance, the intentional consciousness, 
which they constitute, is founded. To be an object means to be given 
to a subject.
Animals, including the higher primates, e x is t, fo r Romero,
in a condition of pre-intentional psychism which consists only of
lived states. He often used such expressions as "dim," "blind,"
"darkness," to characterize the psychic states of animals and he
appealed to psychologists and th e ir experiments with animals to
26
corroborate his view in the matter. Especially useful to him were 
Aloys Muller's views on the preconscious states of a n i m a l s . I n
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w riting  an exposition of Romero's "anthropological conception" in 1956, 
Torchfa Estrada recalls that Müller had held that an "animal does not 
l iv e , he is l i v e d . T h i s  pre-intentional s ta te , being devoid of both 
intelligence and consciousness in the exact sense of these terms, is 
such that the psychic state knows nothing of i ts e lf  as subject nor of 
any "other" as object. Indeed, there is neither subject nor object 
in such states.
Romero acknowledges that some animals do achieve b r ie f , 
sporadic, unpredictable ob jectifications. Such happenings are 
exceptionally rare and are lik e  minute sparks in darkness. Romero 
believed that such facts do not weaken e ither his claim that man is  
the only creature who lives intentional consciousness, or his insistence 
that between man and animal there is a d istinction of kind and not 
merely degree. Man alone is the permanently objectifying being. The 
permanence in large part is attributab le  to language, which embodies 
concepts.
I f  there is ob jectification  in animals, i t  is 
rudimentary and arrested a fte r  i ts  f i r s t  steps, 
as is shown by the clumsiness and lim ita tion  of 
the intelligence [?] even of higher animals and 
th e ir  lacking an objective language, the 
indispensable means of a permanent and normal 
o b je c tific a ti on.29
Since the intentional consciousness is always a consciousness 
of something i t  is necessary to understand what an object of conscious­
ness is . Romero lis ts  a variety of objects discernible as the content 
of consciousness.
Objects [ in  the most non-restrictive sense] include 
the bodies distributed in space, th e ir  parts taken
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separately, psychical acts, souls, the creations 
of f ic tio n , the ideal en tities  of mathematics 
(numbers, fig u res ), re lations, q u a lities , proper­
t ie s , modes, and so forth . Object, in this 
general sense, is anything to which one turns his 
attention , whether presented in perception or in 
in te llectual insight, whether the result of one's 
own imagination or that of another, of a conjecture 
or a conclusion of any kind. From this point of 
view, which presupposes the p ro file  and existence 
of the subject, an object is anything that te s tif ie s  
to its  presence before a subject.30
But in addition to enumerating objects, we can classify them according
to type. There seem to be three types of o b jec tiv ities . They are
f i r s t ,  complete or whole objects, such as the sheet 
of paper I am using now; second, objects isolated within 
the complete objects, yet perceived in them, such as 
the white color or the form of the sheet of paper. I 
am able to consider such an object e ither individually  
as a single fact or in its  un iversality , as something 
identical with i t s e l f ,  regardless of the complete 
object in which i t  may appear; and, th ird , objects 
created through the synthesis of the features common 
to many primary objects. Many objects of this type 
are referred to as specific objects. A ll th is is the 
consequence of the same objectifying capacity, though 
exercised on d iffe ren t levels , which is constituted 
simultaneously with man. That is ,  what we call man 
is the being capable of these o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n s . 31
Romero emphasizes the uniquely human a b ility  to compare and 
relate individual objects so as to form concepts as one type of 
intentional objects. That capacity has made possible the advancement 
of man. Conceptualization gives names to these generalized ob jec tiv i­
t ie s —"house," "rock," "number," "condition," "quality," etc. "This 
means that the objectifying and nominating functions emerge side by side 
and work in harmony. In e ffe c t, ob jectification  requires or gives rise  
to nomination and would seem to be imperfect without i t .
Let us turn our attention now to Romero's analysis of 
ob jec tifica tio n . There are two elements or "moments" in this process
54
by which an object is presented to a subject. Romero calls them the 
"transcendental" and the "perceptive." The transcendental element of 
objectification  is the undisclosed ac tiv ity  which constitutes the 
object. One cannot explain how, in the inscrutable process of man's 
"transcendental a c tiv ity ,"  the object of consciousness is constituted. 
The manner by which this occurs seems hidden even to consciousness 
i ts e lf .  But the object is_ formed though the constituting a c tiv ity  is 
beyond the subject's perception.
The other element in the accomplishment of ob jectification  
is the perceptive, "in which the constituted object is given to the
subject."33 I t  is su ffic ien t to say that this presentation of the
object is the second moment or element. Although the two elements 
can and should be d iffe ren tia ted , they are in actuality  inseparable.
Romero regarded the occurrence of ob jectification  as man's 
cosmic b irth  and, just as Fichte gave a party when his young son gave 
evidence of self-awareness by using Ich for the f i r s t  time, Romero 
exults at the achievement o f intentional consciousness as a new level 
of re a lity . "One of the most important and surprising events in the 
history of the cosmos occurs with the transformation of the undivided, 
v ita l ,  psychical flux into intentional consciousness."34 There is only 
one level of re a lity  that transcends man as mere in ten tionality  and that 
is man as s p ir it .
In the signal act of o b jec tifica tio n , the "I" is born, not 
as a separate en tity  but as a necessary part of this "new form of 
re a lity ."  And, of course, the s e lf as a subject in the in it ia l  object­
ify ing ac tiv ity  is not conscious of i ts e lf .
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According to Romero, perceiving a thing as a "that," or as 
"there," which is the act of the intentional consciousness, involves 
a rudimentary prelogical judgment. The year following the publication 
in Spanish of the Theory of Man Romero explained his use of "judgment" 
in this context.
The root of intentional a c tiv ity , in both 
the natural and sp iritual in ten tio n a lity , is 
the judgment. To perceive beings and things as 
existing en tities  endowed with special features 
which are peculiar to them is the same as to 
say, judging: that is , that is there, that is 
in a mode or another. Judgment is inside the 
o b jec tifica tio n , not an ex p lic it and conscious 
judgment as that studied by logic but a ta c it ,  
im p lic it judgment, though of the same logical 
order, as admission or rejection. We may say 
therefore: "Man is the being that is a subject"
or "Man is the being that perceives objectively
and also directs his acts of emotion and w ill
towards objects" or "Man is the being who can 
judge." These three propositions are eqivalent 
since to be a subject is the same thing as to 
perceive objectively and because the root of 
this objective perception is the capacity to
judge.35
In merely lived states which are characteristic of animal 
l i f e ,  there is no consciousness and thus no judgment or affirming of
en titie s . "The primary function of the pure s e lf ,  of the subject, is
to direct its  glance toward the states and bring them out of th e ir  
condition as states, elevating them to objective dignity through the 
mere act of being aware of them."36 (There is here an apparent 
implication that existence of the subject precedes that of the object. 
That is not held by Romero and the hint of such a view should be 
attributed to a degree of imprecision in word choice.) Judging is ,  in 
the sense at hand, a predicating of presence, which is identical with
o b je c tific a tio n .37
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Romero draws a comparison between this prelogical judgment 
that affirms an object's presence and the judgment of existentia l 
import in logic. I suggest that what intentional consciousness 
affirms might be referred to as "presentational import." In looking 
at the matter, however, in terms of predication, Romero asserts that 
in the affirm ation made by the judgment in ob jectification  there is  
no clear subject of which some characteristic is being predicated as 
in a prepositional form. In logical predication one has a preposi­
tional subject already constituted as an intentional object. But 
with "the objectifying judgment there is a subject of a quite d is tin ct 
kind because i t  is a state which in that instant ceases to be such, 
since i t  is precisely in its  change from a state to an object that i t  
becomes the subject of the objectifying j u d g m e n t . "^8  (Note that 
"subject" as here used is in a logical frame of reference rather than 
the heretofore phenomenological context.) What is common to and 
unites these two levels of consciousness is judgment.
Although the intentional subject and object are both 
necessary to the prelogical judgment of in ten tio n a lity , Romero held 
that the subject's knowledge of s e lf is a fa ir ly  mature o b je c tif i­
cation. Humanity is begun with consciousness of any object, but 
requires self-consciousness for its  fu lfillm e n t. "Although 
self-consciousness is not a basic element of the human, eventually, 
and in a ll probability , i t  becomes a necessary element without which 
the humanity of man would be incomplete."^9
"In a certain sense" the act of self-knowledge, or the 
subject viewing i ts e lf  as an object, "contradicts the proper course
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of perception,"40 fo r in th is act of ob jectification  the subject 
alters its  nature so as to become its  own object. Romero suggests 
a paralle l between consciousness of the merely external and meta­
physics on the one hand, and consciousness of s e lf  and epistemology 
on the other hand.
Metaphysics is inquiry in the d irect sense and 
is concerned with the being of things. Normally, 
i t  is prio r to the theory of knowledge. The 
la t te r  is an investigation of an indirect or 
reflexive kind. Here, the philosopher must turn 
back toward himself, freeing himself from things 
and concerning himself with his knowledge of 
them, giving attention to the modes by which 
he apprehends and interprets re a lity . Something 
sim ilar also occurs in the development of man 
in the f i r s t  stages of his existence: the 
child is more lucidly aware of the external 
re a lity  than he is of himself, and the so-called  
cris is  of adolescence, in large part, is the 
discovery of one's own inner re a lity . The delay 
in the appearance of self-consciousness confirms 
the role of ob jec tific a tio n , which, understandably, 
fa lls  f i r s t  on what is external, on what is 
foreign, on what comes before the subject (a 
category that includes the subjective things 
which are not the s e lf ) ,  and only la te r  turns to 
the hidden re a lity  of the ultimate subjective 
being.41
In point of fa c t, Romero's view is that " i t  seems undeniable 
that both the consciousness of the 'we' and of the 'you' are temporally 
prio r to that of one's own s e l f . "42 He suggests that the community 
and one's intentional recognition o f i t —i .e .  the ob jectification  of 
the "we"--are necessary in order fo r the s e lf to become re flex ive .
The human community is seen, then, as necessary to man's becoming 
fu lly  and completely human.
Important to an understanding of Romero's position on 
intentional consciousness as d e fin itive  of humanity is a statement o f
58
his view concerning the ontology of the s e lf. In his Theory of Man 
Romero recalled three concepts of the s e lf  in Husserl's writings and 
iden tified  his own view with what he called Husserl's th ird  in terpreta­
tio n .*^  The s e lf thus conceived is "something that lives and is
44modified through liv in g , as an essentially historical being." He
quotes Husserl :
With every act i t  carries out and which has a 
new objective meaning, the s e lf . . . acquires 
a permanently new characteristic . I f  I decide, 
for example, fo r the f i r s t  time in an act of 
judgment regarding the existence of some being
and fo r some given determination of that being,
the act passes on, but I ^  and hereafter
remain a s e lf  that has decided in thus and
such a manner. 45
Each intentional subject is a human individual and Romero's 
theory of human individuals is better understood i f  his general 
doctrine of individuals is examined. Taking individuum in a radical 
sense of its  meaning, Romero held that individuality is not constituted 
by anything external to the individual but by an "internal princip le ."
A rock is not an individual—i f  i t  is broken nothing is lo s t, fo r i t  
was kept together in a merely apparent individuality  by something 
outside or external to i t .  I t  is easily thought of as a part of a 
larger rock. In d iv id u a lity , properly understood, "is dependent upon 
the action or control of an internal p r i n c i p l e . i f ,  for instance, 
an atom (or its  elements), a molecule, a crysta l, a p lant, or an
animal is divided, something essential is lost—there is mutilation
of an individual, even i f  the separated portion can be replaced by 
the individual.
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Individuals on one scale may form together to constitute a 
new individual on another scale. These corporate or socializing  
individuals are "functional collectives," also dependent upon an 
"internal princip le ." Examples of such are ant h i l ls ,  beehives, and 
various human organizations. The criterion for corporate ind ividuality  
is that i t  be "centered in i ts e lf  and organized by an inner necessity." 
Individuals at a ll  levels w ill be in d iv is ib le , separate, and re la tive ly  
autonomous.
Romero held that there are degrees of in d iv id u a lity , and 
that the degree o f ind iv idua lity  is a function of the in tensification  
of the individual's unity of structure and function. The higher in 
the natural order the unit is , the more of an individual i t  is .
Because of its  in tensified  structure and expanded function the animal 
is more of an individual than a plant. A plant exhib its , by the same 
token, a higher degree of individualization than a molecule. The 
most individualized individuum is man, who is constituted as an 
individual intentional consciousness.
The fin a l point in Romero's doctrine of individuals is that 
as there is an increase in the degree of individualization there is 
advance toward universality--"toward liberation  from enclosure in 
the p a rtic u la r ."47 Growth toward universality must not be achieved, 
however, at the expense of the individual. Romero's position that 
progress in individualization is also movement in the direction of 
universality is paradoxical. He comments on this apparent contra­
diction in the following remarks.
The increasing individualization . . .  is an increase in
the radius of action of the e n tity , which while i t  becomes
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more i t s e l f ,  in tensifies its  ju risd ic tio n , its  capacity 
to project i ts e lf  into areas increasingly varied and 
extensive so that i t  gradually amplifies its  re lation­
ships with things and beings. The meaning of the 
direction of this development is seen when one thinks 
of the ordered series of in d iv id u a lities , from those 
of plant l i f e  and animal l i f e  in the most primeval 
ages to the anthropoids. With th e ir more active 
processes, with th e ir m obility, animals are far ahead 
of plants in th e ir  relations with things. Psychically, 
the animal species in general gradually open up to 
the world as they climb in the zoological hierarchy, 
and we are able to imagine something like  a fog between 
them and re a lity , which l i t t l e  by l i t t l e  is dispersed. 
In ten tionality  releases the gust of wind that blows 
the fog away completely and with i t  pure animal l i f e  
has come to an end.48
In these remarks Romero is insisting that growth in individualization
necessarily proceeds toward universalization. That is , a t these
successively higher levels the greater individual "has extended its
outreach, . . . making use of its  environment, . . . creating new
individuals"49 through its  'socia liz ing ' tendency.
Human individuals, of course, compose the human intentional
community and Romero distinguishes between i t  and the preintentional
animal community.
In an animal group, beings are joined that have no 
objectified  inner world and are not endowed with 
an instrument of expression suited for communicating 
this world and thus making i t  a common property of the 
group. But i t  is exactly this which occurs in a 
human association and imparts to i t  the essential 
quality for which i t  may be called an intentional com­
munity. 50
The human community is composed of individuals each of whom is possessed
of both a need and an a b ility  to communicate the content of his inten­
tional consciousness. In this thÆ human community is distinguished 
from an animal community. The intentional community "is a mere 
aggregation of intentional un ities , based on the spontaneous tendency
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of in ten tionality  to sa lly  forth from i ts e l f  and communicate with 
others."51
As a resu lt, "the human community is an association of 
subjects and common storehouse of th e ir  ob jec tifications , which are 
at the disposal of each member so fa r as he is capable of receiving 
them as significant th ings."52 "To a considerable extent, a community 
is a tra d itio n , an accumulation."53 (Romero distinguished between 
"tra d itio n " , which is desirable and necessary fo r human advancement, 
and "traditionalism ", which is s tu ltify in g  and counter-productive.)
"The whole community is a vast school, which teaches and instructs man 
from the time his in te lle c t is f i r s t  kindled until the time i t  f in a lly  
goes out.
But the human community, and i t  alone, is capable of becoming
a society. Although one may correctly speak of "social l i fe "  in animal
community, i t  never achieves a society.55 Society "is based on the
capacity of external ob jec tifica tio n . A rudimentary society begins to
emerge as soon as the individuals have gained objective perception of
th e ir community."55 This is stated a b it  more fu lly  in Theory of Man.
A society [ is ]  a grouping with norms and purposes more 
clearly established. In general, . . .  a human grouping 
is  properly a community which, through the o b je c tif i­
cation of ends and means, engenders a great variety of 
p a rt ia l, well-defined groups, but in addition tends to 
change from the communal to the social [so c ie ta l]5 ' 
because o f the ob jectification  of the communal re la tio n s .58
To put the distinction in other words, the in ten tional,
pre-societal community is a group of objectifying individuals who
exist without an awareness of th e ir  interpersonal relationships.
Society exists once individuals begin to objectify those relationships
and especially once language and other symbols are developed and
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employed. Society is an advancement in humanization over the bare
intentional community.
The intentional community is freighted with its  own 
h is to ric ity . Just as "the s e lf  . . . acquires a permanently new 
characteristic"^  ̂ with each act of ob jectification  or judgment, so 
the intentional community, in the course of its  achievements, is 
permanently changed into a society by means of the cultural object­
ifica tions  i t  accomplishes.
Culture, lik e  man himself, begins on what Romero identifies  
as the natural level of re a lity  and develops to the s p ir itu a l. This 
transition is explained in terms of the intentional consciousness and 
its  development from a basic "mere in ten tionality" to "in ten tionality  
made s p ir itu a l."  The basic difference in these two types of inten­
tional consciousness is that the former performs acts of ob jectification  
that are marred by the subjective return. The acts of sp iritua l 
in ten tio n a lity  have no such defect. O bjectification in such acts is 
complete— "absolute," as Romero expresses i t .
In treating Romero's theory of culture on the natural le v e l, 
one must show the crucial role of language in the achievement of culture. 
Romero emphasized the auspicious contribution of language toward the 
advancement of humanity by showing that i t  is unique among the cultural 
products. Although the intentional consciousness is d e fin itiv e  of 
humanity, language is essential to sustain and extend that new level 
of re a lity . "Language is at once the result and the condition of 
in ten tion a lity  as a normal function."61 "Objective language [ is ]  the 
indispensable means of a permanent and normal o b je c tific a tio n ."6%
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In human language there are terms fo r concepts, and concepts
constitute one class of objects. Concepts and the terms by which they
are id en tified  are essential to the advancement of man, "for a non-
conceptual objective language would be a language in which each
individual object had a lin g u is tic  sign of its  own, which is p ractica lly
impossible."63 "What cannot be doubted, so fa r  as we are concerned,
is that man emerges at the same time as does significant or objective
language."64 in Theory of Man Romero suggest the manner in which
language enhances ob jec tifica tio n .
The primary function of language, then, would be 
expression; but i t  also includes communication, 
which is understood as the communication of the 
subject with him self, his saying to himself that 
he perceives, that he is aware of a presence, that 
he has something in sight. Man possesses non­
sign ificant language, in common with the animals, 
yet the superiority and the fullness that i t  attains  
in him is due to that in the emotions and volitions  
which is sp ec ifica lly  human. I t  stems from the 
fact that emotions and volitions are phenomena which 
occur in a subject who is ever conscious o f a vast 
world of o b jec tiv ities . Communication in the proper 
sense, which is the transmission of objectifications  
to other subjects through signs, may undoubtedly 
stimulate nomination, and, perhaps by re fle c tio n , 
i t  may stimulate the ob jectification  contained in 
the foundation of nomination; but this is only an 
incentive to continue the task that the subject 
already carries on by inclination and even by in ­
tr in s ic  necessity. To perceive in terms of 
ob jectiv ity  already implies something akin to te llin g  
oneself that something on the horizon of consciousness 
stands out. To speak is to te l l  i t  to oneself and 
then to te l l  i t  to o t h e r s . 6 5
Despite its  uniqueness language is produced analogously to 
other cultural productions. In the creation both of language and of 
other cultural products there is a d istinction between expression and 
communication. The "expressing a c tiv ity ,"  which is a subjective 
ac tiv ity  of an individual intentional consciousness, is "a spontaneous
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prolongation of the objectifying a t t i t u d e . " T h e  in it ia l  sources of 
language and of a rt are one and the same, and they ought to be related  
not to special values but to a spontaneous exteriorization of something 
inward."67 The in i t ia l  stage of externalization is expression, which 
prolongs the objectifying act. Communication is subsequent and sub­
sidiary to expression.
Romero uses the terms "objective culture" and "cultural 
l i fe "  to distinguish between man's cultural products, on the one hand, 
and his existence amid those productions, on the other hand. In an 
excellent a r tic le  published in 1949 Romero characterized the former 
as consisting "of the unending succession of man's creations. . . 
which constitute his environment; an environment which is something lik e  
his own inner being materialized and externalized."68 Later, in 
Theory of Man, he expressed a more precise meaning: "Objective culture
includes a ll of man's creations that achieve substantiality and 
autonomy with reference to th e ir  creator and thus have a re la tive ly  
separate existence, such as institu tio ns , works of a r t , theories, 
and customs."69
Romero is not altogether consistent in his characterization  
of objective culture. In 1941—eleven years prior to the appearance 
of Theory of Man--he wrote: "Cultural products are realizations of
the s p ir i t ,  sp iritua l objectifications or m ateria lizations."78 This 
attribution  of objective culture en tire ly  to s p ir it  is negated in 
Theory of Man. 71 There his position is that cultural productions come 
about f i r s t  within the prespiritual community--even the presocietal 
community.
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On another occasion prior to the publication of Theory of 
Man he wrote: " [In ] graphic terms, although not wholly proper ones:
[Objective culture is ]  the transformation of s p ir it  into th ing ."7%
The statement has the questionable virtue of having only one asset-- 
i t  is graphic. Its  l ia b i l i t y  is that in lig h t of Romero's la te r  
statements on the subject i t  is misleading, even erroneous, on two 
counts: (1) S p ir it does not really  become "things"--the statement is
a metaphor. (2) According to Romero's la te r  work [Theory of Man) 
objective culture is not restricted to the productions or ac tiv ities  
of s p ir it .  In his most d e fin itive  statements on his theory of culture 
the highest achievements of culture are to be understood as expressions 
of s p ir it .  But in the vast majority of cultural objectifications i t  
is mere in ten tionality  that is responsible.
The division of cultural productions or "objective culture" 
has been made by other philosophers of culture and Romero reviewed 
some of those e ffo rts . One such classification is the following: 
a r t , re lig io n , philosophy, science, technology, mythology, m orality, 
customs, society, the s ta te , language, etc.^3 Such a breakdown seemed 
to Romero organizationally defic ient, as indeed i t  is . I t  is an 
attempt to arrange the productions "according to the content," whereas 
the e f fo r t  should be to classify "according to the manner and direction  
of the ob jec tification ."
In his Contemporary Philosophy ( Filosoffa contemporanea) 
Romero praised the classification  and division outlined by Hans Freyer 
in his Theory of the Objective S p ir it , a work which Romero believed 
comprised "solid and durable material for a complete theory of 
cu ltu re ."74 The five  following general types or categories of
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objective cultural productions are approbatively treated by Romero 
and are attributed by him to Freyer: (1) those objects that are
"formations or creations," including a r t ,  a ll theory, religious doc­
trines , the sciences, philosophy; (2) the usefu l- - that which is made 
or devised for the purpose of practical u t i l i t y  such as tools, 
machinery--even houses, s treets , ships, etc; (3) signs, such as 
language, mathematical formulae, landmarks, and road signs, which 
"serve expressly to signify something"; (4) social forms, including 
human re lations, customs, and law; and f in a lly , (5) education, which 
includes the cultural benefits generally made available to the 
individual, as well as general education and education in specific  
areas such as medicine and jurisprudence.^5 Although this scheme is
by no means exhaustive, i t  does suggest the breadth of the term
"objective culture,"
Romero rejected the proposal made by some that culture and 
c iv iliza tio n  be d ifferentiated  so as to make the la t te r  term 
applicable only to the realm of the practical and technical, and thus 
exclude such from culture. He held that "the notion of culture 
[should include] every human product and a ll human conduct."76 
Objective culture may even be broadened in its  application so as to
include "not only what man produces or purposely alters but also
everything to which he actually ascribes a meaning by his own s e lf  
and his needs, everything that in one way or another he brings into  
his own evironment and places in reference to h i m s e l f . B u t  to 
adopt such a broad meaning for objective culture would result in a 
fa r too general inclusiveness. Romero states that his in terpretation  
of objective culture "w ill consider only human artifac ts  and actual
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modifications of things." This statement, however, w ill need to be
considered as complementary to those above concerning language,
custom, laws, and institu tions.
Romero considered the meaning o f the cultural object the
greatest problem in the philosophy of culture.
The essential problem of the cultural is in general 
a problem of significance, of meaning. Almost a ll 
cultural objects manifest themselves to us outwardly 
as physical objects. . . . But what distinguishes 
the cultural object from the natural object is that 
the natural object is ,  above a l l ,  a physical consti­
tu tion , while that which is essential in the cultural 
object is that its  physical, external re a lity  is only 
the support of the meaning, the receptacle of the 
sp iritua l content. . . . The interpretation of the 
cultural consists in every case, then, in going on 
from those signs, receptacles, vehicles to that 
expressed by them, to that which is contained, to 
the human intention which they enclose.78
We shall grasp the meaning of any cultural object only by succeeding 
in this e ffo r t.
This is not to say that Romero would attempt to ground 
aesthetic value in the intention of the creator of the objective 
a rtic le . One would not attempt to judge the aesthetic value of a work 
of a rt on the basis of whether or not the a r t is t  accomplished his pur­
pose. What is the issue here, instead, is the meaning of a given 
a rtic le  produced by an intentional consciousness within a particu lar  
culture. That meaning cannot be separated from the meaning intended 
by the intentional consciousness of the one who produced i t  by a 
creative act. Furthermore, the object's fu ll meaning must include the 
meaning given to i t  by the culture within which i t  is included.
There are various characteristics postulable of d ifferen t 
portions of objective culture. These are not in trin s ic  qualities of
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the cultural object i t s e l f ;  rather they are relational characteristics  
of objective culture to the l i f e  of man. They refer to the function 
of cultural products in human l i f e .  One or another of these qualities  
or characteristics may be asserted of a ll cultural objects.
In the f i r s t  place, objective culture provides concrete 
representations of human objectifications. These objectifications  
have meanings of th e ir  own which are expressed through the concrete 
and physical existants. Second, objects of culture o ffe r guidance, 
stimulation, and instruction to man's subjective l i f e  individually and 
communally. Third, some cultural productions contribute to the 
establishment of the societal order. Fourth, they increase man's 
"rule over nature" and prepare the way for his emerging s p ir itu a lity .
F ina lly , objective culture "is a veritable medium and atmosphere for
man. " " I t  is part of the fate of man that he cannot jump across 
his culture, any more than he can jump across his own shadow."80 
These five characteristics reveal that objective culture is ,  on the 
one hand, the external expression or projection of man's inner l i f e ,  
and, on the other hand, the result and evidence of his humanization 
of the natural order--o f the human colonization of the nonhuman.
Romero was aware that he had not succeeded in developing a
complete theory of culture although he had hoped to some day publish
such a work. He often acknowledged the fragmentary, tentative  
character of his work on the philosophy of culture. What he did 
accomplish in this area, however, is an account of objective culture 
that corresponds to his theory of man as intentional consciousness and 
s p ir i t .  Man is an objectifying being whose essential nature impels 
him to express to himself and to communicate to others the objects of
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his individual in ten tion a lity . Some of these objects are physical, 
others are idea l, imaginative, or hallucinatory. S t i l l  others are 
generalizations of particu lars, or perhaps attitudes, and even relations 
as well as a myriad of other types of objectifications. Man communicates 
them a ll in cultural objects, including in s titu tio ns , laws, a r t is t ic  
products, mechanical inventions, philosophy, and re lig ion .
The creative process needs our attention now, for this is 
the process by which in ten tionality  produces objective culture.
Romero called i t  "creative ob jectification ." The most notable passgge 
he has written on the subject is in Theory of Man, which w ill be 
paraphrased here so that his idea of creativ ity  as process and product 
may be understood. Since there is such a variety of cultural objects— 
in s titu tio n s , creeds, tools, sculpture, laws—and since there is some 
variance in the steps by which in ten tionality  externalizes these 
extremely varied objects, an attempt should be made to avoid excessive 
formalizing of the creative process.
F irst of a ll in the creative process the objectifying subject 
imaginatively forges the idea. I t  may seem that i t  even comes to 
possess him—the song sings in his soul, the tool is  f e l t  in his hand, 
the formula dictates i t s e l f  to him. Of the multitude of man's 
"imagings," however, few become objectified creations, and even fewer 
attain  acceptance into objective culture. Just as some seeds never 
break the s o il, fa ilin g  to complete fe r t i l iz a t io n , so some o b je c tif i­
cations are abortive. These are the objects entertained by an 
intentional consciousness, but never externalized. Others see the 
lig h t of day as fu t i le  e ffo rts . These are the creations which are 
not assimilated in the "collective consensus" of the people in the
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culture. The song that does not speak to anyone, the tool fo r which 
none find a use, the formula that is not needed or is in error—these, 
to borrow Hume's term, w ill fa l l  "dead-born" into the world. I f  a 
cultural object is persistently neglected by society i t  becomes e ither  
a cultural oddity or a biographical curiosity, somehow deprived of fu ll  
cultural status.
In its  creative process an intentional consciousness is 
judging that something ought to be which is not. The inventor o f a 
machine judges that i t  ought to be b u ilt . The w riter of a song, 
that i t  should be heard. The framer of a law or moral code, that i t  
should be adhered to. These judgments, Romero held, are necessarily 
made when the creative in ten tion a lity  externalizes its  ob jec tification . 
Culture is b u ilt by the agreement between the judgment of individual 
or collective creators and the consensus of society. When the creator's  
judgment concerning his creation finds corroboration in the community, 
the object created then lives in objective culture, taking up an 
identity  no longer dependent upon the mind and efforts of its  creator.
I wish now to turn to the second of the important distinctions  
Romero makes within the realm of culture. The f i r s t ,  which has been 
covered above, was "objective culture." The other, to which we now 
turn, is "cultural l i f e ."  The two terms identify  the relationship  
between man and his cultural creations. In i t ia l ly ,  man creates them 
but they become the milieu within which he exists and by which his l i f e  
is fashioned.
"Cultural l ife "  specifies the state of man among the vast 
array of the creations of in ten tion a lity . The influence of culture  
upon man is profound and pervasive.
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To say that culture influences man is not enough, 
because one could imagine an e ffec t of a more or 
less occasional and restricted reaction. In tru th , 
culture collaborates in an enormous and irreplace­
able manner in the constitution, maintenance, and 
accretion of human intimacy, of that which is human 
in man. I f  i t  is certain in general that we are 
fathers and sons of our works, this is most true 
when our works are not acts that pass, but objective 
rea lizations, and when we attend . . .  to the com­
munity in time, which in every stage carries its  
contribution to the multi secular culture and 
simultaneously assimilates and improves the total 
legacy of past generations.
An entire  world of forms, in s titu tio n s , usages 
and norms welcomes man when he is born, and is as an 
inv is ib le  school which indoctrinates him from his 
f i r s t  years and does not cease instructing and molding 
him until his death.81
Whereas an animal's inheritance is merely biological or 
organic, man's heritage is fa r more extensive. The legacy that is 
exclusively man's includes in addition to the somatic a large content 
of the psychic, even psychic-spiritual, possessions of previous 
generations. Theoretically, each man inherits a ll the vast store of
cultural re a litie s  that have been produced and preserved in his
cultural past. The enormous heritage is such, however, that no in d i­
vidual can fu lly  appropriate i t .  The extent to which he rea lly
receives i t  depends on "the breadth of his comprehension" as well as 
his own unique situation in time and place.
The risk of losing the cultural heritage is as great as the 
legacy is massive. Man may lose large segments of his inheritance i f  
i t  is hidden, or taken from him, or i f  he is "careless in appropriating
i t . "  And the real tragedy in such a loss is that
during the interval between the extinction and the 
restoration, the area in cris is  seems simply abolished, 
nonexistent, and that phase of the human soul which
looked toward i t  and was nourished by i t  remains empty
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and at times retreats to much e a r lie r  stages, and in 
some instances, to a lamentable prim itivism .82
Romero contended that the acknowledgment that the human being 
is shaped through his culture is not in co n flic t with his persuasion 
that man possesses a principle ( principio) "in him" that makes culture 
possible. That princ ip le , fo r Romero, is man's capacity to objectify  
and, u ltim ately, his p o ten tia lity  to become a sp iritua l being. Romero 
recalled that Ortega maintained that man has no being or essense (s e r), 
that he is a mere becoming ( devin ir) . Such a view "denies in advance 
the marks of man's being [ ser] that might be deducible from the con­
stants of that same becoming, inasmuch as that becoming is not pure 
chance, and i t  overlooks also the question of the spring or origin of 
the specific human becoming [ devinir] . "83
Man's cultural heritage becomes most tru ly  his through 
philosophy. In philosophy of culture the intentional consciousness 
analyzes and evaluates the cultural l i f e  within which i t  dwells and 
fo r which i t  is responsible. By this means man becomes re flec tive  
about his cultural productions and consciously makes changes in the 
cultural l i f e .
Philosophy is culture as idea or problem. The human 
s p ir i t ,  which in great part has created culture 
[s p ir it  in culture w ill be dealt with in Chapter I I I ] ,  
spontaneously and even unconsciously turns above i t  to 
comprehend i t  and judge i t ,  to discover its  source, to 
make clear its  ends and to estimate its  meaning.84
Furthermore,
A philosophy of culture is able to reduce the various 
human values to seven, in the following order: Scien­
t i f i c ,  re lig ious, e th ic a l, ju r id ic a l, economic, 
p o lit ic a l,  and aesthetic. None of these values are 
wholly independent of the others. The most independent 
and also the most d i f f ic u lt  o f a ll the values to understand, 
is the aesthetic v a l u e . 85
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The unfinished nature of Romero's philosophy of culture 
le f t  the p a rticu la rities  of the human values undeveloped. Had he 
completed a genuinely comprehensive theory of culture i t  would have 
been necessary for him to show both the relations among these various 
values and the hierarchy they form. I t  seems to me that these are 
matters which Romero is here committing himself to c la rify in g  in such 
a work. In addition, he held that any adequate philosophy of culture 
must include ontological and epistemological, as well as axiological, 
analyses.
I have to this point in the present chapter presented 
Romero's theory concerning the essence of humanity at its  minimal leve l.
I have expressed the d e fin itive  characteristic of man—that which 
separates mankind from a ll other forms of l i f e .  I t  is the intentional 
consciousness as a permanent state that d ifferentiates him from the 
rest of re a lity . This, in its  most elementary state , is what Romero 
calls "natural man."
In addition, I have presented the features of Romero's 
philosophy of culture and have pursued to considerable length his 
positions on objective cu lture, the creative process, and cultural 
l i f e .  Individual objectifying consciousnesses existing in relation as an 
intentional community develop into a society by means of becoming con­
scious of the externalizations of each other's subjective l i f e ,  and 
thus create a growing culture. The massive cultural milieu which 
results encapsulates man, molding him a fte r  its  fashion, and he, being 
aware of that shaping, remolds his culture.
I  turn now from the presentation o f Romero's views of natural 
man and culture to consider a few criticisms of his theory of man up
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to this point. The f i r s t  point o f critic ism  I wish to trea t in 
Romero's theory of man and culture on the natural level is his choice 
of terms. Romero is inclined to se ttle  some problems of terminology 
by arb itrary  stipu lative meanings rather than by methodical analysis 
of the problems and by argument.®® Such terms as "intelligence,"  
"sensation," "perception," "community," and "society" are examples of 
th is . He is not altogether convincing in his insistence that we 
cannot predicate intelligence of animals simply because they do not 
objectify th e ir lived state or its  constituents. His contention that 
sensations are to be distinguished from perceptions in that only the 
la t te r  are ob jectified  also has an arbitrary element. And surely, 
his declaration that the term "society" should apply only to a certain  
level of the intentional community, that animals have communities but 
not societies, is quite arb itrary . One can find no good reason, and 
Romero offers none, fo r not reversing the order of these terms.
In his treatment of the term "sp irit"  Romero applied a 
criterion  that he does not use in the other questions involving term­
inology. That criterion  is the ordinary use of language. In 
defending his use of "sp irit"  as applying to only some human cognitive 
acts and behavior, Romero observed that the ordinary man reserves the 
term "spiritual act" for the most praiseworthy human deeds, and th a t, 
therefore, such a distinction ought to be maintained in the philoso­
phic use of the term. He does not appeal to ordinary usage in 
arriving at the meanings of the other terms, although I find no reason, 
in p rinc ip le , why this index should not apply to other terms. Of 
course, i f  that standard were applied to the terms in question, i t  
would, in most i f  not a ll cases, count against Romero's use.
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Romero's theory of individuals has some problems. What 
precisely is an "internal principle" whose action or control provides 
ind iv iduality  in the ontological sense he describes? I do not find  
any denotation of these principles in his development of the theory.
In what manner, fo r example, is i t  correct to say a rock is not held 
together by an internal principle and is , therefore, not an individual?
Furthermore, i f  a rock is not an individual on the grounds 
that i t  may be thought of as a separated part of a larger e n tity , why 
must an atom or a graft from a plant be considered an individual when 
these alsc^may be so considered?
The most troublesome statement in Romero's theory of individ­
uals is his contention that an individual is more of an individual in 
direct ra tio  to its  inner complexity. In terms of in d iv is ib il ity ,  
exactly the opposite would appear more defensible--the more simple the 
structure and function, the more individual the en tity . I t  is under­
standable that Romero needed to regard the human individual of superior 
value and tending much more toward universalization than more simple 
individuals. However, this could have been done without claiming that 
the more complex the structure and function of the individual, the more 
individual i t  is .
In summary, I have shown the differences Romero himself 
pointed out between his philosophy of man and others. I have shown 
that Romero held to the intentional consciousness as the essential 
constitutive element of minimal or natural man and that man is the 
sole repository of intelligence and consciousness. This view purposely 
rejects characterizing man at this natural level as " s p ir it ,"  re­
serving that term for man at a higher, transcendent level of being. 
Natural man is minimal man and as such he is nonspiritual.
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In dealing with the intentional consciousness of natural man 
I have shown that Romero refers to human consciousness at th is level 
of re a lity  as "mere in tentionality" and that as such each act of human 
in ten tionality  is flawed by the subject's necessity of referring the 
object to himself. This "subjective regress" is overcome by man as 
s p ir it  and is the difference between the act of mere in ten tion a lity  
and s p ir itu a lity . I have shown that the "subjective regress" is the 
fa ilu re  of an intentional act to be a perfect act of ob jec tification .
I have shown here that the process of ob jectification  in ­
cludes both a transcendental and a perceptive element, according to 
Romero, and I have treated the diversity of the intentional objects 
he recognizes, both the perceptual and the conceptual.
Self-knowledge has been seen as an advanced act of inten­
tio n a lity , one which is a more mature ob jectification  than the 
awareness of objects external to the subject. The consciousness of 
s e lf is also viewed as a more mature act of consciousness than the 
awareness of the."we" of community and society and somewhat dependent 
on that awareness.
Next I have offered an exposition of Romero's theory of 
individuals and shown its  relevance to his theory of man and culture 
on the natural level of re a lity .
I have shown that the intentional community, as d is tin ct 
from animal communities, is comprised of intentionalizing individuals 
who may or may not be re fle c tiv e ly  aware of th e ir  relationship in 
community. Because of the permanence and persistence of intentional 
consciousness, however, community is transformed into society. That 
is achieved when individual men express and communicate the content of
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th e ir  own consciousnesses and when individuals in community become 
aware that others are sharing th e ir  subjective l i f e  through objective 
cultural creations. Throughout the growth of community and rudimentary 
society, language develops f i r s t  as a subjective prolongation o f the 
"that is" or "that is there" in consciousness. This inner affirming is 
expressed in objective language and subsequently communicated to other 
consciousnesses in that medium.
The reciprocal relationship that exists between man and his 
culture has been discussed in terms of "objective culture" and "cultural 
l i f e ."  I have shown how objective cultural productions are the creative 
results of the objectifications of the intentional consciousness. Man 
creates his cultural environment and is ,  in turn, himself fashioned 
by i t .  Objective culture incorporates a ll the productions of man as 
well as the process of the creation of the cultural o b je c tiv ities . A ll 
of the varieties of cultural production are, despite the apparent dis­
s im ila r it ie s , the work of the objectifying nature o f man.
I have treated Romero's idea of the problem of determining the 
meaning of objective culture. In order to understand any phase of 
cultural production i t  is necessary to go beyond the in s titu tio n s , the 
physical objects, written words, and works of a rt to the meaning in ­
tended by the intentional consciousness responsible fo r th e ir  in i t ia l  
and continued existence. Only thereby can meaning be found. Romero 
does not explain how one discovers the intentional content of a con­
sciousness.
Every man enters a world that is heavy with culture and 
trad itio n . The pre-human world is not available to him. His culture 
envelops him with language structured conceptually in terms o f the
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composite in ten tional!ties  of its  past communal and societal generations. 
There is no Adam entering an unhumanized world. A prepared atmosphere 
is provided in which the ongoing creational process is continuously 
pursued and, despite the fact that the cultural l i f e  can be and is 
being transformed in varying degrees, every man begins his l i f e  in a 
cu ltu ra l, humanized environment.
The theory we have here is that man has an irreducible  
essence which constitutes his nature--he is the being that permanently 
and uniquely ob jectifies his environment. He is an intentional 
consciousness and thus is d ifferen tiated  from a ll other forms of l i f e .
He is a new level of re a lity  and has the po ten tia lity  for perfecting 
the propensity to ob jectify .
I t  is a theory that man is also a becoming--he is in process 
of not only colonizing the world by humanizing i t  but of being shaped 
in his becoming by the mass of cultural re a litie s  he continually 
produces and which each succeeding generation of his kind inherits .
And, as we shall see, he is in the process of becoming s p ir itu a l.
We are prepared now to deal with the sp iritua l man—the 
being in whom in ten tion a lity  is expressed in fu ll o b jec tific a tio n , in 
whom mere in ten tion a lity  is transcended and cognitive acts occur with 
no subjective regress. In such, the object of consciousness is viewed 
in its  own r ig h t, affirmed for i t s e l f ,  is id entified  and evaluated 
without respect to the in terests , needs, ambitions, or desires of the 
subject. This is the act of completed ob jec tification . In such an 
act of cognition the subject transcends himself. We shall see that 
man as s p ir it  has implications fo r culture.
Notes
Chapter Two
1 Romero's commendations of Scheler's Man's Place in Nature 
were offered from a wide acquaintance with works on man and culture 
in various languages. Romero wrote "[Scheler's] exposition ranks, in 
my opinion, among the clearest and most apposite." See the essay 
"Man and Culture" by Romero, trans. by Helene Weyl as Chapter 18 in 
F. S. C. Northrop, e d ., Ideological Differences and World Order (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1949), p. 386.
^Max Scheler, Man's Place in Nature, trans. by Hans Meyerhoff 
(N. Y .: Farrar, Strauss and Co., 1961), p. 35.
3%bid. Scheler attributes this position to the Darwinian- 
Lamarckian school.
4 lb id ., p. 37. S ib id ., p. 39.
^Romero defines "associative memory" as the "retention of 
whole situations, be they natural or arranged, as those used by man 
in train ing animals." Such mental ac tiv ity  "requires no analysis and 
recomposition of re a lity ."  See Romero, "Man and Culture," p. 386.
^Romero, "Man and Culture," p. 387.
Bibid. 9 Ibid.
lORomero, Theory, p. 16.
llRomero, "Notice," p. 2. "Already" is a word well chosen, 
fo r i t  points up Romero's other difference with Scheler concerning 
the basic character of man. I t  is unnecessary to introduce "s p ir it ,"  
as Scheler does, in order to make manifest the uniqueness of man. For 
Romero, mere in ten tion a lity  does not constitute the sp iritua l being of 
man. He has no intention of denying the legitimacy of either the term 
"s p irit"  or of its  employment in philosophical anthropology, but he 
does in s is t that i t  is not only unnecessary but incorrect to use i t  as 
the defining characteristic of man. On this point he repeatedly affirms 
his disagreement with Scheler.
lORomero, Theory, pp. 14-27.
TSib id., p. 14.
79
80
T4Romero, "Man and Culture," p. 387.
lORomero, Theory, p. 17. ^^Ib id . , p. 18.
I f lb id . ,  p. 20.
I Glbid. , p. 21. "Finding oneself" ( encontrarse) is an 
unfortunate choice of words. Surely the cognitive act of "finding 
oneself subject to gravity" is an intentional act. What Romero wished 
to re fer to here is simply "being subject to gravity" and i t  should be 
so translated.
19lb id . ZOlbid., p. 14.
21 Ib id .. p. 27. 22 ib id ., p. 24.
23[dmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, trans. by Dorion 
Cairns (The Hague: Martinus N ijh o ff, 1960), p. 33.
24Romero, Theory, p. 10. 25ib id .
26$ee, fo r example, Romero, Theory, pp. 5-6.
27see Romero, "Una nueva teorfa del hombre," Revista de 
Cultura Moderna, no. 15 (1950), 9-19. The a rtic le  was written in 
February, l9'49.
28This brief^quotation was lif te d  from Torchfa Estrada's 
a rtic le  "La concepciorTantropoldgica de Francisco Romero," Ciudad, 
nos. 4-5 (1956), 25.
29Romero, "Man and Culture," p. 388.
SORomero, Theory, p. 7. For a more extensive development of 
the content of the intentional consciousness see Romero's essay "Sobre 
los objetos y el conocimiento," Cursos y Conferencias, XXXV (1949), 
261-279.
S^Romero, Theory, p. 47. 32lb id . , p. 48.
33%bid.. p. 9. 34ib id .
35Romero, "Notice," p. 2. 36Romero, Theory, p. 3.
37Romero's idea of the "im plic it judgment" of in ten tionality  
is s im ilar to Brentano's. The la tte r 's  position, however, was that 
judging presupposes a thing-perceived ( Vorstel lung).
38Romero, Theory. p. 34. 39%bjd. , p. 84.
40jb id . . p. 85. 41ib id .
81
4 2 ib id . ,  p. 86.
^^According to Romero the f i r s t  two Husserlian positions on 
the s e lf are as follows: In the f ir s t  Husserl dispensed "with the
subject as a special and d is tin ct en tity ."  (Theory, p. 31) In this  
interpretation consciousness is but the flow of lived experiences in 
inner time."
A second position held by Husserl, according to Romero, is 
that the s e lf is "something, and something exceedingly important, 
though i t  is d i f f ic u lt  to imagine the how of this something. . . . The 
e x p lic it form ' I think o f  remains undisturbed [a fte r  the phenomenolog­
ical reduction], with one of the arms of its  bipolar structure pointing 
toward the subject. . . . [ I t  is something] that is s tr ic t ly  sui 
generis" (Theory, p. 32).
Romero held that the second position is a correction of the 
f i r s t  and, in turn, the th ird  (with which I deal in the text) a 
correction of the second.
^^Romero, Theory, p. 32.
45The quotation Romero uses here on pp. 32-33 of Theory of Man 
is from Husserl's Meditations cartésiennes (Paris: Colin, 1931), 
pp. 56-57.
46Romero, Theory, p. 73. 47jb jd . , p. 79.
48 jb id ., PP. 79-80. ^^ Ib id ., p. 79.
SORomero, "Man and Culture," p. 391.
51 Romero, Ib id . , p. 398.
SZpomero, Theory, p. 88.
53lb id . , p. 89. This quotation employes the term "tradition" 
which is used by Romero to refer to positive and progressive use of 
the past by man. He regarded "traditionalism" as counter-productive.
In terms of Romero's evaluation toward the two, "tradition" is an 
asset to the development of man while "traditionalism" is a decided 
l ia b i l i t y .
54 ib id ., p. 91.
SSRomero, Theory, p. 85. Romero here quotes Morris Ginsberg 
with approval: "Social intercourse [ sociabilidad] is not what d is- ^
tinguishes man from the animals." (See Ginsberg, Manual de sociologie 
(Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, 1942), p. 109.
SGpomero, "Man and Culture," p. 398.
82
57% have suggested here that Romero's use of the Spanish 
social should be translated "societal" on the grounds that this tends 
to preserve the distinction he wished to make between "social l ife "  
(s o c ia lity ), which animals as well as men may be said to enjoy, and 
"society", which is the achievement of man only.
58Romero, Theory, p. 92.
59por Romero, a ll progress in humanization is an increase in 
"the objectifying and judging capacities." This point in his philo­
sophical anthropology is clearly related to his metaphysics, especially 
as set forth in "Program of a Philosophy" ("Programa de una filo s o ffa ") 
and "Transcendence and Value" ("Trascendencia y valor") in his Papers 
for a Philosophy ( Papeles para una f ilo s o ffa ) ,  published in 1945. Cf. 
" In tu itio n  and Discourse'* ("Intuciün y discurso") in the same publi­
cation and "Persons and Transcendency" (Personas y trascendencia") 
in Philosophy of the Person ( Filosofia de la persona), 1944.
60[dmund Husserl, Meditations cartésiennes (Paris: Colin, 
1931), p. 56.
Romero, "Man and Culture," p. 389.
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Romero's tendency to invest well-known terms with special 
meanings without due regard for either th e ir  ordinary usage or fo r  
adequate ju s tif ic a tio n  of the altered meaning is su ffic ien tly  widespread 
to trea t i t  here as a single problem rather than touch on i t  each time 
the d if f ic u lty  is encountered.
CHAPTER I I I  
MAN AS SPIRITUAL INTENTIONALITY
In this chapter I make clear at the outset the function of 
the term "s p irit"  in Romero's philosophy and show the difference between 
sp iritua l and nonspiritual in ten tion a lity .
In the f i r s t  place Romero's meaning of "s p ir it"  must be made 
clear. I t  is important to establish that the expression "the s p ir it ,"  
whatever use i t  may have, and regardless of the grammatical fa c il ity  
with which i t  is used, connotes a substantia lity , an agency, that re­
sults in obscuring Romero's meaning. I shall show that "sp irit"  in 
Romero's theory of man conforms en tire ly  to the human level of re a lity  
and carries with i t  no more suggestion of ontological separateness 
from man than does the term "the intentional consciousness." Indeed,
I w ill show that "s p ir it"  is Romero's means of identifying intentional 
acts in which complete ob jectification  occurs--acts which are fu lly  
objective in that they have no subjective return or regress.
The next task w ill  be to show the place of the sp iritua l in 
re a lity . In order to do this i t  w ill be necessary to introduce Romero's 
metaphysics. The schemata presented in this portion w ill aid in 
illum inating the relation of the sp iritua l to the natural in the order 
of temporality.
Romero, as I w ill show, held that his philosophy of man is not 
dependent on his metaphysics and I see no su ffic ien t reason to take
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issue with him on that point. However, I believe my efforts to show 
man's place in re a lity  succeed in revealing the relation between 
Romero's philosophy of man and his metaphysics.
I t  is , of course, not su ffic ien t merely to identify s p ir it  by 
its  location in the general scheme of things. I t  is necessary to make 
manifest its  specific and unique characteristics. These are absolute 
o b jec tiv ity , universality , freedom, unity, h is to ric ity , responsibility, 
and absolute transcendence. These characteristics w ill be seen as the 
identifying marks of both the sp iritua l act and the sp iritua l man.
Romero's theory of man as a dualism of nature and s p ir it  w ill 
be treated and i t  w ill be shown that Romero holds to both a descriptive 
and prescriptive dualism in his philosophical anthropology.
The dualistic  nature of man gives rise to questions of value, 
especially moral value. I  shall show that Romero's ethics rests on his 
theory of transcendence and th a t, since the sp iritua l act of complete 
objectification transcends the flawed ob jectification  of mere inten­
tional i t y ,  i t  is of greater value and, therefore, coincides with moral 
right.
Next I shall introduce the issues of ontology regarding the 
sp iritua l s e lf and Romero's distinction between the human individual 
and the person. These efforts attempt to make clear Romero's concept 
of the basic human en tity .
The significance of man as a sp iritua l being to culture is 
next analyzed and I show the role of "spiritual in ten tionality" in 
objective culture.
F in a lly , I trea t several problems that I find in th is portion 
of Romero's theory and o ffe r my criticisms of his view of man as s p ir i t ­
ual being.
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Let us turn now to our f i r s t  task—the c la rifica tio n  of s p ir it .  
The term "sp irit"  in Romero's writings is used exclusively in reference 
to man. I t  has no other denotation. Although he uses such expressions 
as "promise of the s p ir it"  and "coming of the s p ir it"  they are devoid 
of otherwordly implication. As Soloman Lipp observed: "For Romero,
the concept 's p ir i t '  does not partake of the supernatural, mysterious 
character. "S p irit ' is human, peculiarly human.
In Theory of Man Romero divides his exposition of s p ir it  into  
three parts, a division which I shall find useful here. These divisions 
are: (1) the general identification  of s p ir it  in terms of the natural
man and mere in ten tio n a lity , (2) the place of the sp iritua l in re a lity ,  
and (3) the unique, specific characteristics of s p ir it . I shall take 
up f i r s t  the general identifica tion  of s p ir it .
I t  is more accurate in explicating Romero's meaning o f s p ir it  
to speak of "spiritual in ten tio n a lity ,"  or "the sp iritua l act," or even 
"the sp iritua l man" than to speak of "sp irit"  as though i t  were a sub­
stantial re a lity  with an existence of its  own. "Spiritual" is a 
modification, a correction, of mere in ten tion a lity . To state the matter 
clearly: the acts of mere in ten tion a lity  are acts whose ob jectification  
is incomplete, marred by subjective regress, whereas the acts of 
sp iritua l in ten tionality  exhibit in ten tionality  completed--objectification  
without a flaw.
For this reason, I  believe the tendency to translate Romero's 
references to espfritu in Theory of Man as "the s p ir it"  is misleading.
I  confess that on occasion i t  is d i f f ic u lt  to avoid some sentence con­
structions that encourage unwarranted emphasis. At other places, 
however, the translation could reasonably avoid this error. A case in
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point is the phrase 1o psfquico intencional y 1o espiritual which 
Cooper translates "psychical in ten tion a lity  and the s p ir it ."^  A more 
parallel structure is desirable, such as "the psychic intentional and 
the s p ir itu a l."  This at least has the advantage of refusing to in tro ­
duce an apparent substantialization of s p ir it  which is not in keeping 
with Romero's views.
I maintain that since the term "s p irit"  is used by Romero 
to re fe r to a level of human intentional consciousness and to nothing 
more, the most profitab le way of c la rify in g  what the term has reference 
to is to take note of the difference between an intentional act that is 
not sp iritu a l and one that is . In the former the in terest taken in 
the object of consciousness by the subject is always related to the 
subject's s e lf-in te re s t. There is in a ll such acts a subjective return 
or regress ( regreso subjetivo) . The subject, whether as a separate 
individual or as a member of a group, relates the object to his own 
individual egoistic center or to that of the group with which he is 
id en tified . "The merely intentional act is characterized by its  two 
moments: its  objective projection and its  subjective return [regreso
subje tivo ]."3 I t  is important to in s is t that this "return" be recog­
nized as a regression from "radical ob jec tiv ity ."  In w riting about the 
general significance of s p ir i t  in Theory of Man, Romero clearly id en ti­
fied the negative value of th is moment of the objectifying act of mere 
in ten tio n a lity :
The subjective return [ regreso] does not emerge as a 
plus, but rather as a decrease in the objectifying  
intention. . . . What happens before the appearance 
of the s p ir it  is that the objective d irection, not 
entire ly  fu l f i l le d ,  is delayed by a ba llast that 
hinders its  free advance. That ba llast is the 
structure of the s e lf as a sheaf of individual
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interests. Mere in ten tio n a lity , therefore, is re­
vealed to us as something incomplete and m utilated, 
as an impetus of the subject toward what he is not— 
an impetus that la te r  weakens and returns to the 
subject, bringing to i t ,  one might say, the usable 
spoils of the object.4
My point here is that Romero has in the words above revealed his view 
of the subjective regress as precisely th at--a  fa llin g  back, a coming 
short, a weakness, as incompletness.5
In the case of the sp iritua l act of consciousness there is no 
such return or regress. The object is identified  or evaluated in and 
for i ts e lf  and neither what i t  is nor the value the intentional con­
sciousness sees in i t  is taken to be a function of its  relation to the 
subject's needs or purposes. The sp iritua l act of consciousness is the 
intentional act purged o f its  impurity, so to speak, and thereby made 
most fu lly  in tentional. "In the sp iritua l . . . [the subjective return 
tendency]is suppressed, [and] what occurs is not, properly speaking, a 
s im p lifica tio n , but a purification of the act."® The term "s p iritu a lly  
intentional" seems to me to suggest the distinction he had in mind.
"Mere in ten tionality" and "sp iritual in ten tionality" are set in contrast 
to each other, and these two terms help to concretize the relation  
between the two levels of the intentional consciousness. "The sp iritua l 
act is an intentional act of a special kind"^ [emphasis mine].
The constitutive elements of an act of mere in ten tion a lity  
and an act of s p ir itu a lity  are the same. The difference between the two 
types of intentional acts is in th e ir  respective "d irec tio n a lities ."
The subjective return is not regarded as an element in the composition of 
the act as an intentional act. Instead, i t  is the "set" or attitude of 
the intentional act. Romero held that the difference between the two
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sorts of acts is a formal difference rather than "m aterial." The 
sp iritua l act is "the intentional act in which the subject yields him­
s e lf to the object."® "Otherness" becomes the s e lf's  in terest.
In one sense, then, th e ir difference is small; in another 
sense (and Romero contended the truer sense) they are immensely 
dissim ilar. "Radical objectivism . . . defines the purely sp iritua l 
act, . . . even a partic le  of the divine—nothing less—is restored in 
humanity."9 He does not explain this use of "divine."
Romero thus did not hold that in ten tion a lity  and s p ir it  are 
mutually exclusive and, therefore, the following statement of Cooper's 
in 1967 is misleading. "In addition to in te n tio n a lity , however, the 
s p ir it  has an essential role in man's being. . . . The whole or complete 
man is constituted by this duality of in ten tion a lity  and sp irit."^®
"The s p ir it  has [a ] role" casts doubt on the nonsubstantiality of s p ir it  
and the manner in which Cooper here juxtaposes unqualified intention­
al i ty  and s p ir it  suggests that sp iritua l acts are not intentional acts. 
"The s p ir it"  is not something "in addition to in te n tio n a lity ." In point 
of fa c t, i t  is Romero's view that the only fu lly  intentional or object­
ify ing act is_ the s p iritu a l act.
I  have shown above that s p ir it  in Romero's philosophy is not 
a substantial e n tity . I t  should be evident that the term "s p irit"  is 
devoid of supernatural implications. Romero's philosophy does not 
provide for a transcendental w ill or power. Thus his is not a philosophy 
with a "religious posture" such as incorporating worship of a transcen­
dental re a lity  or a doctrine of human reconciliation to that re a lity .
Such a philosophy, as a resu lt, would be no longer a philosophy but a
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"philosophy-religion." "Precisely because of th is , those great systems 
of the Orient are not pure philosophies, according to our understanding, 
but philosophy-religions, roads of salvation established on certain  
in tu itions or theorizations of resolute mystical predisposition."^^
A philosophy does not involve i ts e lf  in laying "roads of salvation" nor 
devise its  views in terms of a "resolute mystical predisposition." 
However, some philosophers have posited an Absolute without committing 
themselves to a reverential or worshipful attitude toward that absolute 
re a lity . Notable among these, i t  seemed to Romero, were the German 
id ea lis ts .
Romero confronted squarely the quest' of whether to postu­
la te  a transcendent being in his philosophy and decided firm ly against 
i t .  One of the most d irect statements he made on the issue was in 
Philosophy of the Person (Filosoffa de la persona).
Let us not risk the supposition that an obscure purpose, 
innate in the cosmos, or a transcendent w i l l ,  desires 
to carry forward the individualization, to produce 
ind iv idua lities  that would be each time more r ig h t, 
more complete and exacting. We w ill not venture that 
supposition, not even in the character of a hypothesis.
But the fact is that everything occurs as i f  such a 
purpose ex isted .'2
He found such a postulate neither logically necessary nor systematically 
helpful.
I have taken some pains to establish the non-religious position 
taken by Romero in order to avoid faulty interpretations on points that 
l ie  ahead in our exposition of man as s p ir it .  The remaining issue in 
the general identifica tion  of sp iritual in ten tio n a lity , before the tra its  
of s p ir it  are investigated, is its  place in re a lity . This requires 
treatment of some of the basic notions in Romero's metaphysics.13
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Romero sees re a lity  as a dualism of nature and s p ir it .  Nature 
is divided into the physical, the v ita l ,  and the psychical. Mere in­
tentionality  belongs to the realm of the psychical and therefore to 
nature. S p irit is a new ontological level of re a lity  and is undivided.
Romero's metaphysics is thus a four-level ontology: The
physical, the liv in g , the psychic in tentional, and the s p ir itu a l. The 
intentional portion of the psychical and a ll of the sp iritua l compose 
the entirety of in ten tionality  and can be referred to respectively as 
the levels of mere in ten tionality  or psychical in ten tionality  and 
sp iritua l in ten tion a lity . These terms apply only to man—the f i r s t  to 
natural man, the second to sp iritua l man or man as s p ir i t .
Spiritual in ten tionality  stands over against the three levels 
of nature and, like the others, comes to be in the course of time. I t  
is a product o f temporality in the same sense that mere in ten tionality  
and biological l i f e  are temporal products. I t  is neither an ever-present 
constituent of re a lity  nor a transcendental factor that enters the 
temporal development of the world from outside.
In almost a ll  cases Romero employs the term "natural" in 
reference to the realm of nature in re a lity . However, a t one point in
reference to sp iritua l in ten tionality  he uses the term "natural" in an
ordinary, nontechnical sense. He asserts that once re a lity  has produced
intentional acts—that is , once consciousness has been achieved and
objectification has occurred in the temporal process--it is "natural" 
(that is , in the "nature" of things) that sp iritua l in ten tionality  
should s u p e r v e n e .This imprecise use of the term is certain ly an 
equivocation, but one that is readily understood.
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I t  is evident by now that the term "sp iritua l" in Romero's 
philosophy of man does not denote as extensive a fie ld  of consciousness, 
acts, and productions, as i t  does in some other leading philosophies of 
man, such as D ilthey's. Thus the dualism of nature and s p ir i t  that 
coincides with the le tte r 's  d istinction between the natural sciences and 
the sciences of the human s p ir it  is not the same dualism as Romero's, 
despite the identical terms. D ilthey's denotation of "s p irit"  would 
embrace Romero's spheres o f both mere in ten tion a lity  and sp iritua l 
in ten tion a lity .
Throughout the arrangement of re a lity  there is an impetus 
which Romero most commonly calls "transcendence" and which he describes 
as the "positive element of r e a l i ty ."15 Each level is the foundation of 
the next. Every level emerges from the preceding one, and, by virtue of 
being a new structure, surpasses i t .  As the arrangement of re a lity  is 
traced from the physical or inorganic to the fin a l level of the sp iritua l 
there is an increase of transcendence, for as one a fte r  another of the 
four stages is surpassed there is more of re a lity  produced and transcended. 
The level of l i f e  exhibits a transcendence or surpassing merely of the 
physical, whereas at the las t level in the order the sp iritu a l is a 
transcendence of a ll three preceding levels.
Man alone as s p ir i t  incorporates a ll the ontological levels of 
re a lity . He is physical and subject to the laws of the physical realm 
of re a lity ; he is a liv ing  being o f the v ita l realm; he is the sole 
occupant of the intentional realm; and, f in a lly ,  he alone transcends a ll  
these to become the unique sp iritua l being in a ll o f re a lity . He is the 
bridge that unites the natural and the s p ir itu a l.16
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For Romero "History is a march from nature to s p i r i t . T h e  
process of re a lity  is a movement toward the goal of "humanization." I t  
appears that when once the s p iritu a l level has been achieved there are 
no "additional" realms to be introduced and future advances must be in 
terms of a growing "colonization" of re a lity  by the sp iritu a l inten­
t io n a lity . The following diagram from Theory of Man w ill illu s tra te  
the "sections of reality."^®
inorganic 
“ Nature 1 organic
Reali ty_
■Cintentional
— S p ir it.
man and culture
But re a lity  may be schematized also in terms of the types of 
en tities  that compose it*, so Romero classified  the en tities  constituting  
re a lity  in terms of genus and species. Although he did not consider the 
results exhaustive, he contended that such an e ffo rt would help to 
illu s tra te  some of his ideas. Notably missing from the schema of "real 
en tities" are the objects of culture. The two genera of en tities  are 
the spatio-temporal, comprising the organic and the inorganic levels , 
and the solely temporal which includes the intentional in both its  
nonspiritual and sp iritua l dimensions. As re a lity  progresses toward the 
s p ir itu a l, there is an increase of freedom and a decrease of "mathemat­
ical determinism."^® The path of transcendence from the inorganic to 




















However, re a lity  is only a part of to ta lity . Some objects 
do not belong to re a lity . Again cautioning that his classification is 
not exhaustive, but rather "imperfect and provisional," Romero offers 
a schema of the to ta lity  of o b j e c t s . ^0 I t  is a tentative outline or 
"classification of o b jec tiv ities ."  A complete classification of a ll 
objects constituting to ta lity  must include, at least, those objects 
that are re a l, those that are id ea l, and those concerned with meta­
physical values. In the f i r s t  of these (the real) are included the 
temporal-spatial objects such as physical bodies and liv ing  beings as 
well as the temporal-nonspatial-sensible ob jectiv ities such as psychical 
in ten tion a lity  and s p ir i t .  The ideal objects are mathematical e n titie s , 
essences, and relations. Metaphysical values are the objectively real 
and discernible degrees of transcendence possessed by any part of 
re a lity .
objects
(to ta lity ) '
r-real (temporal) I ^te poral;------------------------------- i-spatial
(sensible)------------------------------------ Unonspatial





The schemata are an aid to an understanding of the relation  
Romero's theory of man has to his metaphysical views and they o ffer some 
assistance in understanding the place of man in re a lity . Although his 
philosophy of man and his metaphysics are not logically  dependent there 
are some ideas, such as transcendence, central to both. As to man's 
place in re a lity , i t  is clear that fu ll humanity is the ultimate 
achievement of the transcending impetus.
At every le v e l, transcendence is important to the being of an 
en tity . "The series physical body, liv ing  being, psyche, s p ir i t ,  
exhibits an increase of transcendence, and this increase becomes the 
maximum possible in the s p i r i t . " E v e n  i f  only provisionally, we may 
put forward this thesis: to be is to transcend. T h a t  i s,  the nature
of re a lity  is such that any en tity  survives only by means of changing- 
proceeding beyond its  present iden tity . Its  being depends upon its  
development in accordance with the expansion of re a lity . Failure to 
transcend is counter to the nature of re a lity  and is , therefore, opposed 
to true being.
There are unsolved problems in Romero's diagrams depicting 
re a lity , the classes of real e n tit ie s , and the to ta lity  of objects. I t  
is not at a ll clear just how en tities  at the physical level are trans­
cending themselves. Of course, Romero does not contend that they are 
presently doing so. The theory is that the class of liv ing  beings may 
be accounted for by regarding them as a transcendence of mere physical 
existence. Living beings are physical en tities  but they are much more. 
They incorporate a ll that is physical but, in addition, exhibit a new 
structure. L ife as a new ontological level "colonizes" the physical — 
to use Romero's term. That is to say, while possessing a ll that
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is necessary to physical e n tit ie s , the level of l i f e  pro liferates its  
new structure throughout much of the merely physical world, thereby 
extending a new dimension to re a lity . A sim ilar colonization occurs at 
each of the two remaining levels of re a lity  as transcendence continues. 
When illu s tra tin g  transcendence, however, Romero prefers to speak of 
the more advanced stages of re a lity  rather than of the physical. Thus 
the manner in which a physical object may be said to transcend i ts e l f  is 
not at a ll clear. I t  can, however, be said that its  transcendence is 
minimal. I t  shows the greatest tendency toward immanence or particu lar­
ism of any level of re a lity .
Romero insists that there is an increase of transcendence as 
each successive stage in re a lity  is reached. The v ita l ,  he claims, is 
more transcendent than the physical, the psychic intentional more 
transcendent that the v i ta l ,  and the level of s p ir it  represents the 
ultimate transcendence. I find no d iff ic u lty  in speaking of "more trans­
cendent" or "less transcendent," but I do confess to being disturbed by 
the quantitative implication of "more transcendence" and "less trans­
cendence." The reason for Romero's contention, however, is that as the 
various stages are reached there is more of re a lity  colonized so that 
man as s p ir i t  is colonizing a ll levels--the physical, v i t a l ,  and 
psychical. Thus, i t  may be said that sp iritua l in ten tion a lity  is 
engaged in colonizing a ll the other levels of re a lity  and is therefore 
"more transcendent" than a ll the others.
The place occupied by sp iritua l in ten tion a lity  in the whole of 
re a lity  and in the class of real en tities  is evident from the f i r s t  two 
schemata above. In addition, Romero's e ffo rt to account fo r a ll the 
ob jec tiv ities  in the schema representing to ta lity  reveals that the
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objects of consciousness, whether sp iritua l or nonspiritual, include 
much more than the real. They include ideal and metaphysical ob jecti­
fications , as w ell.
I f  the process of transcending ends in sp iritua l pro­
jection to essence and value, this is not because i t  
becomes fixed in a higher type of immanent structure 
[ i . e .  "possible transcendences in so fa r as they are 
not realized"] but because i t  has reached its  degree 
of absolute purity , because no more transcendence is  
possible, because the given being has become resolved 
into transcendence, with no remainder. The final 
structure s p irit-v a lu e , fa r from making up another 
immanence, is the formula of total transcendence; the 
personal center as unity and auto-consciousness of 
sp iritua l acts is not a moment of immanence, but 
consciousness of and w ill to transcendence, as well 
as the indispensable condition i f  transcendence is  to 
be an effective act and not an abrogation or disso­
lu tion . 23
The relations between the ontological levels from the mere 
physical to the fu lly  sp iritua l are such that the higher (more tran­
scendent) in each adjacent pair of ontological levels may be said to be 
supported by the previous level. That is to say, for example, in 
reference to the relation between mere in ten tion a lity  and sp iritua l 
in ten tio n a lity , that the former is the necessary condition of the 
la t te r . S p ir it uses mere in ten tionality  and thus the preceding structure 
supports the succeeding one. As a s tru c tu ra lis t, Romero rejected the 
idea that the preceding level is the "absolute determination" of the 
succeeding one or that the succeeding level could be reduced to the pre­
ceding one. Thus, he opposed both mechanism and reductionism.
Mistakenly, "the s p ir i t , is  said to be only psyche (psychologism), the 
psyche in turn to be only l i f e  (biologism), and l i f e  could be resolved 
into a particu lar complication of the physical (m aterialism )."24 Such 
reductionisms seemed to Romero to result from a fa ilu re  to give proper 
place to transcendence and the structural nature of re a lity .
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Thus fa r the present chapter has concentrated on (1) the 
general idea o f the sp iritua l level in re a lity  as i t  compares with and 
is related to that of mere in ten tionality  and (2) the place of man in 
re a lity . We shall now identify  the specific characteristics Romero 
attributes to the sp iritua l leve l. I t  w ill be convenient to speak at 
times of " s p ir it ,"  but i t  must be remembered that the term designates 
nothing more than the level of "in ten tionality  made s p ir itu a l."  Romero 
often used the Spanish el e s p fr itu , so my practice here is in keeping 
with his and should be acceptable so long as the meaning of the term 
is remembered.
In a ll there are seven characterizing tra its  of sp iritual 
in ten tio n a lity : absolute o b jec tiv ity , un iversality , freedom, unity,
h is to r ic ity , responsib ility , and absolute (final) transcendence. The 
f i r s t  six are considered to be re la tiv e ly  equal in importance. The 
seventh, however, is the "essential t r a it"  of sp iritua l in ten tion a lity . 
None are properties existing apart from sp iritua l in ten tion a lity  and its  
acts; they are expressions of the character of the sp iritu a l act.
S p i r i t ^ S  possesses among its  tra its  absolute o b je c tiv ity . 
Although Romero's word here is objetividad, the meaning is clearer i f  
i t  is translated "ob jectification ." In an act that expresses absolute 
ob jectification  the subject regards the object with a "disinterested  
interest" and acknowledges its  "otherness." Spiritual knowledge is  
concerned with the object insofar as i t  exists in its  own righ t. The 
object is not merely presented to consciousness; the sp iritua l inten­
tio n a lity  affirms the object as well as its  autonomous character. In 
this affirm ation the intentional act avoids a ll subjective return.
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Furthermore, the absolutely objective intentional subject 
objectifies  himself as he does others. However, the s e lf is not denied 
or eradicated. "The s p iritu a l subject does not deny its e lf ;  rather i t  
recognizes in i t s e l f  an ob jec tiv ity  parallel to others. I t  is doubt­
lessly concerned with i t s e l f ,  but only as its  being and meaning are 
conceived objectively."^^ That is ,  the sp iritua l subject regards its  
being and meaning in the same objective manner i t  does any other 
subject's being and meaning, without a subjective return.
Universality as a t r a i t  of s p ir it  is a function of thorough­
going, unqualified or, as Romero calls i t ,  absolute ob jectification . 
Egoistic particularism is annulled; the subject finds a new v ita l i ty  
resulting from deliverance from the immanence indigenous to particu lar­
ism. He is open to re a lity  and re a lity  is open to him. Romero finds
fa u lt in attempts at universality through a fusing of the sp iritua l 
subject with re a lity  in a mystical union of id en tity . In such efforts
the subject, in being projected toward re a lity , attempts
to empty himself into i t ,  to be assimilated in i t ,  but
in the attempt he is shipwrecked by re a lity  and disappears 
as a subject. Hereby the sp iritua l instance, [in s ta n t], 
which is absolute transcendence, is annulled; i t  becomes 
one with a re a lity  l i f te d  above natural particularism  
only through s p ir itu a lity . In the order of re a lity ,  
universality is obtained only by the sp iritua l subject; 
and when his thrust is exhausted in the identifying  
purpose, he is annulled as s p ir i t ,  and re a lity  is de­
prived of the universal moment that the s p ir it  alone 
brings to i t . 27
The universal moment as an experience of in ten tion a lity  is lost i f  the 
sp iritua l subject is eradicated. Mystical union is a meaningless 
e ffo rt to achieve universality . Romero takes this position toward the 
idea of mystical union with re a lity  because even the momentary loss of 
the subject contradicts experience as an intentional act.
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This impetus toward universality by the sp iritua lized  human 
in ten tion a lity  moves toward ultimacy or f in a lity  in a ll areas, in ­
cluding knowledge, ethics, and aesthetics. This "universality of 
projection" is an expression of sp iritua l in ten tion a lity ; i t  is the 
sp iritua l man's native a ir . He strives to know a ll things fu lly  in 
a ll th e ir  re lations, he strains to inaugurate and spread a perfect 
ethical order, to establish beauty in every part of the earth.
Freedom as a t r a i t  of the sp iritua l man is a "setting free , 
with respect to a determined constriction, that of the requirements of 
the natural order."28 i t  is a transcendence of individual interests 
and incentives. The natural, especially exhibited in man as mere 
in ten tion a lity  with its  subjective return, is a bondage; and the 
setting free or movement toward increasing freedom is accomplished in 
direct proportion to the degree to which sp iritua l in ten tionality  
spreads in the l i f e  and acts of the individual. The subject performing 
as s p ir it  is no longer restricted by the immanence of nature's partic ­
ularism and selfbound regression. As the sp iritua l dimension grows, 
freedom advances; but, in lig h t of the necessity for the natural 
dimension to remain in man, there is no absolute freedom.
Romero confessed his in a b ility  to decide whether the "auto­
cratic  rule" of s p ir it  is "determined by a rigorous necessity: or
pQ
whether i t  eludes a ll s tr ic t  determination." I t  can only be said 
that the freedom he postulates is a "setting free" that is requisite to 
absolute ob jectification  and a reaching for universality in a ll things.
An additional mark of sp iritua l in ten tionality  is the unity 
of the subject with its  act and with a ll other sp iritu a l acts and th e ir  
subjects. Unity as a sp iritua l t r a i t  is expressed in both these
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relations. There is no such unity in mere in ten tio n a lity . In 
practica l, social, and p o litic a l relationships formed by the non­
sp iritua lized  subjective center there is always a marked pluralism,
"a fundamental divergence," in the acts of mere in ten tio n a lity , which 
breeds conflic t as a result of each subject's referring the intentional 
object back to himself. In nonspiritual in ten tion a lity  there is a 
fa ilu re  of unity both between the subject and his acts and between the 
subject and other objectivizing subjects. Whenever mere intention­
a lity  forms a "we" i t  is always a particularized, or factional, union 
marked by a fa ilu re  to re late  freely and objectively to any other "we."
Unity has been variously interpreted, Romero said, by 
philosophers both past and present. In Socrates i t  "consisted p r i­
marily in showing the iden tity  of the concepts and the norms grasped 
by reason"30--a unity for which he contended against the "sophistic 
skeptics." In Plato i t  is given support "through contemplation of the 
immutable world of ideas"^^ and his contention that a ll souls are 
"equally suited to perceiving"32 the ideal world. In A ris to tle  the 
idea of unity is seen in the notion of the active in te lle c t. Out of 
this Averroes draws his doctrine of " lite ra l or numerical unity in the 
conception of the one in te lle c t , a single sp iritua l en tity  that hovers 
above individuals and makes possible in them the superior forms of 
knowledge."33 In addition, some Christian speculators have contributed 
to an interpretation of unity in th e ir  concept of God as holding a 
vision of a ll the ideas. According to Romero, the development of the a 
prio ri in modern philosophy has contributed more to the idea of unity 
than has any other recent notion. "One might say that in Kant one can 
conceive of the one subject, a supra-individual complex of forms or
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norms that is imposed on individual subjects and is a central part 
of each one."3*
Although some of Romero's h istorical examples of unity 
illu s tra te  the idea that the subjects of sp iritua l acts "come together 
and feel completely linked together"^^ others exemplify the unity be­
tween the subject and its  act. Those sp iritua l acts in which the sense 
of unity with the subject is probably the greatest and most obvious 
are,
for example, when the objective demands of reason, the 
s tr ic t  rules of log ic, the incontrovertible evidence 
of mathematics are obeyed, or when fundamental ethical 
postulates are recognized. In such cases, the subjects, 
compelled by ob jec tiv ity , feel as i f  they coincide 
completely in th e ir acts .36
The reference to the "incontrovertible evidence of mathemat­
ics" as a positive example of the subject's identifying with the 
object of his in ten tionality  is merely an instance given by Romero in 
his phenomenological analysis of unity. Romero's position that sp ir­
itual en tities  exhib it a maximum of freedom and a minimum of
"mathematical determinism" is an ontological position and is not in ­
compatible with his use of mathematics as an exemplification of 
sp iritua l unity. His point, however, could have been made without the 
use of sucli a problematical illu s tra tio n .
In Theory of Man Romero gives more space to the explanation of 
unity than to any other one t r a i t  o f s p ir i t ,  with the exception of 
absolute transcendence. In summing up unity he asks what the metaphysi­
cal significance of the t r a i t  might be and answers:
. . . one might risk the following hypothesis. R eality , 
which is one with respect to logical or h istorical
p r io r ity , is divided and d iversified  in a process of
particu larization . The partia l instances, as they in ­
crease in th e ir  particularism , at the same time gradually
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open up to to ta l i ty ,  leaning toward i t  without ne­
glecting the individual foci that are being 
constituted, in such a way that simultaneously the 
ind iv idua lity  is purified  and the striv ing for 
to ta lity  is in tensified . An animal, fo r example, 
is more an individual than a plant, and i t  is also 
more open to re a lity . In the sp iritua l individual 
this double process comes to a close because i t  
achieves maximum individuation, and correspondingly 
i t  becomes completely open to to ta lity . In the 
s p ir i t ,  to ta lity  experiences a reencounter and a 
recognition of i t s e l f ,  coming to possess i ts e lf  in
terms of consciousness. Suppositions of this kind
are not rare in the history of philosophy; and with 
adequate modification, they serve as d ifferen t 
interpretations of the whole.37
I t  is evident from a ll that Romero has said on the subject 
that unity is open to a variety of interpretations. I t  is an iden ti­
fication  the subject feels with its  intentional object and with a ll 
other in tentionalizing subjects. I t  is on the one hand the sense of 
iden tity  that one gets with the object when doing mathematics or logic 
or, fo r that matter, in the commitment to axiomatic ethical postulates.
I t  is also the closure between the single sp iritu a liz in g  subject and 
a ll other such subjects.
H is to ric ity  is a characteristic of s p ir i t .  That is , s p ir it  
comes to be in time. Individual acts, however, do not undergo a
temporal process so as to become sp iritua l acts by degrees. There is  an
absoluteness concerning whether an act, e ither cognitive or behavioral, 
is s p ir itu a l. Each act as a whole expresses either mere in ten tionality  
or s p ir itu a lity . There are no degrees in this respect. However, i t  
is Romero's position that in the temporal development of the subject that 
becomes s p ir itu a l, and probably a ll men do, there is that occasion on 
which the dimension of s p ir it  f i r s t  occurs in an act of consciousness. 
Furthermore, there is growth in s p ir itu a lity  fo r a subject and for a 
culture as w ell. In any subject or culture there may be a numerical
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increase in sp iritua l acts. There is increased awareness of the value
of sp iritua l acts over merely psychical (non-spiritual) intentional
ones and in some subjects and cultures an increasing commitment to the
sp iritua l level of in ten tio n a lity . That s p ir it  has h is to ric ity  as
one of its  tra its  is simply to say, then, that i t  is achieved and
developed in tim e..
Responsibility characterizes s p ir i t .  "The responsibility of
the subject to himself as a sp iritua l subject, as a person, presupposes
responsibility to other persons conceived as en tities  of equal worth."38
The sp iritua l subject shows a sense of responsibility not merely toward
any detriment or flaw i t  finds in i ts e l f  but also toward whatever i t
sees as deficient or as that-which-should-not-be in the world about i t .
I t  is as i f  every vio lation of sp iritua l demands is the
subject's fa u lt ,  remote though the violation may be from
the subject who experiences this feeling. The sp iritua l 
subject feels himself to be the bearer of a supreme and 
universal principle that he accepts as ju s tif ie d  and re­
sponsible, and he suffers when he ascertains that this  
principle has not succeeded. In every sp iritual attitude  
there is the impression of an unlimited responsibility , 
because the command to take charge of to ta l i ty ,  to be
the meaning of to ta l i ty ,  and to carry out complete
sp iritua l colonization, is inherent in the s p ir i t .39
For man to experience responsibility in th is sense is for him to feel the
most intensive and extensive sense of obligation.
These, then, with the exception of absolute transcendence,
are the tra its  of s p ir i t  and Romero points out that self-transcendence
is not included. Max Scheler and others are incorrect in attribu ting
self-consciousness to s p ir i t .  The division Romero makes between mere
in ten tion a lity  and sp iritua l in ten tio n a lity  w ill not permit such an
a ttrib u tio n , since self-consciousness occurs also in mere in ten tio n a lity .
Nevertheless, self-consciousness changes from the natural to the
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s p iritu a l. Self-consciousness without s p ir it  is egoistic and thereby 
is diametrically opposed to what sp iritua l in ten tionality  represents. 
Spiritual in ten tio n a lity , even in acts of self-consciousness, e ither  
tends to be or is  totality-conscious. Although mere in ten tionality  
may be self-aware, only "spiritual self-consciousness . . .  is con­
sciousness of a s e lf in sp iritua l relation to the whole.
Spiritual self-consciousness is
the self-possession of the center of objectively  
directed acts, understood as a focus whose incom­
parable value derives not from the more or less 
suspicious secrets of the so-called "inner l i fe "  
but from the clean sp iritual l i f e  that is a gen­
erous acceptance of a ll that is . From this comes 
the material fo r an intimacy in which the objective 
and the subjective are two sides of the same c o i n . 41
The fin a l and most significant t r a i t  of sp iritua l intention­
a lity  is absolute transcendence--transcendence completed or fu lf i l le d .  
This is "the essential t ra it"  of sp iritua l in ten tion a lity . The term 
does not suggest, however, accomplishment of complete universality or 
freedom or responsibility. In sp iritua l in ten tionality  the tran­
scending impetus of re a lity  achieves the fin a l ontological leve l. The 
goal of the world's process is humanization and the sp iritua l level is 
the fin a l step toward humanization.
We have seen that transcendence is "the positive element of 
re a lity  in Romero's metaphysics."4% He also states that "the truth of 
being is transcendence."43 He chose the term "transcendence" because i t
seems to side step accusations of p a rt ia lity  [a charge to 
which Bergson's elan v ita l seemed vulnerable] and to have 
the indispensable breadth needed to include a ll events.
. . . The monism of transcendence is d iversified  in the 
pluralism of the d ifferen t rules of transcendence, 
according to the four orders of r e a l i t y . 4 4
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This monistic impetus enters its  fin a l stage in sp iritua l intention­
a l i ty —the las t of the four levels of re a lity . In man as s p ir it  
transcendence has reached its  highest ontological level.
All the other tra its  of sp iritua l in ten tionality  are con­
sequences of to ta l or absolute transcendence. "In the sp iritu a l act, 
transcendence works without obstacles or lim itations: its  strength
yields to no opposition."^5 The level of absolute transcendence is 
contrasted with the lim ited levels of transcendence. Romero ins ists ,
"v/e must distinguish here between restricted and to tal transcendence, 
between a transcendence that la te r  becomes immanent [as in the sub­
jec tive  regress of the acts of mere in ten tion a lity ] and a pure or 
sp iritu a l transcendence."^®
I t  seems fa ir  to ask what the future of re a lity  is in lig h t  
of the claim that the "positive element" of re a lity  has reached its  
"highest possible attainment." With no "sleeping transcendences" to be 
awakened—no new structures forthcoming—what w ill the future be? One 
can only respond that increasing pro liferation  of the evidences of 
absolute transcendence—exhibited in sp iritua l a c tiv it ie s —is expected 
by Romero. A new day has dawned with sp iritual man, but that dawn has 
only fa in tly  broken the gloom of a world wrapped in particularism , s e lf-  
in te res t, and immanentism. S p irit has scarcely begun the colonization 
or gradual domination of mere in ten tion a lity . The possib ilities  fo r  
the expansion and expression of sp iritua l being are enormous. But those 
po ssib ilities  do not include a new level of ontology.
In lig h t of the idea of absolute transcendence as the essential 
t r a i t  of sp iritua l in ten tionality  and of the direct correlation between 
transcendence and freedom in Romero's philosophy, I wish to raise the
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issue of absolute freedom. "Transcendence is always a setting free 
and, in its  turn, freedom is a mode or an aspect of transcendence."4? 
Individuals of the intentional order are more free than those of the 
organic order. Furthermore, the characteristics of s p ir i t  reveal, 
also, that the sp iritua l order is one of greater freedom than that of 
mere in ten tio n a lity . Since there is a positive correlation between 
transcendence and freedom, one might surmise that absolute transcendence 
ushers in absolute freedom as w ell. That position, however, Romero 
rejects.
The parallelism  between freedom and transcendence is 
evident: to the partia l transcendence of the merely
intentional act corresponds a partia l freedom; and 
to the absolute transcendence of the sp iritua l act 
corresponds an obviously greater freedom, because 
a ll natural compulsions have been suppressed. We 
do not wish to designate this freedom as absolute, 
since,as we have seen previously, we have no desire 
to include in this discussion the d if f ic u lt  topic 
of freedom in its  ultimate metaphysical r e a c h e s . 48
Having presented the human s p ir it  as an intentional conscious­
ness of a high order, along with its  t r a its , I must now show that being 
fu lly  human requires both mere in ten tionality  and sp iritua l intention­
a l i ty —both nature and s p i r i t . 49 "Duality is the constitutive event of 
the complete m a n . "50 "The fundamental characteristic of man . . .  is not 
s p ir itu a lity  nor naturalness [ naturalidad], but 'd u a lity ,' a m ilitan t 
duality , in which one element, the natural, is more ancient and hard, 
and the other, s p ir i t ,  more recent and f r a g i l e . "51 The short-term  
advantage seems to reside with the natural, but Romero held that the 
future belongs to the s p ir itu a l. Yet man remains necessarily a composite 
of the two. There is no wholly sp iritua l person and, fo r that matter, 
probably no en tire ly  natural man e ither. Complete humanity requires a 
homeostasis between the two.
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We exclude the possib ility  of a purely sp iritua l man.
In his fullness, man is a dual, composite being. His 
in teg rity  demands the confluence of mere in ten tion a lity  
and of the s p ir i t ,  and there is no true humanity without 
the mixture of these two components and the tension that 
grows between them, even to the point that the most 
characteristic aspect of man does not stem from one or 
the other of these elements, but from th e ir  dual 
indwelling within the human u n ity .52
An analysis of Romero's value theory is outside the scope of 
the present work, but, in lig h t of his dualistic  theory of man, some 
attention to his axiology is called fo r , especially as i t  relates to
his moral philosophy. Let us f i r s t  note the basis on which his
general theory of value rests and then see how this applies to his 
ethical theory.
How does one decide what value is , according to Romero?
"Value is the degree of transcendence and therefore the degree of the 
actual re a lity  of b e i n g . "53 Being is actualizing i t s e l f  throughout the 
ascending levels of the physical, v i t a l ,  mere (or psychical) intention­
a l i t y ,  and sp iritua l in ten tio n a lity . The degree of transcendence is 
invariably on the increase as the ascending stages are achieved.
Failure to actualize possible transcendent capabilities is a disvalue, 
called "immanence" by Romero, and such "can be considered as that kernel 
of transcendent acts which have not been actualized and are held in
r e s e r v e . "54 Thus value is measured by transcendence.
A value may be e ith er sp iritu a l or nonspiritual. Spiritual 
values are absolute or ultimate in that there are no higher values. 
Nonspiritual values are re la tive  in that they "allow fo r degrees and 
nuances in magnitude and dignity th a t, regardless of the grade they 
a tta in , never equal the magnitude and dignity of absolute v a l u e s . "55
Since he makes no provision for degrees of absolute ob jectiv ity  
the position Romero espouses appears to be that a ll sp iritu a l acts are
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expressions of absolute value. The “degrees and nuances in magnitude
and dignity" that are applicable to re la tive  values are not applied to
absolute value. The essential problem of this position is its  fa ilu re
to o ffe r a basis on which one s p ir itu a lly  intentional act can be judged
as more valuable than another. Such d iff ic u lt ie s  as this surely
account in part for Romero's fa ilu re  to publish his E tica.
Since transcendence is the measure of value i t  follows that
value is not subjective. The degree of value corresponds to the degree
of transcendence. I t  is in this sense that transcendence is the
determinant of value and i t  is apprehended
by means of special emotional acts. We therefore accept 
the ob jec tiv ity  of value yet re s tric t its  reference to 
the metaphysical structure of what is , and, likew ise, we 
accept the apprehension of value through feeling and not 
through the in te lle c t , a position taken by many eminent 
writers on value.56
In Romero's theory of moral value there are two additional 
points that must be made. The f i r s t  is that absolute ethical value 
can apply only to sp iritua l acts and persons, since " fu ll ethical 
a c tiv ity  . . . i s  personal because only a person is capable of fu lly  
transcendent acts . . . ."57 i t  is the intention of the act that con­
stitu tes its  ethical value.
The second point, somewhat subsidiary to the f i r s t ,  is that 
the ethical value of an in s titu tio n , custom, or law cannot rest on the 
basis of intention. The moral worth of these "does not depend on the 
intentions that created them, but on th e ir  inherent structure and meaning, 
on th e ir objective insertion in the ethical order, on th e ir  ethical 
adequacy and efficiency."58
There is no enigma here i f  one remembers that the im­
portant thing in the act from the point of view of
no
value is the intention; and the important thing 
in what is produced and objectified is the proper 
consistency of the product and not the intentions 
of the producer, since his intentions are 
necessarily set aside when there is complete 
objectification  and when the product takes on its  
own meaning.59
"The act transcends in accord with its  intention and the ob jectification  
["product"] transcends to the extent that i t  is adequate to its  pur­
pose."GO Just how the purpose or meaning of an institu tion  or law may 
be determined apart from the intention of its  creators or sustainers is  
not at a ll clear.
F ina lly , transcendence as the measurement of value provides 
a categorical imperative in Romero's ethics: "Act in such a way that
the direction of your act accords with the essential direction of 
r e a l i t y . And, of course, re a lity 's  essential direction is from 
particularism to universality , from individual subjectivism to super­
la tive  o b jec tiv ity , from various degrees of p a rt ia lity  to to ta lity .  
Whether the act is an expression of conscious and reflective  duty 
("the ethic of e ffo rt" ) or, on the contrary, springs forth spontaneously 
(the ethic of "grace) is of small consequence as a value determinant.
"In our opinion, the only thing that is decisive is the intention  
clearly supporting transcendence."G%
Romero contends that "s tr ic tly  speaking, absolute obligation 
is toward a sp iritua l subject, toward the sp iritua l face of man."G  ̂
Romero's position, Martin Buber notwithstanding, is that the most 
desirable human relationship is not in terms of "I-Thou," but "I-Him." 
The "thou" of the "I-Thou" relation tends to be defined in terms of the 
relation i t  has with the "I" and, hence, i t  is somewhat informed by the 
subject's egoism. Only when the "thou" becomes objectified  as a "him"
m
is transcendence complete in the relationship and the genuinely dis­
interested attitude achieved. The "him" is "an ' I '  that is not 
related to our own s e lf in any particular concrete re la tio n ."^4 By 
the same token, the "I" is ethical in the fu lle s t sense only when one 
turns to his own "I" as he would to any other as a "him." " . . .  the 
sp iritual or absolute ethical quality demands the changing of the 
'o ther,' of the 'thou,' [and] of 'm yself to 'h im .'"65
Throughout his published works Romero avoided a thorough 
treatment of ethics and, fo r that matter, of general value theory.
The most he wrote on e ither of the subjects is to be found in Theory 
of Man, and i t  is from that material that I have drawn in the pre­
ceding paragraphs. I t  is surely clear that the ethical man is the 
sp iritua l man and that the extent to which one is ethical is dependent 
upon the extent to which one's acts are correlated with the essential 
transcending character of re a lity . Even though "the transition from 
nonspiritual to sp iritua l interest is a 'conversion' in the fu ll sense 
of the word,"G5 there is ,  nevertheless, no such thing as en tire ly  
putting o ff  a ll  the works of "the old man." In terms of nature and 
s p ir i t ,  being human is an incurable duality.
In the previous chapter I  established that fo r Romero the 
s e lf as the "subject" of in ten tionality  is "something that lives and 
is modified through liv in g , as an essentially historical being."G? He 
considered the human s e lf  "a concrete re a lity  that lives and develops 
h is to r ic a lly ."65 This e x p lic it language, together with the theories 
of the s e lf  Romero rejected (see Chapter I I ,  footnote 43 ), su ffic ien tly  
reveals that his ontology of the s e lf is a substantialist theory.
What I need now to make clear is the view Romero held concerning the
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sp iritua l s e lf. He offers the following statement of his position:
In functioning as the agent of [the s p ir itu a l] act, 
the subject does not change in what we might call 
his subjective makeup but rather in his implanta­
tion within re a lity , in his meaning, in his posture 
or attitude. One cannot say, however, that for the 
subject the sp iritua l state is only a mode of 
working and not a mode of being, because the subject 
is constituted by his acts, and what he is depends 
on the character of his acts, with reference both to 
actuality  and to acquired habit.
Although there is no change in the "subjective makeup" when 
the subject becomes sp iritua l there is an important terminological 
distinction made by Romero here. He uses "individual" to re fe r to the 
human being as the agent of nonspiritual acts. "Person" is the 
sp iritua l subject. Thus the term "natural individual" may be used for  
emphasis in reference to the human agent of solely non-spiritual 
a c tiv itie s . However, the term "person"in Romero's vocabulary is re­
served for reference to the agent of the act of fu ll o b jec tific a tio n , 
of the sp iritua l act.
Thus the individual and the person are the two poles of the 
human duality. Their relationship in any given human being is such 
that the individual may be considered an actor and the person the role  
he enacts or character he becomes. But being a person is no pretense— 
the individual takes on the character o f the person. The person "is 
a role we [as individuals] carry out, a direction outlined in advance, 
a succession of foreseen or foreseeable attitudes [or intentions]."^®
The individual and the person "embody our double nature, the common 
human condition, in which one pole [the individual] affirms the empirical 
ind iv iduality  and the v ita l contingency, and the other [the person] the 
love of value and of the absolute.
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I wish especially to emphasize here that "person" in 
Romero's sense of the term does not identify  an en tity  separate from 
the individual.
The person is the sp iritua l individual. I t  is 
not substance, nor is i t  an en tity  of which acts are 
the manifestation or consequence; i t  is a c tiv ity ,  
pure actua lity . The person is but the whole of 
sp iritu a l acts in every subject, but that whole is 
rigorously unitary, of such manner that the person
is manifested to us at the same time as a complex
of sp iritu a l attitudes, and as the ideal center from 
which those attitudes rad ia te .72
Now that s p ir i t  has been id en tified  and its  tra its  explained, 
what difference does i t  make in objective culture? I t  w ill be remem­
bered that for Romero s p ir it  is not essential to the in it ia l  production
of culture; that natural man produces cultural ob jectifications. 
Nevertheless the proximity of sp iritua lized  culture to segments of 
purely natural culture results in a sp iritu a liz in g  influence on the 
la t te r .
In p rin c ip le , there is no absurdity in a cultural 
creation deprived of the sp iritua l ingredient, 
and in e ffe c t, there are sectors of human culture 
that appear to have l i t t l e  or nothing that appears 
as s p ir i t .  A mere subjectively centered psychic 
a c tiv ity  is su ffic ien t for explicating certain  
zones or achievements of objective culture . . .
[but] i t  is probable that the cultural zones that 
privately are constituted without interference of 
s p ir i t ,  receive an indirect sp iritua l influence 
inasmuch as they are necessarily integrated into  
the to ta l human culture, because in this en tire ty  
nothing is found from which s p ir it  is absent.'3
Since "s p irit"  in Romero's philosophy means "spiritual inten­
t io n a lity ,"  our concern here must also be with the e ffec t of this level 
of in ten tio n a lity  on the creative process by which the products of 
objective culture are brought into being. Since the act of sp iritua l 
in ten tio n a lity  has no subjective regress in which the object is referred
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back to the needs and ambitions of the subject, i t  appears that 
objects conceived and produced by sp iritua l man are created and 
affirmed in th e ir  own righ t—in and for themselves.
In addition, whether or not a cultural object has been pro­
duced by a human creator at the level of mere in ten tion a lity  or of 
sp iritua l in ten tion a lity  i t  may be considered, nevertheless, in a 
sp iritua l manner by men or cultures. As individual men and cultures 
become sp iritua l objective culture is both produced and regarded in 
accordance with the tra its  of s p ir i t .
Furthermore, i t  is apparent that sp iritua l in ten tion a lity  
must be chiefly responsible for both the production and experience of 
aesthetic objects as such. Objects viewed aesthetically are regarded 
with a "disinterested in terest,"  which is a term Romero uses in con­
nection with complete ob jec tifica tio n .
The e ffec t of sp iritua l in ten tion a lity  on cultural products 
such as tools and other u t ilita r ia n  objects, which Romero treats in 
his explanations of objective culture, is not at a ll obvious since 
these objects are brought about by the immediate and individual needs 
of men. And these are, of course, cultural objects. There lik e ly  is 
no d iff ic u lty  in understanding that an attitude of fu ll  ob jectiv ity  
might be accorded such objects once they are created, but th e ir  creation 
requires attention to the "immediate interests" and "practical consid­
erations" for which they are produced. Such interests in the object 
seem necessarily marks of mere in ten tio n a lity . Thus, insofar as 
u tilita r ia n  objects are created not fo r themselves but rather for what 
they can do, i t  is unlikely that such cultural objectifications result 
from the sp iritua l in ten tio n a lity . Thus some cultural objects are less 
susceptible to "sp iritua liz ing" than others.
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I have attempted in this chapter to give an accurate and 
comprehensive analysis of man as s p ir it .  Before summarizing the 
chapter, I wish to discuss some of the questions and problems of 
Romero's idea of man as s p ir i t .  One scholar of Latin American philos­
ophy has raised three questions which I believe require attention:
1. What is the origin of the sp irit?  2. Why is there an oscillation  
in each person between s p ir it  and mere intentionality? 3. Does the 
sp iritua l act appear suddenly, without cause?^^ As to the f ir s t  
question, one had as well ask the origin of mere in ten tionality  as to 
inquire into the origin of s p ir it  fo r , as we have seen, s p ir it  is simply 
"sp iritual in ten tio n a lity ."  I f  the question is intended to inquire 
into the means by which mere in ten tioan lity  is able to become sp iritua l 
then one must reply that Romero is content to affirm  that such is_ the 
case and that i t  is natural. He no more undertakes to explain the "how" 
of this than he undertakes to give an account of how the physical 
yields the liv in g , or the liv ing  the psychical. The general explanation 
is in terms of structuralism. As has been shown, the term "sp irit"  
référés to a function, a level of a c tiv ity , a class of specific and 
unique workings of the intentional psyche. This being the case, i t  
would appear that no explanation is rea lly  possible as to the origin of 
s p ir it  other than to say that i t  is in the nature of re a lity  to perfect 
the objectifying capacity of in ten tion a lity  once i t  has occurred in the 
imperfect form expressed by mere in ten tio n a lity .
Let us look at the second question: Why is there an o sc illa ­
tion in each person between s p ir it  and mere intentionality? Romero's 
theory of man maintains that human nature is incurably dualis tic . Romero
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regards the dualism as not only descriptively accurate but normative 
as w ell; i . e . ,  every person necessarily is and ought to be a duality  
of nature and s p ir it .  According to Romero s p ir itu a lity  is necessarily 
in term ittent. The question at hand apparently is why Romero holds this 
position as the necessary human condition. However, to maintain other­
wise would be to trea t the relationship between the two highest 
ontological levels of re a lity  d iffe ren tly  from a ll the others. As has 
been shown, each succeeding level in re a lity  colonizes the level 
immediately p rio r to i t - - i t  does not destroy i t .  I t  does, however, 
"populate" i t  with its  own characteristics and gradually succeeds in 
dominating i t .  Romero expected that this would be the case in regards 
to the long-range superiority of sp iritua l in ten tionality  over mere 
in ten tion a lity . This seems to be a su ffic ien t reason—that of a con­
sistent theory of re a lity -- fo r  declaring the impossibility of a 
thoroughly sp iritua l person, and the necessity for a duality which 
in term ittently  expresses both types of intentional acts.
The th ird  question in this series is concerned with whether 
or not sp iritua l acts occur "without cause." Solomon Lipp suggests 
that Romero has fa iled  to provide an account of the causal antecedents 
of the sp iritua l act and that that fa ilu re  is  a "vulnerable spot in the 
impressive ed ifice erected by Romero in his attempt to combat the 
deterministic thesis which denies freedom to m a n . "75
I agree that the explanation concerning what causes sp iritua l 
acts to occur is not given in Romero's philosophy. Neither does he 
attempt to re late  the causes fo r the emergence of l i f e  or psychical 
in ten tion a lity  on the preceding levels of re a lity . Such matters are 
not problems of philosophy although explanations regarding these issues
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may produce such problems. I t  is ny opinion that Romero is , indeed, 
intent on describing each level of re a lity  within the framework of his 
theory and shows l i t t l e  inclination to defend or ju s tify  his theory.
This is a general weakness in his w ritings. As to why in ten tion a lity  
develops into acts that are en tire ly  without subjective return, Romero 
merely says that once there is imperfect ob jec tifica tio n , i t  is in the 
nature of things that i t  be perfected. I t  appears to me that the 
insistence on a causal explanation of rudimentary in ten tion a lity  is 
much more to the point. However, even that lie s  outside the province 
of philosophy.
The charge has been made that Romero fa iled  to achieve a 
complete system in his philosophy and that this fa ilu re  is especially 
evident in his not developing "an explanatory principle to account for 
the a c tiv itie s  of transcendence or of regression into immanence.
To the general complaint that there is an incompleteness in his philos­
ophy Romero would doubtless plead g u ilty , fo r i t  is in the nature of 
his philosophical method that such should be the case. Although I 
contend that there is a growing synthesis in his owrk, I am aware that 
he never arrived at an architectonic completeness. However, the present 
critic ism  is chiefly concerned with the absence in Romero's philosophy 
of an all-embracing principle of explanation which would supply both a 
criterion  for predicting instances of transcendence as well as of 
immanence and a means of identifying them as they occur at various 
ontological levels. The problem thus stated is involved with sweeping 
metaphysical concerns. Since the issue has to do with a ll levels of 
re a lity  i t  is not suitable to attempt a response merely in terms of how 
a sp iritua l act may be recognized. The question, put simply, is "How
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does one decide the degree to which a 'th ing ' is transcendent or 
immanent?" Since the value of anything depends on its  degree of 
transcendence and, fu rther, since the recognition of value is by means 
of an "emotional act" or in tu itio n , i t  follows that transcendence and 
immanence are discerned in th is manner. There are no empirical sense 
data or chain of deductive analyses that w ill reveal the transcendence 
or immanence with which any particu lar thing is endowed. The problem 
posed here is not solved by Romero. He does in s is t , of course, that 
both transcendence and immanence are objective characteristics of con­
crete things, although he confesses that the cognition of those quali­
ties may be extremely d iffic u lt--p e rh ap s , on occasion, impossible.
In lig h t of Romero's position that a ll sp iritua l values are 
absolute or ultim ate, i t  has been pointed out by one w rite r that Romero 
has
the d iff ic u lty  of any se lf-re a liza tio n  eth ic . . . .
[He] does not take su ffic ien tly  into account the 
d iff ic u lty  that in acting on his proposed trans­
cendent level the attainment of some states of 
a ffa irs  might be more praiseworthy than o th e rs .''
This critic ism  is well founded in that Romero avoided taking the time or
space in Theory of Man to develop his moral philosophy. Surely, the
issue of the conflic t of values must be handled in any adequate ethics.
The d iff ic u lt ie s  of Romero's axiology on this issue is ,  I  believe, one
reason his Etica was never published.
In presenting Romero's theory of man as s p ir it  I have shown
his views on a number of issues central to that theory and, in order to
set them in focus, I wish now to summarize the major points. Among the
important matters are those dealing with what s p ir it  is . I have shown
that s p ir it  is not an en tity  and that i t  refers to intentional acts
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whose objectification is complete—those in which there is no subjec­
tive  return or regress. In lig h t of th is , I have contended that 
"spiritual in tentionality" is a preferable term to "s p ir it ."
In addition to c larify ing  what s p ir it  is ,  I have shown the 
place of sp iritua l in ten tion a lity  in the whole of re a lity  and its  
relation to natural man or mere in ten tio n a lity . The level of s p ir it  
is the last of the four ontological realms of re a lity  and thus exhibits  
the final structural order of the cosmos.
In c larify ing  what s p ir it  is ,  I have presented the seven 
tra its  of man as s p ir i t .  These are absolute ob jec tiv ity , un iversality , 
freedom, un ity , h is to ric ity , responsib ility , and absolute transcendence. 
I have shown that insofar as an act, a man, or a culture is s p ir itu a l, 
i t  expresses these tra its .
I have shown that Romero unites the doctrines of natural man 
and sp iritua l man in his philosophical anthropology and develops the 
theory that man is and must be a dualism of both mere in ten tionality  
and sp iritua l in ten tion a lity . Being fu lly  human requires the presence 
of both levels of the intentional consciousness as well as the necessary 
conflic t that is requisite to the tension between the two. This is a 
m ilitan t dualism in which the subjective-return tendency, on the one 
hand, and the impetus toward fu ll ob jectiv ity  and un iversality , on the 
other, are opposed. The entrenched egoism expressed in the subjective 
return appears the more forceful of the two, but Romero believes that 
the more transcendent sp iritua l tendency proves in time to have the 
advantage. The consequences of sim ilar conflicts between two adjacent 
ontological realms on less transcendent levels of re a lity  seem to bear 
out this projection.
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I have pursued some of the axiological implications of 
Romero's dualis tic  view of man so as to show that value coincides with 
the degree of transcendence and th a t, since transcendence is absolute 
in sp iritu a l in ten tio n a lity , ethical value at that level is also 
absolute.
The introduction of the sp iritua l dimension into culture I 
have shown results in the creation and maintenance of cultural objects 
in and for themselves. T h is ,I have indicated, has fundamental im­
plications for aesthetics. I have brought out, furthermore, th a t, 
although many objects o f culture can be produced and confirmed in th e ir  
own right without reference to a subject's own needs and uses, other 
objects, including such diverse u t il ita r ia n  creations as tools and in­
s titu tio n s , seem necessarily created out of immediate, subjective 
human needs. These are not so susceptible to sp iritua l influence.
Romero's theory of man has a great deal to do with the manner 
in which he compares cultures. The value of the human individual, the 
idea of self-transcendence, the importance of time in human development, 
and the nature o f re a lity  are a ll  employed in Romero's study of three 
great cultures. We turn our attention now to his application of some 
of these ideas to comparative culture and his analysis of the present 
cris is  of the West.
Notes
Chapter Three
^Solomon Lipp, "Francisco Romero," The Philosophical Forum, 
XXI (1963), 75. Lipp observed: "Romero seems to shy away from
attributing  a substantive quality to s p ir it .  I t  would appear that 
s p ir it  is something b u ilt into the structure of Romero's scaffolding.
I t  is program, plan and purpose. It^ is  'the role we p lay .'"  (p. 78)
See also Hugo Rodrfguez-Alcala, Hi si on y pens amiento, p. 77.
^Romero, Theory, p. 147. Valenzuela has avoided this error 
in his dissertation on Spanish American Philosophy (see bibliography), 
in which he treated Romero's work extensively. On the other hand. 
Cooper has fa llen  into what I believe is an undesirable extensive use 
of the defin ite  a rtic le  in both the 1967 paper cited above and in 
certain places in his translation of Theory of Han. A great deal of 
praise is due Cooper, however, for the genuine landmark he has created 
in introducing Francisco Romero to the English-speaking world. Through 
his efforts many have become acquainted with Romero's views.
3 lb id ., p. 142. 4 ib id ., p. 140.
Sfhere is some s im ila rity  between Romero's treatment of the 
subjective regress and the idea in Christian ehtics that sin is in 
some sense equivalent to self-centeredness. In his Papers for a 
Philosophy (papeles para una filo s o ffa ) ,  in 1945, Romero wrote: " . . .
also i t  is a primary and common in tu ition  in s tr ic t  ethics that there 
is no greater sin [ pecadol than egoism, that is ,  the centering of 
action on the subject as an individual s e lf and referring i t  only to
himself, acting in the sense of immanence." p. 41.
^Romero, Theory, p. 135. ^Ib id . , p. 136.
8 lb id ., p. 134. * Ib id . ,  p. 138.
T^These remarks are W. F. Cooper's and were included in a 
monograph mimeographed at Baylor University in Waco, Texas on September 
25, 1967. The paper was read by the author at the Southwestern Philo­
sophical Society meeting in New Mexico in the Fall of that year. The
t i t l e  of the paper was "The Concept of Man: Francisco Romero and José
Ortega y Gasset." The quotation used here comes from pp. 9-10 of that
paper. Harris in On Problems committed the same error on page 77 of
that volume.
Francisco Romero, Relaciones de la  filo so ffa  (Buenos Aires; 
Perrot, 1958), p. 13.
121
122
IZprancisco Romero, Filosoffa de la persona {3d éd .; Buenos 
Aires: Losada, 1961), pp. 50-51. Quoted in part by Valenzuela,
Emerging Concern, p. 403.
Raymond A. Valenzuela has certainly proposed a s im plis tic , 
uncritical alternative to what he regards as Romero's untenable position 
in refusing to hypothesize the existence of a transcendent w i l l .  " I f  
things happen as i f  a purpose existed, is i t  not more reasonable to 
accept the B iblical view and to say 'In  the beginning God. . . . *?
Reality is not self-explanatory, and i f  we reject the th e is tic  hypo­
thesis we only end by introducing another and in fe rio r concept--Romero's 
word is 'transcendence,'-- to account for what the B iblical cosmology 
attributes to the work of God." See Valenzuela, Emerging Concern, p. 403.
There are three points in Valenzuela's remarks which should
have individual attention: (1) Things happen [ f  there wera a tran­
scendent w ill at work. (2) Reality must be explained by some principle  
outside i t s e lf ,  and (3) Any explanation other than the B iblical view 
(" th e is tic  hypothesis") is an in fe rio r account.
In response: (1) The "as if"  postulate merely asserts that a
certain explanation, v iz. a transcendent w i l l ,  would be su ffic ien t to
account for the manner in which things happen. That does not mean that
such an account is necessary. Valenzuela quite obviously would be 
pleased were Romero to posit a transcendent w ill (which Valenzuela 
apparently regards as equivalent to Biblical theism) but Romero stated 
that an innate purpose within the order of re a lity  could account fo r  
things being as they are, also. Just as obviously, Valenzuela would 
not approve this hypothesis even i f  i t  is adequate. (2) I t  is not at 
a ll self-evident that the explanation of re a lity  requires resorting to 
the postulation of something outside i t  that pre-exists i t  and is 
essentially other than re a lity . (3) There is no such thing as Uiie 
Biblical view. I f  Valenzuela would be content to have the assertion 
made that the natural order is "the work of God," I dare say there are 
many philosophers and theologians who w ill and do readily assent to 
this but whose views, i f  and when they are adequately understood, are 
extremely unsatisfactory to Mr. Valenzuela.
Romero does contend fo r a monistic transcendence that is 
exhibited throughout the entire four-level ontological structure of 
re a lity , but he consistently resists the temptation to a ttribu te  a 
cosmic purpose or w ill to the nature of things. Transcendence is an 
innate cosmic principle but is  not to be construed as exhibiting an 
obscure purpose, "innate in the cosmos."
T^Although Romero maintained that his theory of man was not 
dependent on his metaphysics, he confessed that they occurred to him 
at the same time. See Romero, Theory, p. 175. For an outline of
Romero's metaphysics see his Papeles para una filo so ffa  (Buenos Aires:
Editorial Losada, 1945), pp. 9-45.
T^Valenzuela, Emerging Concern, pp. 383-384.
T^Romero, Theory, p. 176.
^^Francisco Romero, Teorfa del hombre (Buenos Aires: Editorial 
Losada, 1952), p. 144.
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T^Francisco Romero, "La f i lo s o f 'a , la cultura, y el hombre,"
La Nueva Democracia, XXIV (July, 1943), 7. Schelling subscribed to a 
sim ilar idea.
TGRomero, Theory, p. 152 and Teorfa, p. 144.
T^Romero, Theory, p. 139 and Teoria, p. 132.
ZORomero, Theory, p. 146 and Teoria, p. 139.
Z^Anfbal Sanchez Reulet, Contemporary Latin-American Philosophy, 
trans. by W illard R. Trask (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,
1954), p. 257, quoting Romero, Papeles, p. 14.
Z^Ib id . , p. 258, quoting Romero, Papeles, p. 14.
ZZjb id . , p. 260, quoting Romero, Papeles, pp. 16-17.
Z^ Ib id . , p. 260, quoting Romero, Papeles, p. 17.
Z^i remind the reader that "s p irit"  in Romero's philosophy is 
the human s p ir it  much more restric ted ly  construed than by some others, 
such as Max Scheler. Prim arily, i t  is to be understood as a new 
dimension in the intentional consciousness. I t  has important ethical 
implications which I shall mention farther on in this chapter. The 
characteristics which are discussed here w ill bring to lig h t what 
Romero regards as a ‘‘sp iritua l cognition" or "sp iritual act."
Z^Romero, Theory, p. 163.
Z 7 ib id ., p. 164. ZB ib id ., p. 165.
Z9ib id. SOibid.. p. 166.
31 Ib id .
3ZRomero, Teorfa, pp. 156-157. I am offering here an 
alternative translation to Cooper's. The original reads: "En Platon.
. . .  las almas son identicas en cuanto igualmente aptas para re c ib ir  
ese mundo ideal . . . "  W. F. Cooper translates this sentence: "In
Plato . . .  the souls are identical in that they are equally capable of 
perceiving this ideal world . . . "  My reading of ". . . equally suited 
to perceiving . . ." is a s light change but I think i t  avoids the 
suggestion that Plato held that a ll souls are possessed of an identical 
capacity in th e ir  earthly existence for fu lly  grasping the ideas. For 
Plato there are pre-existent factors th a t, in part, make capacities 
for knowing id ea lities  d iffe r  from one soul to another.
S^Romero, Theory, p. 166. ^^Ib id .
3 5 ib id ., p. 165. SGlbid., p. 166.
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S^lb id . . p. 167. For a discussion on Romero's theory of 
individuals, see supra, pp. 58-60.
3 8 ib id .. p. 169. 39lb id.
40Romero, Theory, p. 170. ^^Ib id .
^^ib id . , p. 182; supra, p. 92
43 lb id ., supra; p. 95.
4 * Ib id . , p. 180. 4 5 ;b id ., p. 173.
46 lb id ., p. 174 4 7 ib id ,, p. 173.
48Romero, Theory, pp. 173-174. See^Norberto Rodriguez 
Bustamante, "Persona y libertad en la  filo s o fia  de Francisco Romero," 
Ciudad, Nos. 4-5 (1956), 36-42. I confess to some dissatisfaction  
concerning the "reason" Romero gives in this statement for not affirming 
absolute freedom. I think his refusal to do so is wise but the "reason" 
is surely inadequate.
4^Romero uses the term intencionalidad espiritual in Papeles,
p. 17.
SOpomero, Theory, p. 207.
Slprancisco Romero, "Reflexiones sobre el hombre," La Nueva 
Democracia, XXXIV (July, 1954), 19. For additional treatment of Romero's 
concept of the duality of man, see J. Kogan A lbert, "La dualidad del 
hombre en Francisco Romero," in Ciudad, Nos. 4-5 (1956), pp. 30-35.
33Romero , Theory, p. 155. 3 3 ib id ., p. 182.
54%bid. 55Ib id . , p. 183.
36 Ib id . S^Ib id ., p. 198.
5 8 lb id ., p. 200. 3 ^ Ib id ., p. 189.
GOlbid., p. 201. G ^Ib id ., p. 202.
G^Ibid. G^Ibid., p. 198.
G 4ibid., p. 199. GSlbid., p. 200.
GGlb id . , p. 203. See W. F. Cooper, Francisco Romero's Theory 
of Value, Ph.D. dissertation (Indiana University Press, 1967), pp. 84- 
115 for a more extensive treatment of "Value in the Context of 
Transcendence." Ethical value is discussed on pages 105 through 115.
G^Romero, Theory, p. 32, supra, p. 58.
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69lb id . , pp. 136-137. For further discussion of thi^s subject 
see Solomon Lipp, "Francisco Romero," pp. 78-79 and Hugo Rodrfguez- 
Alcala, Mi si on y pensamiento, pp. 75 ff.
70Romero, Persona, p. 25. Perhaps this is an apt moment to 
acknowledge a change in Romero's terminology from the work here cited  
and Teorfa del hombre. As the passage here reveals, Romero distinguished 
between "person" and "individual." The former term was used by him 
prior to 1952 to identify  the man in whom s p ir it  is actualized, whereas 
the individual is the nonspiritual subject or s e lf. However, in Teorfa 
del hombre there is almost a to ta l lack of such a distinction and of 
such employment of these terms. I t  is because of this that I believe 
Marjorie Harris is ill-adv ised  in her work on Romero, written in 1960, 
to make such extensive use of th is d istinction . See Harris, On Problems, 
pp. 63-66.
fT lbid. 72 lb id ., p. 11.
73pomero, "El hombre, el esp fritu , y la  cultura," Sur,
Nos. 192-194 (O ct.-D ec., 1950), 67.
^^Lipp, "Francisco Romero," p. 79. Solomon Lipp expresses 
these questions in a more extensive formulation without attempting to 
formulate any possible reply to them. He concludes that the mere posing 
of the questions "would seem to be a vulnerable spot in the impressive 
ed ifice erected by Romero in his attempt to combat the deterministic 
thesis which denies freedom to man."
75%bid.
^^William J. Kilgore, "An Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Francisco Romero," in Romero, Theory, p. xxvi. This is one of several 
points of critic ism  raised by Kilgore. The critic ism  is well taken 
but I am at a loss to understand Kilgore's suggestion that "impetus" 
might possibly be considered as the principle to explain transcendence.
I surely agree with him that i t  does not do so, but fa il  to see how i t  
could possibly be conceived of as offering such an explanation. Tran­
scendence might explain the impetus, but surely the converse is not 
comprehensible.
^^Kilgore, in Romero, Theory, p. x x v iii.
CHAPTER IV
THE THEORY OF MAN AND THE CRISIS 
OF WESTERN CULTURE
The relationship between Romero's theory of man and his view 
of the current cris is  in Western culture w ill become clear i f  we f i r s t  
investigate his accomplishments in comparative culture. We shall need 
to see what are the great cultures of the world in Romero's judgment 
and the reason he gives for th e ir extraordinary survival. Among those 
enduring cultures there are philosophical differences that set one of 
them above the others and i t  w ill be necessary that I show the basis of 
this divergence as well as the reason why, according to Romero, i t  
results in a superiority for one of the cultures over the others. Only 
then w ill i t  be possible to undertake an analysis of the twentieth- 
century cris is  o f the West as well as Romero's proposed solution and, 
f in a lly , his idea of the future of man.
According to Romero there are three great cultures that have 
outlasted a ll others: The cultures of India, China, and the West.
Their perdurance is attributab le  to th e ir  philosophical principles.
Each of them provides for individual human identity  and personal meaning 
through self-transcendence. In each there is an absolute value toward 
which the individual is directed. But each culture's provision for 
these is d ifferen t from the others and i t  is in these differences that 
Romero discovers a basis for regarding Western culture as higher than 
those of India and China.
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According to Romero, from the moment the individual emerges 
as an objectifying being in any culture he is reaching beyond his own 
s e lf-id e n tity  to the knowledge of others, attempting to understand his 
relationship to those about him, and ultim ately, desiring to expand his 
consciousness to grasp the whole of objective re a lity . There is a 
thrust in man toward ob jec tiv ity , universality; a reaching toward 
to ta lity . He regards this tendency in man as evidence that "he needs 
the goal and lodestar of a supreme and absolute object to set his mind 
at rest."^ Romero holds that sp iritual in ten tionality  reaches toward 
that end. When man transcends himself by becoming a sp iritua l being he 
is reaching toward the absolute—toward total knowledge and the abso­
lute good. Such a man endeavors to comprehend ob jectiv ities  in th e ir  
own righ t. He desires to achieve an understanding of a ll that is . As 
s p ir i t ,  man finds liberation from individual particularism and seeks 
unity with a ll others, and ultim ately, with to ta lity .
I have said that Romero was persuaded that a ll three cultures 
mentioned o ffer some absolute for which individual man may aspire and 
that each provides a means for fu l f i l l in g  that aspiration. However, 
the differences of those means convinced Romero that Western culture 
is preferable to those of Asia. The divergence of East and West is 
revealed, according to Romero, in th e ir respective treatments of two 
very important subjects. These are: (1) the survival of the subject
in the self-transcending moment, and (2) the necessity of time for human 
self-transcendence. I shall treat these two matters separately.
In the case of Indian culture, with rare exceptions, the 
individual finds re a lity  by resigning himself to an undifferentiated  
whole--"the cosmic in f in ity  into which the individual yearns to dissolve
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divesting his separate personal existence of a ll v a l u e . T h e  s e lf is 
abandoned in deference to a selfless to ta lity  in which there are no 
individuals or particulars. "In the classic culture of India one aspires 
to the dissolution of human ind ividuality  in the cosmic to ta lity .
What is undesirable in this is that i t  requires a self-nega­
tion based on value being posited in the "metaphysical or cosmic 
to ta lity "  rather than in the human subject. Confronted by such an over­
whelming re a lity  "the individual, with its  particularism and transitory  
state , judges i ts e lf  devalued and almost nonexistent . . . i t  is a 
sheer appearance.
In the culture of the Chinese one discovers th a t, with the 
exception of the Taoist hermit and the Buddhist monk, the transcendence 
of the individual is accomplished through identifica tion  with the 
family and particu larly  the ancestors. The individual finds himself 
only through "that vast community in which the ancestors liv e  together 
with th e ir  descendants and rule over them, an immense fam ily , held in 
religious reverence, of which the State is only a p o litic a l continua­
t io n ."5
But in th is , as in the Indian tra d itio n , the resu lt is a 
negation, a denial, of the individual subject. "Just as in India the 
individual feels himself devalued before the cosmic and metaphysical 
re a lity , and seeks to return to i t ,  so in trad itional China the 
individual above a ll lives the experience of the to tal community,"® 
and thus the price o f transcendence in terms of meaning and value is 
the loss of the individual's sense of personal worth. In both the 
Indian and Chinese traditions the individual must give way to a value 
that is greater than himself at the cost of s e lf- id e n tity .
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Although neither of these Is desirable from Romero's per­
spective, each has, nevertheless, provided a way fo r man's personal 
transcendence and this accounts for th e ir endurance. In a unique 
fashion, each of the two Eastern cultures has provided a^ answer "to 
the most profound and permanent questions and needs of man."^
The clue of Indian culture is the whole, the cosmic 
in f in ity  into which the individual yearns to dissolve, 
divesting his separate personal existence of a ll 
value. In trad itional Chinese culture, the clue is  
the social r e a li ty , that vast community in which the 
ancestors liv e  together with th e ir  descendants and 
rule over them, an immense fam ily, held in religious 
reverence, of which the State is only a p o litic a l 
continuation, and which in terlaces, through the ties  
of magic, with the supernatural powers.®
The point here is that in both the above cultures there is a 
"premature resignation" of ind iv id ua lity . As a result of this aban­
donment of the individual, "these cultures ignore or deny ideally  the 
fundamental condition of man as being a subject. They try  to d ilu te  
the individual in complexes which they consider superior to him in 
value and dignity.
Romero believed, on the other hand, that the Western tra ­
dition has made provision for man as an objectifying subject who finds 
his id e n tity , his value, and his dignity in transcending himself 
without losing himself as subject. In the West, man as personal subject 
is affirmed, not devalued;
the "I" as person or absolute subject, . . .  as 
sp iritua l "I"--requires constant progress in s e lf­
ob jectification  and persistence in that objectifying  
exertion which, as we have seen, constitutes man as 
such . . . .  I t  becomes clear that the success of 
Occidental man [results from] the fact that the course 
of his culture coincides su ffic ien tly  well . . . with 
the general trend assigned to man by his inmost essence
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. . . .  For the person taken in his plenitude is a 
complex of disinterested and reverent intentions toward 
a ll that exists. Recognition of the equality of 
persons is by no means alien to him. Such a cosmic and
social union, however, Occidental man w ill try  to
accomplish not through annihilation and surrender of 
his own "I" but, on the contrary, through an ascent 
from his intentional individual "I" [ i . e . , t h e  "I" of 
mere in ten tio n a lity ] to the sp iritua l
The difference among the three cultures regarding personal
f in ite  existence and its  meaning has been expressed cryp tica lly  by one
w riter: "India says, 'A H ';  China says, 'We'; the West says, '1 '."^^
In both Oriental cases the s e lf  is lo s t, given up. Only in the West is
i t  affirmed.
Romero placed a special emphasis on the difference between the 
Oriental and Occidental man's confrontation with re a lity . Whereas in
both Asiatic approaches to the cosmos, there is an e ffo rt to eradicate
the distinction of the subject and object, there is in the West an 
e ffo rt to understand i t  by means of reason. He writes concerning the 
Western man:
He trusts his capacity to know, to penetrate a re a lity
from which he remains rad ically  separated: he is a
cognitive subject facing a cognizable cosmos. In short, 
he is a microcosm scrutinizing a macrocosm. Instead of 
this Western separation [d is tinction ] of subject and 
object, the Oriental wants union, fusion, integration.
I t  is ,  of course, with th is e ffo rt to know via "union, fusion, integra­
tion" that Oriental mysticism has become identified .
In addition to the differences between East and West on the 
survival of the subject in self-transcendence, the concept of time is  
s ign ifican t. "The classic Indian culture is nontemporalist. I t  
despises the p articu lar, change, h istory, time. The Chinese equivalent 
is 'e te rn a lis t, ' i t  fixes time, immobilizes i t  by putting a l l  present
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13under the rule of the past.' In each case--in one a denial, in the 
other a paralyzing—time is not affirmed.
On the other hand, in the West temporality is affirmed. 
According to Romero only Western culture has history in the true sense. 
Romero sees the West's affirmation of temporality as closely related to 
the importance i t  provides for personal id en tity , inasmuch as the fu l­
fillm ent of the la t te r  requires time and history. This he called the 
West's "conjugating ind ividuality  with te m p o ra lity .W h e re a s  the 
Asiatic cultures' doctrines of the individual's abandoning himself to 
either a cosmic or social whole results in a denial of time, the 
affirmation of the "I" in the West requires the affirmation of time.
The empirical " I" --th e  imperfect subject, chained to 
nature in many ways—is aware, and conceives, of the 
person as an object to be realized, a duty or task . . . .
All this signifies nothing i f  not the gradual triumph of 
the personal or sp iritua l principle over concrete 
individual man who lives immersed in his particu lar aims 
and interests. Occidental man believes in time, in 
history, in progress because his being is given to him 
as something latent and potential. He endeavors to 
realize i t  in time and in history, va lian tly  taking upon 
himself the long task of giving existence to what ought 
to be, of implanting the ideal in the real.15
In summing up his assessment of Western culture, Romero
touches on what he was convinced was the heartbeat of the Western World:
I believe that, despite its  mistakes, faults and even 
crimes, our culture is the only one that remains 
fa ith fu l to the profound and essential nature of man.
The only in which destiny is to be an ecumenic culture.
I f ,  in fa c t, i t  is becoming a world culture, i t  is not 
by chance, technical superiority or material force; i t  
is because the citizens of other cultures discover in 
i t  a higher princip le , a capacity to sa tis fy , more 
widely and deeply than th e ir own, the great human ends.
This does not mean that we have nothing to learn from 
the other cultures. Probably the Indian has much to 
teach us in cosmic feeling , so scarce in ours, and the 
Chinese in social or communal feeling. But these would
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be moments of integration and would not modify 
substantially the basis of the W e s t . 16
Romero highly regarded the three great cultures but found Western cul­
ture more desirable on the two counts stated above--the importance of 
the individual and the significance of time or temporality.
In interpreting the West's theory of man in terms of his own 
philosophic framework, Romero found that only the West adequately 
provides fo r man as an objectifying subject that develops in time 
toward the absolute transcendence or s p ir itu a lity  without the loss of 
the subject's identity in the process. "For the culture of the West, 
the supreme re a lity  is the marching s p ir i t ,  in its  personal form, 
which colonizes nature and develops in a manner ever more inclusive and 
perfect.
However, despite its  commendable q u a lities , a ll is not well 
with the culture of the Western world and Romero undertook to diagnose 
its  i l ls - - t o  take un inventario de la c r is is . The West faces, i t  
seemed to him, an imminent c ris is . His analysis of the problem re­
vealed that the crisis has three fronts.
The fundamental characteristics of the West, which show 
an evident unity of origin and meaning are three: in ­
te llec tua l ism, activism, individualism. I f  the present 
cris is  is completely studied, i t  is easily seen as a 
cris is  of these three principles: a crisis of in te lle c ­
tual ism (bankruptcy of the rational conception of 
mechanism, ir ra tio n a lis t attacks, necessity of accepting 
the irra tio n a lit ie s  of a superior type such as the values, 
e tc .) ;  the cris is  of activism (submission of man to pro­
duction, the revolt o f technique, economic disorder, 
weakness of the inner l i f e ,  e tc .) and the cris is  of 
individualism (conflicts of the individual with the State, 
of the individual with society, general conflic t of 
ind iv iduality  with a ll the attempts at socialization
and planning).18
Thus the formidable cris is  is not economic or technological. I t  is a 
cris is  of the human s p ir i t .  A better understanding of Romero's
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diagnosis of the problem is possible by taking each of the three 
phases of the cris is  separately.
In reference to the cris is  of in tellectualism , Romero held 
that the rationalism of Descartes and his successors contributed to 
what he called "immanentization," resulting in the mechanistic concept 
of the universe. In this context "immanentization" refers to a concept 
of re a lity  that posits immutable substances, each of which is separate 
from the others, identical with i t s e l f ,  and incapable of developing 
beyond i ts e lf .  I t  regards a ll transcendence as illu sory . Rationalism, 
with its  mechanistic view of the cosmos, was man's grandest e ffo rt to 
comprehend re a lity  by reason alone. I t  assumed that the categories of 
human reason and those of re a lity  coincide and that the mind is capable 
of understanding with mathematical accuracy the nature of the universe. 
As one w rite r expressed i t :  "From Galileo and Descartes to Spencer and
Darwin a colossal prowess of immanentization was put into effect with 
pride and enthusiasm."19
To Romero, the culmination of these trends was positivism. 
Under its  conmitments man became euphoric over the p e rfe c tib ility  of 
man—a perfection believed to be possible by means of the sociological 
implementation of the principles of positivism its e lf .  As Hugo 
Rodriguez-Alcala observed, " I f  positivism . . . rejected the trad itional 
eschatological fa ith , i t  was able to o ffe r man a fa ith  in man replacing 
the fa ith  in God."20
But in the twentieth century positivism yielded before non- 
rational attacks from various quarters. Romanticism, intuitionism , and 
existentialism  took th e ir  to ll  on the p o s itiv is tic  doctrines.
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The Western mind faced the undeniable evidence of the 
ir ra tio n a l. I t  was an appalling realization . The 
bankruptcy of science was announced, that is , the 
fa ilu re  of reason. Ir ra tio n a lis tic  philosophies came 
to the fore. The West grew b it te r  and despondent.2'
Although the collapse of positivism in the present century is
one major precipitating factor in the c ris is  o f Western cu lture, Romero
applauds the collapse since the p o s itiv is tic  voices were false prophets.
However, Western man has suffered a lamentable loss that was subsidiary
to the demise of positivism. Man has lost fa ith  in his own future.
Rodriguez-A lc a li describes i t  well as "the extinction of a fa ith --a
fa ith  in science, a fa ith  in progress, a fa ith  in the perfec tab ility
of man, in the ultimate triumph of intelligence over the forces of e v il ,
ignorance and superstition ."22
There are no regrets expressed by Romero over the discrediting
of positivism. Since he saw i t  as the outgrowth of rationalism and
mechanism, and since these represent what he called "immanentization,"
which is opposed to transcendence, i t  follows that he would necessarily
approve the collapse of positivism. Its  assumptions and doctrines
were unwarranted and fa lse.
I t  is ,  however, Romero's contention that there should not
have been a surrender of hope and fa ith  in man's future when positivism
was la id  aside. The fact is ,  he contends, the culture of the Western
hemisphere is capable of bringing about that unity of mankind that
continues to be the ambition of succeeding human generations. He is
not quite w illin g  to abandon hope in the p e rfe c tib ility  of the human
species. Positivism did not have the righ t answer, but i t  had the righ t
expectation in its  b e lie f that man can solve his deepest problems and
perfect his world.
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The fin a l question is whether our culture is capable 
of becoming a to tal or ecumenical culture. I believe 
that i t  is , because i t  is the culture that responds to 
the peculiar essence of man with the greatest accuracy.23
That is to say, i f  any present culture is to become the solution to the
present cris is  i t  must be that of the West i ts e lf .
The cris is  of activism in Western culture, according to Romero,
results in part from the fact that our planet now has been explored,
and quite generally populated. The consequence is that there is a deep
discontent in man as the species that has thrived on a continual
activism that accompanied the fascination of undiscovered continents
and seas.
There is also the industria lization  and automation of the 
means of production in the West that require men to become manipulators 
of machines. As a resu lt man finds himself diverted from more human and 
meaningful a c tiv ity . In this.devaluation, he suffers a loss of dignity  
which compounds the c ris is .
Romero sees th is subversion of human a c tiv ity  by technology 
as an obstacle that detains man from achieving "s p ir it  and universality  
by way of the personality ."24 The powers of Western economy and industry 
have turned aside from the high humanitarian purposes to which they 
should aspire until i t  seems "at times [Occidental man] thinks he was 
born to fabricate countless th ings."25
The cris is  of the West is manifest not only in in te llec tu a l ism 
and activism, but also in its  th ird  characteristic— individualism. This 
is evidenced by the conflicts between the individual and both the state  
and society. Society at various levels is engaged in socializing the 
individual man and the state has undertaken to plan the personal
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well-being of its  citizens and to provide for th e ir individual needs. 
Societal and governmental molding of the individual is practised in a ll  
sorts of institu tional forms and, regardless of the good intentions, 
i t  is a curtailing  of freedom in the l i f e  of the individual man.
Socialization of the human individual is necessary, however, 
and, according to Romero, not undesirable. But i t  carries with i t  
certain hazards. The chief danger is that i t  can work against the 
tendency of sp iritua l in ten tionality  to universalize every man. Social­
ization can contribute to developing sp iritua l men, but i t  can also 
hinder that process. Rodrfguez-Alcala has summarized Romero's position 
in this matter quite w ell. Since "individual lib e rty  and socialization  
are antagonistic, and since Romero considers socialization inevitable  
and necessary, the philosopher proposes a formula. Man is a duality of 
individual and person; socialize the individual; spare the p e r s o n ."26 
Socialization should have universal dimensions.
Romero diagnosed the cultural cris is  of the West as, at base, 
the result of the loss of a Weltanschauung without a subsequent re­
placement. Twentieth-century Western man finds himself cut o f f  from 
the old mechanistic view of himself, his world, and values and presently 
without an adequate substitute. Concerning the situation he wrote:
What about our own time? When values change, Ascarate 
y Rosell says, "there is a transformation or transmu­
tation of values, but at times the ancient forms are 
destroyed and new ones do not arise to replace them.
This is the tragedy of present humanity."<7
From Romero's perspective the cris is  expressed in terms of in te lle c t­
ual ism, activism, and individualism is , however, not merely an axiological 
cris is  but a to tal cris is  of the human experience expressed as the loss 
of one world-view without another to take its  place.
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But i t  is one thing to diagnose the problem and quite another 
to prescribe a remedy. Romero has done both. His analysis of the 
cris is  is a plausible one in that i t  avoids confusing the symptoms with 
the real source of the d iff ic u lty . In addition, he has offered some 
suggestions fo r improving the current situation. Those prescriptive 
offerings are in terms of his own philosophy of man.
What is the Romeroan prescription for the recovery of man-in- 
crisis? Certainly, to begin with, there must be an acknowledgment of 
the lim itations of reason in knowing re a lity . The old rationalism is 
discredited. Reason by i ts e lf  is incapable of providing man with a 
theory of re a lity  that adequately provides for meaning and value, and 
which combines with i t  purely rational principles fo r action. Romero 
insisted reason is incapable of presenting man with the world-view by 
which he is to liv e . A Weltanschauung is not a rational construct.
As Rodriguez-Alcala says, "reason must humble i t s e l f ,  give up its  ex­
cessive demands so that the irra tio n a l may be apprehended by means other 
than rational ana lys is ."28 Romero believed that philosophy to a great 
extent has already passed through the cris is  by virtue of the defeat of 
positivism and the rise of phenomenological theories of man and culture 
which, lik e  his own, view man as an objectifying en tity  capable of the 
sp iritua l dimension. There must be a growing rehumanization of society 
and, to put i t  into a sentence: Men must consciously engage in turning 
a ll individual and societal endeavor into incessant eagerness to sp ir­
itu a liz e  the world. This is the "pilgrimage of the individual in 
search of the person.
Reality cannot be comprehended by reason alone because 
re a lity  proceeds from one ontological structure to another and rational
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analysis is incapable of e ither discovering or proving the principles 
of structuralism. The idea that a whole is more than the sum of its  
parts is nonrational. The idea of a novelty in re a lity  resulting from 
a previously unrealized structure of re a lity  is also nonrational. 
Transcendence is another idea not within the grasp of reason. These 
considerations suggest the inadequacies of reason as the sole means of 
knowledge.
In lig h t of his expressions of hope in man's future and the 
sense of importance he attached to his own theory of man, i t  is obvious 
that Romero did not view the present cris is  as a demise of Western 
culture o r, for that matter, even as an evidence of its  weakness 
He wrote
In my opinion, the cris is  does not signify the end or 
even the decline of Western culture. I t  is a c ris is . . • 
of growth, of those three orinciples [in te llectualism , 
activism, individualism ].30
I believe that Romero saw his own theory of man as offering  
the most promising means o f "enlarging" the West's principles of 
in tellectualism , activism, and individualism. The tra its  of sp iritua l 
in ten tionality  commend to us sp iritua l man as the being who above a ll 
others is capable of giving an expanded meaning to the three principles 
that characterize Western culture. Man as s p ir it  in Romero's philosophy 
is a being who desires to know a l l .  The objects of in telligence and 
understanding are not a ll comprehended by reason. Some in te llectual 
curiosity is sa tis fied  by means o f an in tu itiv e  grasp of the structural 
nature of re a lity  and of metaphysical values. The activism of sp iritua l 
man takes on new dimensions beyond that of the natural man in that 
s p ir it  directs the ac tiv ities  of the human individual beyond a ll  
res tric tive  social and cultural boundaries to the universality of
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mankind as a whole. And, as I have already shown, Romero held that the 
individual who becomes sp iritua l expands his own existence so as to see 
himself as well as others with complete ob jectiv ity . The narrowness of 
subjectiv ity is transcended and the result is the expansion of individual 
existence toward to ta lity . A ll the tra its  of s p ir it  seem to contribute 
toward making the present cris is  one of growth.
I have shown in this chapter that Romero analyzed and com­
pared the three cultures of the present which he considered the most 
durable--the cultures of India, China, and the West, which includes 
Europe and the Americas. My review of his studies reveals that Romero 
fe l t  the reason for the endurance of those cultures is that they each 
provided a means of self-transcendence for the individual human being. 
However, of the three, only the West offers a theory of s e lf-tra n ­
scendence in which the individual is not devalued or negated.
Furthermore, only the West makes an adequate provision for time as the 
dimension within which a ll transcendence must occur. For these reasons 
Romero held that the culture of the West is more in accord with the true 
nature of man and re a lity  and is thus preferable to those of Asia.
In addition, I have shown th a t, according to Romero, the 
Western world is , and has been for generations, in a state of c r is is , 
which is expressed in each of the fundamental characteristics of 
Western culture; in tellectualism , activism, and individualism. The 
c r is is , however, is one of growth. Western man can assimilate into  
his philosophy some commendable tra its  of the Asian cultures and can 
become the instrument of advancement and progress in the world for the 
future.
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However im p lic it ly , Romero commends his theory of man to us 
as the answer to the present c ris is . Spiritual man is the answer to 
the present problem, the hope of the future. And, although Romero was 
careful not to evangelize in behalf of his theory of man or his own 
metaphysics, I believe his persuasion was that his own view of re a lity  
could f i l l  the void occasioned by the loss of a former world-view.
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION
There are three things to be done in the closing chapter of 
this study: (1) a summary of my study on Romero's philosophy of man as
presented in the preceding pages, (2) a statement of the place of Romero 
and of his theory of man in Latin American philosophy, and (3) a 
suggestion of the significance of my exposition of Romero's theory of 
man in lig h t of the present lite ra tu re  on his philosophy.
I have presented Francisco Romero's philosophy of man as a 
doctrine in the phenomenological trad itio n . He has described man as 
the being that becomes aware of isblable en tities  within a previously 
lived state of preconsciousness. Man is the only creature that has an 
existence that can be properly termed "consciousness." The condition 
of the preconscious animal mentality is a sensorial s ta te , whereas man 
has a perceptual awareness of objects.
Furthermore, man objectifies the relations he finds among 
the objects of consciousness, and with the aid of memory develops 
concepts which are in turn treated as another class of objects of 
consciousness.
There are s t i l l  other types of objects of consciousness such 
as numbers and other Ideal objects. Values are objects of the inten­
tional consciousness, are held to be actual characteristics of real
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objects, and are known by nonrational means. F ina lly , intentional 
consciousness reflects on its  own subjectiv ity and thus becomes its  
own object.
Man's a b ility  to permanently o b jec tify , however imperfectly, 
is what constitutes him human. He is the only creature that possesses 
a world. He alone has intelligence and achieves a language, which 
includes terms that refer to concepts and id e a lit ie s . I t  is not a 
"nature" as such, but a function, or a c tiv ity . As consciousness, man 
is the highest level of re a lity , incorporating a ll the lower levels , 
and, as such, he has inherited the earth.
Man is the sole creature to have developed--by means of the 
intentional community—a society in the proper sense. The intentional 
consciousness necessarily produces culture, but that culture forms man 
as w ell. The world into which every human comes and within which he 
matures is inevitably lined through and through with culture so that 
human existence is unavoidably a culturally-molded l i f e .
There not only is_ a reciprocity between man and the culture 
he produces, but, as Romero remarks, man is aware of that relationship. 
That awareness makes possible the philosophy of culture and also leads 
to extensive and deliberate human efforts to influence and redirect the 
future of humanity by altering the cultural m ilieu. The reciprocal 
influence between man and culture, thus, becomes increasingly complex.
As I have here shown, Romero held that in its  inception, 
and to some extent in its  continuation, human culture is the product 
of mere in ten tio n a lity—sometimes called psychic in ten tio n a lity . Given 
the objectifying capacity, man necessarily creates objective culture
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as a result of the affirming judgment of the intentional consciousness. 
An object of culture is the externalizing of an idea of some individual 
consciousness. In the act of creating, one is affirming that that 
which is being produced should exist in external re a lity . This suggests 
the two "worlds" within which men liv e --th a t which is and that which 
should be; and the la tte r  is expressed in the entirety  of cultural 
productions, including, of course, ethics. The a r t is t ,  the inventor, 
the founder of an in s titu tio n , the w riter of a law a ll affirm  in the 
very process of creating that the work of a rt should be seen, the tool 
used, the in s titu tio n  joined, the law obeyed.
Language, lik e  a ll other cultural products, is a result of 
the prolongation of the objectifying judgment of intentional conscious­
ness. That is to say, language is ,  f i r s t  of a l l ,  an affirming to 
oneself that a thing is an object of consciousness. Then language 
becomes communication of the content of a consciousness with others.
I t  is doubtless through language that the objects of in ten tion a lity  
are developed beyond single, isolated ob jectified  particulars in such 
manner that concepts are formed. Language enhances the intentional 
consciousness, enriching the capacity for more complex experiences and 
adding new dimensions to the content of consciousness.
We have seen, however, that the ob jectification  of natural 
man is imperfoct. The object is referred back to the intentional 
subject so that the id e n tity , meaning, and value of the object of con­
sciousness is ultim ately regarded by natural man in reference to the 
subject's own needs, in terests , and ambitions. This tendency of the 
incomplete intentional act is called the subjective return and, since
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i t  exhibits a fa ilu re  of fu ll o b jec tifica tio n , is an imperfection. The 
subjective return expresses an attitude of regression from absolute or 
entire ob jec tifica tio n . I t  constitutes a fa ilu re  of the intentional 
consciousness to complete its  ob jectification in the intentional act.
I t  is in the nature of things that the objectifying function, 
which begins imperfectly as mere in ten tionality  on the natural leve l, 
should be perfected. There is , then, a higher order of cognitive 
ac tiv ity  of which in ten tion a lity  is capable; v iz . ,  that sort of act 
in which there is complete ob jectification—in which the object of 
consciousness is affirmed in its  own right and evaluated without 
reference to the subject's needs or ambitions.
Man as s p ir it  confirms the object of consciousness purely in 
its  own right regardless of the ontological level to which the object 
belongs. In human relations the sp iritual attitude regards both "I" 
and "Thou" as "he." Thus in the sp iritua l dimension there is no 
interest in "my rights" or "your rights," but merely rights as such. 
This is the disinterested interest of ob jec tiv ity .
The act of fu ll and complete ob jectification is called a 
s p iritu a lly  intentional act, and every human being does, indeed, per­
form som  ̂such acts. These s p ir itu a lly  intentional acts exhibit 
re a lity 's  transcendence to a new ontological le v e l, the s p ir itu a lly  
in tentional, at which level of ob jectification  there is no subjective 
return.
Transcendence occurs, of course, on each of the levels of 
nature prior to the supranatural level of s p ir it,^  but, since more and 
more of re a lity  is surpassed, the degree of transcendence increases
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at each ontological level of re a lity  until sp iritua l in tentionality  
achieves the most extensive move away from individual particularism  
toward universality. The transcendence of in ten tion a lity  made s p ir itu a l,  
which performs acts of "absolute" or perfect o b jec tifica tio n , is a 
transcendence of a ll previous levels of ontology--the physical, the 
v ita l ,  and the merely psychical. The sp iritu a l level subordinates the 
preceding, less transcendent realms, "colonizing" them in behalf of 
unity, ob jec tiv ity , and universality , and the other tra its  of s p ir it .
The sp iritua l s e lf is the s e lf o f mere in ten tionality  with 
a new program or role to carry out. That role involves a radical 
expansion of the se lf's  interests so that i t  becomes the agent of 
universality and unity. The program for the sp iritua l s e lf breaks down 
particularism , party s p ir i t ,  d ivision, and prescribes the common good 
of a ll men as its  goal and thereby supplies an adequate ethical basis 
for human existence.
The sp iritua l individual, however, does not become wholly 
sp iritua l e ither in his intentional acts or in his ethical conduct.
Fully human consciousness is a duality. Mere in ten tionality  and 
sp iritua l in ten tionality  co-exist in each member of the human species.
In point of fa c t, there is neither a human being who is en tire ly  given 
to mere in ten tionality  nor one wholly committed to the s p ir itu a l. Both 
kinds of intentional acts, some with and some without subjective regress, 
are equally necessary to the human condition. Romero held that the 
fu lly  human condition requires a homeostasis between the two sorts of 
intentional acts, although there can be no doubt that the completed 
objectification  of the act of sp iritua l in ten tion a lity  carries ethical 
value.
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Such, then, is Romero's philosophical anthropology insofar 
as i t  is a theory of man in the more restricted sense. However, I 
have shown th a t, although Romero insisted that his concept of man and 
culture would stand without his metaphysics, he did develop a meta­
physics at the same time he devised his theory of man and that he gave 
attention to the place of man in re a lity . I have found i t  advisable to 
show the place of man in the cosmos in order to adequately trea t Romero's 
concept of man.
Romero’s metaphysics, like  Hartmann's, was a four-level 
ontology: the physical, the v ita l ,  the intentional psychic, and the
s p iritu a lly  intentional. At other places in this work I have lis ted  
this quadruple ontological scheme by using s lig h tly  d ifferen t id e n t if i­
cations for some of the four realms. The differences are merely 
apparent. Romero was not altogether consistent in the labels he gave 
them.
There is a cosmic impetus which Romero called "transcendence," 
and this principle in his metaphysics is the cohesive force of re a lity ,  
giving i t  order and direction. By means of the impetus re a lity  is a 
march toward the fu ll being of humanity. As each successive ontological 
level is transcended, re a lity  exhibits increasing freedom and decreasing 
mathematical determinism. The highest freedom is expressed in sp iritua l 
in ten tionality .
I am convinced, as I have indicated, that "sp irit"  and "tran­
scendence" have sometimes been misinterpreted by those who deal with 
Romero's philosophy and I have shown my reasons for this persuasion. 
"S p irit,"  insofar so feasib le, should not be referred to as "the s p ir it ,"  
but should be consistently equated with e ither intentional acts that
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have no^subjective return and, hence, are perfect ob jectifications , 
or with the individual in ten tion a lity  which performs such acts. In 
neither case is s p ir it  personified or given the status of en tity .
I have shown that in his treatment of transcendence Romero 
refused to posit a transcendental w ill or innate cosmic purpose.
Although he might have done so, I believe he had su ffic ien t reason for 
avoiding such postulates. His suggestion that once imperfect ob jecti­
fication  occurs in the temporal order, i t  is in the nature of things 
that i t  be perfected into "absolute ob jectification" is the nearest 
he comes to introducing the idea of a purposive element into his meta­
physics. Transcendence, however, is not to be treated as a cosmic 
purpose or te l os. Even in his remarks that time is a march toward 
humanity in the world's process he avoids the idea of purpose.
One of the most succinct summary statements Romero ever gave 
of his theory of re a lity  was written the year following the publication 
of Teorfa del honfere:
To me, the being of re a lity  or its  capital and 
positive element is transcendence (an expression not 
to be understood in a religious sense). Transcendence 
fosters the apparition in re a lity  of orders more and 
more complicated and of higher dignity. Thus l i f e  
with its  v ita l psychism rises above physical m aterial­
i ty .  Above l i f e ,  rises autonomous or intentional 
psych Urn defined by the object-subject structure.
Above this psychism, the s p ir i t .  Each order indicates 
an increase in transcendence up to s p ir it  where tran­
scendence is absolute or to ta l. S p ir it is therefore 
the apex of re a lity , since in i t ,  transcendence, the 
impulse that animates a ll re a lity  and moves i t  from 
its  lower steps, is fu l f i l le d  in its  complete, las t 
and supreme form. The capital feature of properly 
sp iritua l acts is the transcending d irection .2
The place of man in th is scheme is ,  of course, that of highest
dignity. He alone incorporates a ll levels: "Physical m ate ria lity ,"
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"v ita l psychism," "intentional psychism," and " s p ir it ."  Although 
other beings exist in the physical, v i ta l ,  and pre-intentional psy- 
chistic  realms, only man inhabits the realms of intentional psychism 
and s p ir it .  And as the sole inhabitant he is unique in both possessing 
the world as object and in creating the highest order of value.
In this work I have also shown that Romero studied various 
world cultures and that he compared other theories of man and philoso­
phies of culture with his own. His work in comparative cultures resulted 
in two main conclusions: (1) that of a ll the cultures in the world past
and present three stand out as great and enduring: those of India,
of China, and of the West, and (2) that Western culture, which includes 
principally Europe and the Americas, embraces a philosophy of man more 
coincident with the nature of re a lity  and is thus preferable to the 
other two.
I have presented Romero's ideas concerning why the cultures 
of India, China, and the West have endured. The lasting quality of a 
culture, he says, is in the provision i t  makes for individual s e lf-  
id en tity  and for individual self-transcendence. A ll three of these 
cultures have a viable provision for both these.
The theory of man and culture in the West, however, is 
preferable to those of Asia in that the prevailing Western philosophy 
provides for a self-transcendence that does not annul the meaning and 
value of the individual. Rather, i t  affirms the primacy of the ind i­
vidual. The two Oriental philosophies are faulted for th e ir  loss or 
devaluation of the individual in the process that provides fo r s e lf­
transcendence.
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When Romero writes of the importance of temporality in the 
West he apparently has in mind especially his own theory, which makes 
much of the significance of the temporal process of becoming. He sees 
the cultural philosophy of India as a denial of time, and that of China 
as an attempt to hold back the temporal flow. Only in the West, he 
maintains, is time affirmed, and that results from the necessity of 
time for individual self-transcendence. I t  is necessary to the 
sp iritu a liz in g  of men and cultures.
Nevertheless, the Occident is ,  Romero believed, in a state of 
c ris is --a  cris is  occasioned by the loss of a past world-view and the 
fa ilu re  to develop another. The lost Weltanschauung was a mechanistic 
one resulting from rationalism and, although i t  has suffered general 
discred it, no other has taken its  place.
The Occidental cris is  is one of growth, according to Romero, 
despite the fact that i t  involves the basic characteristics of Western 
culture—intellectualism , activism, and individualism. Western man can 
and should p ro fit from the collapse of such previous philosophies as 
rationalism and positivism. In order for there to be advancement from 
the present c r is is , man must regain his hope in the future.
The former b e lie f in the identity  of the categories of 
re a lity  with those of reason has been seriously damaged. So also the 
b e lie f in the p e rfe c tib ility  of man in accord with the p o s itiv is tic  
anthropology and sociology has been frustrated. These d is illu s io n - 
ments, Romero believed, are largely responsible for the twentieth- 
century cris is  of Western man. But he must see that the crucial 
situation in which he exists is the result o f a growing humanity. He 
must regain his hope in his own future and make i t  what i t  can be—the 
hope of the en tire  human world.
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Some of the critic ism  I have made of Romero's philosophy of 
man has been concerned with problems of terminology. On occasion I 
have suggested solutions to these d iff ic u ltie s  by offering alternative  
translations. The distinction between "absolute objectification" and 
"absolute objectivity" is a case in point. However, there remain two 
unresolved terminological problems. One of these is Romero's per­
sistent use of the terms "s p irit"  and "s p iritu a l."  I have stated that 
th e ir reference is en tire ly  to the human realm and that "spiritual 
in tentionality" simply identifies  an advanced level of self-transcendence. 
Just as I believe that "completed objectification" is a clearer term 
for Romero's meaning than "absolute o b jec tiv ity ,"  so also I  believe 
"spiritual in tentionality" is preferable to "the s p ir it ."  The terra 
"spiritual in tentionality" identifies  completed in ten tio n a lity .
The other unresolved problem in Romero's philosophical 
vocabulary is "absolute transcendence." The transcendent cognitive 
acts denoted by this term are those in which the subject affirms the 
object and evaluates i t  as i t  is in i ts e l f  and not as i t  is seen in 
relation to the subject's interests and goals. Why should this be 
called absolute transcendence? Such acts may very well be the apogee 
of self-transcendence in human in ten tio n a lity , but what necessity is 
there for regarding completed in ten tionality  as the fin a l developmental 
stage of reality? Our in a b ility  to imagine further transcendence in 
the cosmic process is not su ffic ien t reason to declare that the highest 
level of human development is the fin a l level of transcendence in 
re a lity .
In some ways Romero shows no great independence of thought.
His doctrine of man is within the framework of descriptive phenomenology
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and he is greatly indebted to German philosophy. The numerous points a t 
which he borrowed from Oil they, Scheler, Husserl, and Nicolai Hartmann 
have been noted in this study. Although Romero's philosophy differs from 
a ll his predecessors, his deep respect for the philosophers of the 
past and for the achievements of philosophy prior to his time mark him 
as a man who does not highly prize for himself a radical new beginning in 
philosophy.
But Romero was often called the dean of Argentine philosophers 
and must be counted as one of the most outstanding philosophic minds of 
South America. While he s t i l l  lived , one scholar offered the following 
appraisal of his work:
[Francisco Romero] is almost universally respected 
as the greatest liv ing  Latin-American philosopher. His 
Theory of Man could be interpreted as a Herculean e ffo rt  
to turn the tide of e x is te n tia lis t irrationalism .^
His philosophical leadership throughout Central and South America is
v irtu a lly  without dispute.
Following Romero's death on October 7, 1962, Solomon Lipp
published an evaluation of Romero's contribution to the philosophy of
the Spanish speaking world.
Of Romero i t  has been said that he created a philoso­
phical climate in Hispanic A m e r i c a . 4 There is no doubt 
but that he injected new energy into the bloodstream of 
Argentina's philosophical organism, an organism which had 
emerged with fa ltering  steps from an era of overwhelming 
po s itiv is tic  influence, and was struggling to achieve a 
greater degree of maturity.5
Romero has le f t  behind him a few men who attest to his con­
tinuing influence. Romero's "eminent disciples," as Izquierdo Ortega 
refers to them—Risieri Frondizi, Torch fa Estrada, and Francisco Aguilar— 
have been prestigious writers fo r some time in the f ie ld  of philosophy.
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They have done much to extend Romero's influence and reputation to a 
new generation.
The philosophy o f man developed by Remero should find a place 
in the p o litic a l l i f e  of his people. The stress he la id  on human free­
dom and the in trin s ic  worth o f every human being requires the rejection  
of p o litic a l oppression and the domination of some men over others. I t  
is an im p lic it rejection o f to ta lita r ia n  rule.
Romero and his philosophy of man have a permanent place in 
Latin America. An enthusiastic, hopeful, radiant humanist he was: One 
of the many fine eulogies that have echoed from three continents 
following the death of th is great Argentine is from Solomon Lipp, 
formerly of Boston University.
The philosophy of Romero can perhaps be said to be 
a refreshing contrast to the a ll-p reva ilin g  anguish, 
melancholy and overpowering sense of absurdity and 
desolation, so characteristic of contemporary existen­
t ia l is t  metaphysics. Romero's l i f e  and works are 
characterized by a dynamic sense of human vigor and
c re a tiv ity , by a giving of oneself to an attempt to
sp ill over beyond the confines of the narrowly individual 
and egocentric.
A few months before his death, he wrote that i t  
was necessary to conquer the "absurd pessimism" o f the . 
moment, and "to strengthen the creative energies." And
further: "I have in f in ite  fa ith  in man . . .  ; a ll
l i f e ,  especially the sp iritua l aspect, is overflowing, 
generous, creative and se lf-g iv in g ."
These las t words may well serve as a s e lf-p o rtra it  
of Francisco Romero.6
In order to identify  the significance of my own work I must 
recall my original in tent. I stated at the beginning that my inten­
tion was chiefly expository. In the twenty years since Teorfa del .
hombre f i r s t  appeared, there has been no dissertation w ritten in 
United States universities on Romero's philosophical anthropology and.
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i t  seemed to me, some such work was long overdue. This e ffo rt is a 
beginning toward f i l l in g  that void. Perhaps now other more c r it ic a l  
works w ill be forthcoming.
As I read Romero I became convinced that others who had 
completed works on Romero were not su ffic ien tly  careful on such matters 
as Romero's philosophical method, his doctrine o f the s e lf ,  and the 
meaning of s p ir it  and I have made some contributions in those areas.
I have attempted to d iffe ren tia te  between his "problems approach" and 
the system-building approach to philosophy. I have shown that he 
subscribed to the idea of s e lf as agent and identified  this view with
a late  concept in Husserl. Furthermore, I have brought out that s p ir i t
in Romero's philosophy is often misunderstood in that some have regarded 
"the s p ir it"  to be something other than fu ll in ten tio n a lity . I  have 
shown that i t  is identical with intentional acts and intentional 
consciousness in which ob jectification  is complete. I have documented 
with care the tra its  o f s p ir it  in Romero's philosophy.
There are several areas of my work on Romero that I believe
o ffe r genuine opportunities for future development by others. P oss ib ili­
ties for greater depth of treatment include: (1) The German influences,
(2) Romero's metaphysics, (3) his ethics, and (4) his aesthetics.
The b r ie f material I have included on the f i r s t  of these is 
su ffic ien t as a guide to further study on the topic. Most writers  
merely re fe r to the German influences on Romero. I have e x p lic itly  
stated the points at which these influences are manifest. There is a 
great deal o f work to be done in the broader area of German philosophical 
influence in Latin America as well as additional development of those 
influences on Romero himself.
156
In reference to the metaphysics o f Romero, the present work 
has offered the general outline and the fundamental ideas that comprise 
his theory of re a lity . The place of man in the cosmic order has been 
presented as a part of my work. There is s t i l l  the need of an extensive 
study of Romero’s metaphysical scheme as a whole.
Romero's value theory has been presented by William F. Cooper
but separate studies are now warranted on his ethics and aesthetics.
Some of my work touched on those areas. Explication of the f i r s t  of
these would require perusal of the unfinished and unpublished manuscript
«
of Romero's E tica. An exposition of his aesthetics would require the 
pursuit of inferences drawn from various statements in Theory of Man 
and other writings.
The foregoing are, in a way, accomplishments of th is present 
work. By introducing b r ie fly  some of the areas of Romero's work without 
treating them in f u l l ,  I in v ite  others to jo in  in the work of Latin 
American philosophic studies. Admittedly, there are areas in this work 
that could be expanded and additional criticisms that could be offered 
of some of Romero's philosophy. In spite of the weaknesses, however, I 
am convinced that the time and e ffo rt of this work are ju s tif ie d . I t  
has been an enjoyable and personally profitable enterprise. I have long 
f e l t  that the philosophers of the Americas can p ro fit from each other 
and i t  is my hope that future generations of philosophers in North 
America w ill become increasingly open to the work o f philosophers in 
Central and South America. I find i t  lamentable that both English- 
speaking and Spanish-speaking America are more open to the philosophical 
winds of Europe than they are to each other.
Notes
Chapter Five
^The transcendence of which purely physical individuals are 
capable and which is manifest by them is expressed by means of merely 
the tendency of atoms to cohere and o f masses to mutually a ttra c t each 
other. Such characteristics of matter are regarded by Romero as 
evidences that physical "individuals" can and do transcend the immanence 
of a wholly individual particularism.
Zib id . , pp. 3-4.
3john Lawrence Groves, The Influence of Heidegger in Latin^ 
American Philosophy, (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston Univer-~
s ityT  1950)', pTlGT.
4lipp is referring here to a tribu te  to Romero in Julian 
Izquierdo Ortega's a r t ic le , "La obra de Francisco Romero," Cuadernos 
(P aris ), No. 69 (February, 1963), pp. 33-37.
^Lipp, "Francisco Romero," p. 69.
^ Ib id ., pp. 84-85.
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